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This dissertation introduces a novel augmentation to systems engineering 
methodology based on the integration of adaptive capacity, which produces enhanced 
resilience in technological systems that operate in complex operating environments. The 
implementation of this methodology enhances system resistance to top-level function failure 
or accelerates the system’s functional recovery in the event of a top-level function failure due 
to functional requirement shift, evolutions, or perturbations. Specifically, the dissertation 
defines and proposes a methodology to integrate adaptive resilience and demonstrates its 
implementation in a relevant armor system case study. The conceptual validity of the 
methodology is proven through a physical comparative test and evaluation of the system 
described in the case study. The research and resulting methodology supplements and 
enhances traditional systems engineering processes by offering systems designers the 
opportunity to integrate adaptive capacity into systems, enhancing their resilient resistance, or 
recovery to top-level function failure in complex operating environments. 
The research expands traditional and contemporary systems engineering, design, and 
integration methodologies, which currently do not explicitly address system adaptation and 
resilience. The methodology accomplishes this objective by defining adaptive design 
considerations, identifying controllable adaptive performance factors, characterizing adaptive 
performance factors and configurations, mapping and integrating adaptive components, and 
verifying and validating the adaptive components and configurations that achieve system 
requirements and adaptive design considerations. The utility of this research and 
methodology is demonstrated through development of an adaptive resilient armor system 
called the mechanically adaptive armor linkage (MAAL), which was designed, developed, 
and validated using the methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience 
(MSIAR). 
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Systems engineers design, develop, and field traditional systems to address a set 
problem or fixed set of requirements that the system’s functionality solves or fulfills. These 
traditional systems tend to operate at one optimized design point for a given set of external 
operational conditions to achieve a given top-level function or task. This approach, while 
acceptable for most systems, presents a significant functional limitation for systems that must 
operate or function in complex environments. Complex environments can be defined as 
environments in which operational conditions are unpredictable, experience disruptive 
perturbation, and rapidly shift.  
This dissertation proposes a new system attribute called adaptive resilience, which 
enables a system to adapt its functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity in order to 
maintain or regain functional effectiveness in satisfying its top-level functional requirements. 
This attribute is particularly beneficial in complex operating environments. In order to 
achieve an adaptive resilient system, system designers and engineers must identify, account 
for, and incorporate the necessary range or capacity for adaptation early in the design and 
development process. This dissertation demonstrates such an integration methodology, which 
achieves the desired attribute of adaptive resilience.  
All technological systems operating in complex environments are disadvantaged 
when they encounter operational circumstances that may cause them to fail to achieve and 
maintain their top-level function. Traditional static system designs often fail in complex 
operating environments due to their inability to readily adapt to changing functional 
requirements. Contemporary fixed system designs (design for robustness) are better suited for 
operation in uncertain environments. However, they likely possess parasitic capacity created 
by their robust nature and are ultimately susceptible to failure complex environments because 
they also employ fixed functional states. Parasitic capacity is underutilized functional 
capability that detracts from adjacent functional capabilities within a system. Adaptive 
resilient system designs possess adaptive physical components that enable the system to resist 
or recover from functional failure in complex operating environments in an agile fashion, 
while simultaneously mitigating the effects of parasitic capacity.  
 xx 
Within a system, adaptability is the key element that produces resilience. A system 
can only adapt to a purpose or a situation if it has the capacity to adapt or if some means of 
intelligence externally influences the system to adapt its use to new ends. Adaptive capacity 
is the critical system attribute that produces system resilience (Jackson 2009). Adaptive 
capacity can be defined as the extent to which a system can adapt or absorb a functional 
disturbance without completely losing operational performance of a top-level function 
(Jackson, 2009). Adaptive capacity can be further decomposed into modes of adaptability. 
Modes of adaptability are the ways and means to restructure or reconfigure a system’s 
functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity. Two modes of adaptability—internal 
reconfiguration and external reconfiguration—serve to achieve the desired adaptation. 
Adaptations that occur through internal reconfiguration use means such as processes, 
mechanisms, and artifacts within the system to achieve desired functionality. Internal 
reconfiguration can occur through four means: operational variation, reallocation, 
degeneracy, and exaptation. External reconfiguration involves external means to achieve 
desired system functionality. Adaptive Mode 1 includes adaptive means present within the 
system at the time of the functional disturbance or incident. Adaptive Mode 2 involves 
external means (e.g., mechanisms, processes, and artifacts) not present in the system when its 
functionality was lost, but when applied after the fact, allows the system to regain its 
functionality. External reconfiguration occurs through three means: progressive scaling; 
redundant scaling; and replacement, repair, or healing.  
In a systems engineering context, resilience is a system attribute that describes the 
system’s ability to withstand or recover from perturbations and disruptions that exceed its 
functional tolerance. Resilience is a system state of being, without which a system would fail 
with the slightest external influence. Resilient ends are brought about by adaptive ways and 
means that exist in a system. 
Adaptive resilience is a system attribute that enables a system to adapt its functional 
traits, structure, process, and/or identity in order to maintain or regain functional effectiveness 
in satisfying its top-level functional requirements. The conceptual need for adaptive resilience 
stems from the growing complexity present in modern system operating environments. As 
previously discussed, traditional technological systems are generally developed and fielded 
 xxi 
with a set problem or static set of requirements that the system’s functionality solves or 
fulfills. These systems generally operate at one optimized design point for a given set of 
external operational conditions to achieve a given set of principal/parent system tasks (Braha, 
Minai, and Bar-Yam 2006). This approach, although acceptable for most systems, presents 
significant functional limitations for systems required to operate or function in complex 
environments where those external operational conditions are unpredictable, experience 
perturbation, or rapidly shift. The purpose of adaptive resilience is to enable a system to adapt 
its functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity in operationally relevant timescales in 
order to maintain or remain functionally effective in satisfying its principle/top-level 
functional requirement in an unknowable and rapidly shifting environment. In order to 
achieve an adaptive resilient system, system designers and engineers must identify, account 
for, and incorporate the necessary range of performance–trait adaptability or adaptive 
capacity early in the design and development process. Therefore, an effective integration 
methodology is required to achieve system-level adaptive capacity during the system design 
and development process.  
The methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience (MSIAR) builds 
on prior design approaches and paradigms such as axiomatic, allocated design, set based 
design, as well as methods which employ Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) and 
tradespace analysis to mitigate the consequences of uncertainty in the system’s functional 
design. The MSIAR transcends beyond these methods by placing emphasis on the adaptive 
resilient physical component design. By doing this the components are enabled to 
accommodate a broad range of functional requirements while simultaneously mitigating the 







This figure depicts the proposed methodology that integrates adaptive resilience into 
technological systems. The methodology supplements the steps of the existing systems 
engineering process to incorporate the adaptive capacity necessary for a system to attain 
functional resilience. This dissertation provides the foundational concepts on which the 
methodology is based, demonstrates its application on a relevant technological system, 
and validates the methodology’s efficacy in achieving the desired attribute of adaptive 
resilience. 
Figure 1. The Methodology for the System Integration  
of Adaptive Resilience. 
 
The methodology utilizes seven high-level steps that can be decomposed to any 
requisite level of fidelity for the integration effort of interest. The seven steps are as follows: 
 
1. Define adaptive design considerations 
2. Identify controllable/adaptive performance factors 
3. Characterize adaptive performance factor configurations 
4. Verify and validate adaptive performance factor configurations 
5. Map validated configurations to adaptive system components/modules 
6. Integrate adaptive components and configurations into system 
7. Verify and validate integrated component configurations and performance  
 
 xxiii 
In this study, this seven-step methodology was applied to the design of a novel armor 
system as a case study to demonstrate its efficacy in integrating the adaptive capacity that 
produces system adaptive resilience. The case study used the draft capability definition 
document for the U.S. Army Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) as the basis for the protection, 
mobility, and transportability requirements. These requirements were used as the inputs to the 
methodology, which generated adaptive design consideration. These MSIAR-generated 
design considerations specified a range of protection, considerations for the competing 
mobility, protection interests, and limitations on the vehicle width for transportability 
purposes. These considerations are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Adaptive Armor Design Considerations 
 
 
These considerations were then used to identify controllable performance factors that 
relate to and influence the realization of the design considerations. These factors were 
characterized as potential means and ways to achieve the adaptive design considerations. The 
characterized configurations were then verified and validated adaptive system configurations. 
The adaptive factor configurations for the novel armor system were armor mass, 
dimensionality, and dynamic state. These system configurations were then mapped to 
physical system components that could achieve the adaptive ranges of armor system 
configuration. Once mapped to suitable physical components, the components were 
ADC 1:
The adaptive armor design must be able to prevent the 
penetrations of .30 cal APM2 threats at the threshold and 
.50 cal APM2 threats at objective levels through adaptive 
mode one (internal reconfiguration) and adaptive mode two 
(external reconfiguration) at 50% reduction of weight from 
a Fixed RHA Armor System.
ADC 2:
The adaptive armor design must achieve the maximum 
amount of ballistic protection from the least amount of 
weight.   
ADC 3:
The integrated adaptive resilient armor design while 
integrated on the host GCV platform may not exceed 204 
inches of total GCV system width during strategic 
transport. 
Adaptive Armor Design Considerations:
 xxiv 
integrated into the holistic armor systems and again verified and validated for overall armor 
system suitability in achieving the original requirements and adaptive design considerations.  
The case-study application of the methodology resulted in the creation of an adaptive 
resilient armor demonstrator, which employs a novel armor technology called mechanically 
adaptive armor linkage (MAAL). MAAL serves as a physical realization of the 
methodology’s final product. This demonstrator physically achieved all requirements and 
adaptive design considerations, as well as all the adaptive factor configurations generated by 
the methodology. These configurations provided enhanced ballistic protection capability over 
a traditionally designed armor with similar material technology through adaptive internal and 
external design reconfigurations. Further, the adaptive resilient armor demonstrator showed 
how in certain circumstances, the methodology can eliminate the need to compromise on 
certain system components constrained by competing requirements. The outcomes of the 
design study are depicted in Table 2. 
 




Ballistic evaluation of the adaptive component configurations demonstrated 
significant enhancement to the ballistic protection of the armor system. In some instances, 
ballistic protection against objective threats attained an 80% reduction in armor system 
weight over a nonadaptive resilient armor system. Nonadaptive armor systems can perform at 
this weight but with significant operational consequences for the width of the vehicle system 
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on which the armor was integrated. The adaptive resilient armor system can achieve this 
enhanced protection at a lighter weight while retaining the adaptive ability to collapse the 
enabling width, regaining the narrow width for mobility when needed. This is shown in the 
ballistic evaluation results shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
These plots depict the core proof of concept ballistic experiments for the MAAL armor at 
key adaptive factor configurations. These plots show the performance at key 
dimensionality adaptive factor configurations. The bright pink diamond depicts the 
performance of a similar nonadaptive static armor. It does not have a range of 
performance because it does not have adaptive capacity needed to provide the range. The 
adaptive resilient armor can adapt its armor dimensionality and obliquity to provide 
objective threat protection at an armor areal density 50 psf less than the fixed nonadaptive 
armor. This weight can be used to regain vehicle performance with respect to mobility 
and transportability. 
Figure 2. MAAL Ballistic Evaluation Plots. 
 
The methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience is shown to be a 
sound methodology for the creation of adaptive capacity within armor technological systems. 
The MSIAR enables these systems to adapt performance factors and realize a resilient state 
of operation for complex environments. This methodology was applied to the design of an 
adaptive resilient armor system. This system was based on relevant operational requirements 
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in which a top-level function was defined by a requirement often at odds with other critical 
requirements for the greater system of systems. The adaptive capacity realized in the adaptive 
resilient armor system provided the armor system the capability to meet and exceed top-level 
functional requirements in a fashion that did not implicate other requirements. The armor 
system provided a range of ballistic protection that handily met the requirements, and had 
extensible means available to rapidly address unknown/emerging penetrating threats.  
This dissertation serves as an initial foray into integrating the attribute of adaptive 
resilience into a technological system. The proposed methodology incorporated concepts and 
principles from the maturing field of resilience engineering and merged them with systems 
design and engineering principles. This methodology was demonstrated on a single-case case 
study of the design of an adaptive resilient armor system, although it is meant for any 
technological system that operates in a complex operating environment and with competing 
requirements. Future research efforts for the methodology should center on applying the 
methodology to other systems that require adaptive resilience as a functional attribute. This 
future research should focus on refining the activities and processes associated with each step 
of the methodology.  
This methodology makes possible many new applications for integrating adaptive 
resilience technological systems. These questions and many more will arise as systems 
engineers and designers employ and expand this approach. Adherence to the fundamental 
principles of systems engineering will serve as a guidepost in answering these complex 
questions. The methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience has the potential 
to eliminate many of the system tradeoffs that have limited the functional utility of systems 
that operate in complex operating environments. The methodology also has the potential to 
enhance the operational effectiveness of systems that continually encounter operational 
challenges that stress or overmatch their ability to maintain top-level functionality. With 
proper discipline and application, this methodology enables users to enhance significantly the 




THE NEED FOR ADAPTIVE RESILIENT SYSTEMS: A 
HYPOTHETICAL VIGNETTE 
In April 2007, in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, members of the Third IBCT, 
“Spartans” of the 10th Mountain Division, entered their second year in Afghanistan, and as 
such, their second enemy offensive season. During the quiet winter months, the unit had been 
reconstituted with new up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWV). The HMMWVs represented a technological response to the Taliban’s 
asymmetrical approach to offensive operations: conventional weapons coupled with 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) employed in complex ambush scenarios. The new up-
armored HMMWVs provided enhanced 360-degree protection from small-caliber individual 
and crew-served weapons, as well as from fragments and shrapnel from IEDs. The previous 
year was marked by significant casualties because of the lack of protection now provided by 
the new HMMWVs. The harsh winter brought tactical operations to a standstill, allowing the 
U.S. Army to invest in, upgrade, and enhance the protective capabilities of their operational 
forces and vehicle fleet. The ground commanders of the Spartan Brigade were optimistic 
about the 2007 offensive season. However, the Taliban had not been blind. They silently 
watched the truckloads of heavily armored HMMWVs pass through the few highways in this 
austere country. Realizing that their crew-served PKMs and RPKs would have little effect on 
these new vehicles, they adapted. 
Early one crisp morning, a platoon of the Spartan Brigade conducted a mounted 
patrol. Confident in their new HMMWVs protective capability, the patrol traversed through 
the Manekandow Pass, a Taliban-watched pass that was expected to bring direct fire contact 
to the patrol. As the last vehicle rounded a narrow bend, automatic fire erupted throughout 
the valley. Spartan Soldiers fired their crew-served weapons to suppress and gain fire 
superiority over the asymmetric Taliban forces. The Spartan Soldiers emerged victorious, and 
the Taliban ambush was defeated. The patrol dismounted to clear the fighting positions from 
which they had been attacked. As the dismounted Soldiers climbed the ridgeline where they 
were ambushed, a Taliban sniper lay in wait on the opposite ridge. The sniper was not 
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targeting the dismounts, but the new up-armored HMMWV. He wanted to see if the newly 
fielded HMMWV could withstand the Taliban’s newly purchased PTRS-41 anti-materiel 
sniper rifles. The sniper targeted the last vehicle in the convoy. The vehicle’s remaining 
occupants, gunner, and driver, were providing over-watch of the dismounted patrol climbing 
the opposite ridge, unaware they were easy targets for this sniper. The sniper could not see 
the driver but wanted to shoot through the armor of the vehicle to both kill the driver and to 
send a chilling message to the Spartan Soldiers that their new vehicles were easily 
overmatched by the Taliban’s new sniper rifles. The sniper estimated a bullet trajectory that 
would achieve both objectives.  
The crack of the PTRS-41 sniper rifle destroyed the brief calm of the Manekandow 
Valley. The dismounted patrol returned overwhelming fire at all suspected enemy fighting 
positions on the opposite side of the valley from whence the shot rang out. However, their 
fire was ineffective. The sniper exfiltrated from his position before the patrol could return 
fire. A hidden photographer further up the valley recorded the incident and the actions of the 
Spartan Brigade patrol. The gunner in the targeted HMMWV screamed for a medic. The 
patrol medic approaching the vehicle noticed a smoking hole in the driver-side door armor of 
the vehicle. The crew cabin was filled with smoke and screams. The gunner dropped from his 
cupola, still screaming. As the medic opened the passenger side door, he saw the driver’s 
door swing open. The HMMWV driver emerged, hacking and coughing, uninjured from the 
anti-materiel rifle’s projectile. He ran over to the passenger side to assist the medic. The 
gunner’s leg was sprayed with spall and shrapnel left when the projectile penetrated the 
vehicle—a minor but painful injury. The smoke erupting from the open doors was from a 
smoke grenade, which fortunately had stopped the bullet before it struck the driver. This was 
a close call, inches from a catastrophic result. The patrol leader looked at the gaping hole torn 
in the vehicle’s armor from the sniper’s bullet. His heart sank. Their new $250,000 
HMMWV with enhanced protection was easily penetrated by a $2,000 heavy rifle and bullet 
that was fielded in 1941. 
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Systems engineers design, develop, and field traditional systems to handle a set 
problem or fixed set of requirements that the system’s functionality solves or fulfills. These 
traditional systems tend to operate at one optimized design point for a given set of external 
operational conditions to achieve a given top-level function or task. This approach, while 
acceptable for most situations, presents significant functional limitation for systems that are 
required to operate or function in complex environments. Complex environments can be 
defined as environments in which the operational conditions are unpredictable, experience 
disruptive perturbation, or otherwise shift rapidly.  
This dissertation proposes a new system attribute called adaptive resilience, which 
enables a system to adapt its functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity in order to 
maintain or regain functional effectiveness to satisfy its top-level functional requirements in 
complex operating environments. This attribute is particularly beneficial in complex 
operating environments. In order to achieve an adaptive resilient system, system designers 
and engineers must identify, account for, and incorporate the necessary range or capacity for 
adaptation early in the design and development process. This dissertation demonstrates an 
integration methodology that achieves the desired attribute of adaptive resilience. This seven-
step methodology is depicted and briefly described in Figure 1.  The methodology, which is 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, supplements the steps of the existing systems engineering 
process to incorporate the adaptive capacity necessary for a system to attain functional 
resilience. This dissertation provides the foundational concepts on which the methodology is 
based, demonstrate its application on a relevant technological system, and validate the 
methodologies efficacy in achieving the desired attribute of adaptive resilience. 
A. BACKGROUND 
All technological systems that operate in complex environments are disadvantaged 
when they encounter operational circumstances that may cause them to fail to achieve and 
maintain their top-level function. Technological systems that operate in combat environments 
demonstrate the validity of this idea. For example, a common military trailer has fixed 
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dimensions and a payload weight restriction that cannot be changed without a significant 
redesign. The system’s functional constraints limit the utility of the trailer when it receives a 
nonstandard load that exceeds its traditionally designed capability. Another example might be 
a common military FM radio. Military FM radios operate in a set mode of frequencies. In 
today’s modern era, many other pathways of digital and analogue communication exist, 
whether cellular network, satellite, or even the aging telephone lines. The common FM radio 
uses line-of-sight electromagnetic frequencies, which have limited range and are easily 
obstructed or jammed in complex operating environments. Soldiers are surrounded by other 
modes of voice communication but are constrained to a system that only exploits one of those 
available modes. In short, these legacy systems could provide far greater capability if they 
were designed and engineered using a different paradigm.  
 
 
This figure depicts the proposed methodology that integrates adaptive resilience into 
technological systems. The methodology supplements the steps of the existing systems 
engineering process to incorporate the adaptive capacity necessary for a system to attain 
functional resilience. This dissertation will provide the foundational concepts on which 
the methodology is based, demonstrate its application on a relevant technological system, 
and validate the methodologies efficacy in achieving the desired attribute of adaptive 
resilience. 
 The Methodology for the System Integration  Figure 1. 
of Adaptive Resilience.  
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Systems are commonly designed using an allocated architectural approach. One 
method for framing a system in an architectural fashion was proposed by Dennis Buede. 
Buede’s (2009) approach defined functions that are traced to physical components through an 
allocated architecture. This approach is shown in Figure 2.  Functions which reside in the 
functional architecture are mapped to an executing component in the physical architecture.  
 
 
This figure depicts an allocated architecture in which system functions are traced to 
physical components that execute those functions. Buede emphasized that correct system 
design singularly maps one function to one component. Coupling of functions to 
components creates system design and operational challenges that are not preferred. 
Source: Buede (2009, 290). 
 System Functions and Physical Components Mapped Through an Figure 2. 
Allocated Architecture. 
This traditional approach to system design works very well for systems which operate 
in environments which are static or have minimal uncertainty. This is shown in Figure 3. 
However, what happens when functional requirements shift or evolve due to complexities in 
the system’s operating environment? This situation is depicted in Figure 4. Often, the 
components that execute the functions fail to accommodate the functional requirement 
evolutions that occur in complex operating environments. In many of these circumstances, a 
significant redesign of the system or component must occur, which can be costly in both time 
and resources to address this shift in functional requirement. 
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Traditional, fixed system design works well in static operating environments with 
minimal uncertainty. In static operating environments, functional requirements seldom 
shift rapidly and evolve more predictably with the development of new technology. The 
optimized static physical components perfectly address the static functional requirements 
for the design. 
 Traditional Systems in Static Operating Environments. Figure 3. 
 
 
This figure depicts how a statically design system, when placed in to a complex operating 
environment will likely fail from rapid functional requirement evolution. The fixed, 
optimally designed components cannot accommodated functional requirement shifts 
(depicted with red dashed path) making them lose their ability to fulfill the system’s 
designed functionality. 
 Traditional/Static System Design in Complex Operating Figure 4. 
Environments. 
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In an effort to address this issue, contemporary system design approaches, tools, and 
methods develop systems which have a robust accommodation to broader set of functional 
requirement states. These approaches include designs for robustness (Frey, Li 2004), set 
based design (McKenney, Kemink, Singer, 2011), and the many Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE)-tradespace approaches (MacCalman, Beery, Paulo 2016). Generally, 
these approaches focus on developing functional requirements that are broadly applicable to a 
many operating conditions. In doing this the function can accommodate many states but in a 
fashion that is less than optimal. Set based design delays key technical functional design 
decisions until absolutely necessary, and makes the final decision more informed to address 
the functions actually required (McKenney. Kemink, and Singer, 2011). MBSE tradespace 
approaches also serve to inform the system designer of the most broadly suitable design 
points, enabling a greater amount of functionality across uncertain operating conditions 
(Beery, MacCalman, Paulo 2016). These approaches are effective but often have excessive 
parasitic capacity which affects other adjacent components or system’s functional 
performance in the broader system or system of systems. Parasitic capacity, a new term 
generated from this dissertation research, refers to underutilized functional capability that 
detracts from adjacent functional capabilities within a system. A moniker that sums these 
approaches up well is that these types of systems are “jacks of many trades, but masters of 
none.” Despite their robust design for broader functionality, they are still likely to be fixed 
systems which are susceptible to unpredictable functional requirement shifts and evolutions 




This figure depicts how contemporary designs have enhanced robustness (broad circular 
line around requirement) to the uncertainty of complex environments. However, in 
achieving this robustness the system traded away optimal performance in certain 
functions to achieve a level of performance for a broader set of functions. This situation 
oftentimes creates parasitic capacity (depicted in yellow) where the broader system 
capacity that is created or enabled by trades, seldom get employed. This makes the 
functions that are employed more often perform in a less than optimal state. Ultimately, 
robust system design are likely to employ static components and will encounter 
circumstances where their functional requirements will shift, rendering the components 
incapable of functional accomplishment.  
 Contemporary System Design in Complex Operating Figure 5. 
Environments. 
Systems with adaptive resilience are designed with integrated component-level 
adaptive capacity. This adaptive capacity enhances the system by giving it means to 
accommodate and remain functional in the face of the requirement shifts or to rapidly recover 
functionality if the systems fall short in fulfilling their top-level functional requirement. 
Adaptive resilience also seeks to mitigate the added functional burdens associated with 
parasitic capacity which affect overall system performance. It does this by tailoring the 
physical component functionality to specific need at hand, vice the blanket approach of 
broadly traded or robust contemporary system designs. An architectural view of adaptive 




This figure depicts how an adaptive resilient system overcomes the challenges associated 
with operation in complex operating environments by creating a range of suitable 
functional performance (fx) enabled by adaptive physical components (cx vice c1). The 
range of functional performance (dashed ring) provide functionality in an extensible 
fashion beyond the functional requirement, or just enough to satisfy the requirement 
while still allowing maximum efficiency within the design. Furthermore the system 
adapts to the design point that is most optimal for the functional need at hand. In doing 
this the effects of parasitic capacity are mitigated. 
 Adaptive Resilient Design in Complex Operating Environments. Figure 6. 
In summary, traditional static system designs often fail in complex operating 
environments due to their inability to readily adapt to changing functional requirements. 
Contemporary fixed system designs are better suited for operation in uncertain environments, 
but are likely to possess parasitic capacity, and are ultimately susceptible to failure complex 
environments because their fixed functional nature. Adaptive resilient system designs possess 
adaptive physical components which enable the system to resist or recover from functional 
failure in complex operating environments in an agile fashion, while simultaneously 
mitigating the effects of parasitic capacity. A comparative summary depiction of these design 




 Comparison of Design Paradigms Figure 7. 
B. MOTIVATION 
This functional resilience is the essence and value that the system attribute of 
adaptive resilience brings to systems which operate in complex operating environments. 
Combat is a highly complex environment in which the primary objective of the opposing 
forces is to overwhelm and diminish the combat power of the other. A driving factor or 
contributor to combat power is a belligerent’s combat technology capability, thereby making 
combat technology an oppositional target for destruction or obsolescence. Combat 
technologies have traditionally been static in architecture and design, requiring cyclical 
upgrade, redesign, or abandonment. An example of this concept was the evolution of 
protective armor used on tactical vehicles during the global war on terrorism (GWOT).  
In 2002, U.S. military forces invaded the country of Afghanistan to root out the Al 
Qaeda forces that planned the September 11, 2001, attack and the Taliban regime that hosted 
them. A year and a half later, U.S. forces invaded the country of Iraq under the auspices of 
preventing proliferation and growth of their dictator’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
arsenal. The U.S. and coalition forces, structured for a conventional fight, greatly 
overmatched both opposing forces encountered in these countries. Operations in both 
countries rapidly converted from conventional warfare to counterinsurgency, forcing the U.S. 
military to utilize its equipment in a nondoctrinal fashion. A particular example of this is how 
the military employed tactical vehicles. Tactical vehicles, unlike combat vehicles, are 
generally designed for operations behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), such as 
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conducting logistics, reconnaissance, and security operations. During counterinsurgency 
operations, the conventional boundaries of the battle area disappeared. Although not high 
intensity, the battlefield enveloped the tactical vehicles, which were being engaged with 
weapon systems designed to destroy heavily armored combat vehicles (Kempinski and 
Murphy 2012). 
After recognizing this new engagement style, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
engineers, scientists, and acquisition community rapidly evolved and developed vehicle 
survivability solutions to protect the Soldiers operating in this complex, asymmetrical-threat 
environment. The first evolution involved the “up-armoring” of the tactical vehicle fleet to 
protect against small arms fire and roadside bombs called improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs; Zoroya 2013). An example of this reaction is depicted in Figure 8.  
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This figure shows that for much of its life cycle, the HMMWV remained static in its design. With the initiation of the GWOT, complex threat 
conditions drove rapid requirement changes in the HMMWV protection levels. These changes appear below the red dotted line. The changes 
created implications on other vehicle subsystems, causing costly second- and third-order effects to the vehicle requirements. These effects 
required engine upgrades and increased suspension capacity. Source: Rodgers (2006). 
 Evolution of the HMMWV: 1984–2011.Figure 8. 
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With the up-armoring of the U.S. fleet of tactical vehicles, insurgents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were forced to change tactics. The easily penetrated soft-skin and lightly 
armored tactical vehicles now had fully integrated armor kits supplemented with aluminum 
appliqué that protected the crew and occupants from small arms and IED fragmentation 
threats. In an effort to maintain the casualty rate they had been inflicting, insurgents began 
emplacing IEDs in the middle of the road to strike the relatively unprotected underbody of 
the vehicles. The effects of these attacks were generally catastrophic to the tactical vehicles 
and their crews. By this point, U.S. forces were acquiring and fielding M1114s and the new, 
comparable M1151 HMMWVs, which provided moderate underbody protection to the crew 
and occupants. However, this armor was easily overwhelmed with an increased IED charge 
weight. The HMMWV platform, already at its maximum capacity for add-on weight could 
not sustain further add-on armor without serious consequences to the handling, suspension, 
and structure to the vehicle. A new vehicle with greater capacity was required.  
One of the other IED mitigation measures being employed in both theaters was the 
use of route-clearance patrols to detect, diffuse, and destroy the emplaced IEDs. These 
patrols had special vehicles elevated up to four feet off the ground, with monocoque hulls 
reinforced to sustain underbody mine blasts, fragmentation, and small arms fire. This was not 
a new concept: These vehicles had been in use for decades in Africa to clear mines. Seeing 
the integral protective capability, the U.S. Navy and Army, with influence from Congress, 
created the Joint Program Office Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle 
program. Billions of dollars were spent, and thousands of these vehicles were procured and 
poured into Iraq and Afghanistan as an answer to the insurgents’ simple change in IED 
emplacement tactics (Zoroya 2013). Figure 9. shows the family of MRAP vehicles that were 
used as an answer to the insurgent forces’ evolving threat tactics. 
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This figure shows the MRAP family of vehicles, which evolved to address threats and other external requirement perturbations created by the 
complex operating environments of Iraq and Afghanistan during the GWOT. Source: Joint Program Office MRAP (2016).  
 Complex Operating Environment MRAP Evolutions.Figure 9. 
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With small arms fire, blast fragments, and now underbody blast threats effectively 
mitigated, insurgent forces in Iraq and Afghanistan had to begin employing threats of a 
more technical nature to overwhelm the new protective armor and hull designs employed 
on the MRAP vehicles. The insurgents’ evolutionary response to this situation was to 
employ improvised anti-armor weapons with shaped charge liners to penetrate heavy 
armor deeply. This threat evolution shell game continued for many years. U.S. forces 
were continually in a reactionary state with respect to the enemy threat evolutions. This 
situation is depicted in an allocated architectural fashion in Figure 10.  
 
 
Tactical vehicles were fielded with the intent for operation behind the forward line of 
troops where minimal protection levels were required (Static Operating Environment). 
During the GWOT, the forward line of troops was undefined and these tactical vehicles 
were thrust into overmatched threat environments (Complex Operating Environment) 
which were in a persistent state of evolution. Small arms ballistic threats, underbody 
IEDs, to anti-armor shape charge technology, all drove the required protection levels for 
combat vehicles higher and higher, creating numerous system redesigns over the course 
of the GWOT. The figure shows static functions which were allocated to static 
components that were suitable for the static operating environment behind the forward 
lines. In this role the vehicles were used for logistics, transportation and other benign 
purposes. When the forward line of troops was erased, that static environment 
transitioned to a complex environment. Now the static functions which were allocated to 
static components were no longer suitable for the complex threat environment they were 
thrust into. 
 Architectural View of Tactical Vehicle Evolutions  Figure 10. 
Driven by a Complex Operating Environment. 
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This reactionary approach was not a sound method to tackle the system challenges 
associated with operations in complex operating environments. A new system design 
paradigm was needed to mitigate these functional requirement perturbations, evolutions, and 
shifts. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Traditionally engineered systems lack the ability to maintain agile top-level 
functionality when faced with rapid and significant requirement perturbations associated with 
operation in a complex environment (like those witnessed during the GWOT). The situation 
discussed in the example placed U.S. systems in a reactionary state of disadvantage rather 
than in a proactive or rapidly adaptive position of strength in the complex operating 
environment. This situation consumed significant engineering effort, time, and financial 
resources to address. Adaptive resilience enhances system functionality for these types of 
situations and can serve as a solution to address or mitigate this problem. However, the field 
of systems engineering does not have a coherent methodology to account for creating the 
adaptive capacity needed to enable adaptive resilience in technological systems. 
A complex operating environment (COE) is defined as an environment that is not 
only unknown but also unknowable and constantly changing (Odierno, Perkins 2014). 
Developing systems with integral adaptive resilience can enhance their functional 
effectiveness in complex operating environments. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
develop and validate a methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience 
(MSIAR). The concept of adaptive resilience was conceived as an observed solution from the 
field of resilience engineering to address the growing complexity present in modern system 
operating environments. As previously discussed, system engineers design, develop, and 
field traditional systems to handle a set problem or fixed set of requirements that the system’s 
functionality solves or fulfills. These traditional systems tend to operate at one optimized 
design point for a given set of external operational conditions to achieve a given set of 
principle or top-level function(s) or tasks (Braha, Minai, and Bar-Yam 2006). This approach, 
while acceptable for most systems, presents significant functional limitations for systems that 
must operate or function in complex environments.  
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The purpose of adaptive resilience is to solve this problem and enable system’s to 
maintain or remain functionally effective in satisfying their top-level functional requirements 
in unpredictable and rapidly shifting operating environments. In order to achieve an adaptive 
resilient system, systems designers and engineers must identify, account for, and incorporate 
the necessary range or capacity for adaptation early in the design and development process. 
Therefore, an effective integration methodology is required to achieve system-level adaptive 
resilience during that system’s design and development process. This dissertation achieved 
this purpose through the accomplishment of the following objectives. 
D. DISSERTATION RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The questions that guided this study included: 
1. How can appropriate adaptive capacity be integrated into a technological 
system in order to achieve an enhanced state of functional resilience? 
2. How do adaptive resilient system designers avoid or mitigate parasitic 
capacity while simultaneously realizing adaptations in operationally 
relevant timelines? 
3. How can adaptive resilience be used to aid in better system development, 
such as enabling system to provide adaptive capability in uncertain, 
complex environments?  
E. ASSUMPTIONS 
The MSIAR is nested with the fundamental steps of systems engineering processes 
that exist in this field of study. Use of the MSIAR presumes that those who employ it have a 
competent comprehension of systems engineering and design, and the fundamental principles 
associated with each. This understanding will enable users of the methodology to apply each 
step of the methodology effectively and properly in the appropriate order for the challenge at 
hand. 
In terms of this dissertation and its centerpiece methodology, it was assumed that a 
given system can achieve a state of adaptability. It was assumed that all systems and 
processes have factors that drive their output performance. In addition, it was assumed that 
those factors can be manipulated and controlled to achieve a desired output. The question or 
concern with adaptability was whether there is economy or value achieved in the proposed 
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adaptation. It was assumed that this methodology should only be employed when there is a 
clear and present value proposition to building a system’s inherent adaptive resilience. 
F. DISSERTATION CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This dissertation is broken out into six total chapters, followed by an epilogue, and 
four appendices. Chapter II discusses the prior work and art which led to the development of 
the MSIAR. This chapter focuses on the definitions of adaptability and resilience and the 
state of the art in their application to system design and engineering. Chapter III seeks to 
thoroughly define and then describe step-by-step the MSIAR. Chapter IV describes a 
constructive application of the MSIAR in the design of an adaptive resilience armor system. 
This chapter opens with an armor technology primer to familiarize readers with the 
fundamental concepts of terminal ballistics. Chapter IV then walks step-by-step through the 
methodology and describes the activities of each step as there are applied to the adaptive 
resilient armor case study. Chapter V expands on Chapter IV and focuses on the verification, 
validation, and proof of concept for MSIAR. This chapter discusses the ballistic results and 
their implications on the enhanced functionality of the armor system. This chapter then 
portrays conceptual implementations of the adaptive resilient armor on a notional ground 
system platform. Chapter VI concludes the dissertation by summarizing the salient points and 
concepts, and then discussing where future research on this subject should focus. Appendix A 
provides the reader an example of a Technical Drawing package that resulted from the 
Chapter IV case study. Appendix B summarized the adaptive resilient armor ballistic 
evaluation results into a concise format for future reference. Appendix C is an additional 
study conducted by NPS on the failure modes that were observed during the adaptive 
resilient armor ballistic evaluations. This analysis will be critical for future research on proper 
material selection for the adaptive resilient armor that was developed. Appendix D concludes 
the dissertation with a glossary of terms used throughout this study. 
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II. PRIOR WORK 
This dissertation contributes to the intellectual study of systems adaptability and 
resilience engineering. Researchers have studied resilience engineering and adaptability at 
length and found that these elements enhance system performance constructively in complex 
environments. Although a large body of knowledge, study, and analysis exists regarding 
resilience engineering and adaptability, a lack of research and design approaches hampers 
efforts toward effectively integrating these attributes into a technological system. This 
dissertation leverages the large body of knowledge, study, and analysis and fuses it with 
fundamental concepts of systems engineering to integrate these attributes into a technological 
system design. 
A. ADAPTABILITY  
Webster defined adaptive as showing or having a capacity for or tendency toward 
adaptation. Webster defined adaptability as the process of changing to fit some purpose or 
situation (Merriam Webster 2015). In other words, adaptability is the ability to exhibit 
adaptation. Capacity is the key word that stands out in the first definition. Systems can only 
adapt to a purpose or a situation if they have the capacity to adapt or are externally influenced 
by some means of intelligence designed to adapt that system’s use to new ends. Most 
engineered technological systems are closed systems in the sense that they do not evolve or 
demonstrate emergent behaviors. That is, most engineered systems are deterministic: their 
functional output will never expand or grow outside of the operational states designed into 
the system from the start. Therefore, for an engineered system to achieve a state of 
adaptation, the capacity to do such must be designed or integrated into the system at 
conception. Although nondeterministic adaptation can be achieved in technical systems, it 
requires a level of intelligence or awareness, as well as a capacity to learn, that goes beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. This intelligence attribute is known as equifinality. Equifinal 
systems achieve similar outcomes in a given environment despite their disparate starting 
points (Bertalanffy 1950). Most deterministic systems are not equifinal. However, by 
introducing humans to the system, the potential for equifinality in a system increases.  
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Humanity’s ability to create intelligent, self-adaptable equifinal technological systems 
is in its genesis. Technical systems with the ability to adapt still require significant human 
interface to realize their adaptive potential. An example of this was the Apollo 13 mission 
during which the crew of this ship averted catastrophic system failure (Jackson 2009). Apollo 
13 was to be the third intentional U.S.-manned lunar landing. The craft was launched on 
April 11, 1970, from the Kennedy Space Center, but the lunar landing was aborted when an 
oxygen tank exploded two days later, crippling the command and service modules that were 
critical to its mission. Despite this critical-system failure, the crew adapted systems and 
subcomponents of the ship, enabling it to sustain basic life support and allowing them to 
return safely to Earth on April 17. The Apollo 13 ship itself did not self-adapt and produce a 
feasible solution for crew and ship survival. Instead, it was the crew, the ship, and knowledge 
from Mission Control on Earth that allowed the mission to end without loss of life. The ship 
structure had been designed with a level of structural modularity. When Apollo 13 lost its 
main power, the crew moved to a smaller structural module in the ship and routed the 
remaining power sources to sustain them in this smaller hold (Jackson 2009). Thus, 
adaptability was the fundamental ingredient or attribute necessary for the system to be 
resilient (Jackson 2009). Had the Apollo 13 ship not possessed this level of adaptive capacity 
(e.g., crew, parts, subsystems), then the crew’s resilient improvisational response would have 
failed, and the result of the mission would have been much different. In this instance, a 
question remains. When this ship was designed, was this adaptive capacity intentionally or 
unintentionally achieved?  
1. Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive Capacity can be defined as the extent to which a system can adapt or absorb 
a functional disturbance without completely losing operational performance toward a top-
level function (Jackson 2009). An example of adaptive capacity in operation was the New 
York City power loss and recovery on September 11, 2001. New York City had experienced 
power grid and infrastructure failures prior to the September 11 attacks, which had motivated 
energy providers to purchase backup generators to sustain the city’s power needs in the event 
of a primary power-generation system failure. On September 11, 2001, the city sustained a 
significant disruption to its power infrastructure because of the loss of the World Trade 
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Center buildings; thus, the city completely lost electrical power. However, within five hours, 
power was restored to the city because of the adaptive capacity provided by the backup 
generators (Jackson 2009). This case demonstrates the value of this capacity provided. It also 
showed that the capacity was agnostic to the purpose for which it was created. The generators 
were purchased for rolling blackouts on the Eastern Seaboard, but were used to restore power 
during the terrorist attack. The point here is that the capacity may be unrelated to its original 
purpose as long as it delivers the function needed to fulfill that original purpose.  
Adaptive capacity can be realized in two ways, both based on the functional 
requirements for the system. First, adaptive capacity can be produced through pure added 
performance, as shown in Figure 11.  
 
 
This figure is a notional depiction of the power requirements for New York City (purple), 
the power available from the primary power plant (green), the available power from the 
backup generator (red), and the total available energy available in blue. The excess power 
capacity is the adaptive capacity that the city had to work with when disruptions 
occurred. Backup generators provided this adaptive capacity.  
 Notional NYC Power Output on 9/11/2001.  Figure 11. 
Here, the baseline requirement was fulfilled with the primary power generators. The 
redundant backup generators doubled the available power for when needed. Second, the 
opposite of adaptive capacity would be an instance in which total available power would be 
just enough to meet the maximum total requirement, but that total maximum requirement 
would not always be used. In Figure 11. the primary power generators provided a capacity 
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that generally exceeded the need. For example, imagine this primary power output was the 
maximum requirement needed if every household in New York City was using all available 
power. This would likely never occur, but the primary power generators had the capacity to 
meet the demand if needed. The excess power not being used (difference in the green line 
and purple line) is excess capacity that could be exported to another city or used for another 
purpose. In addition, the output could be reduced when not needed and increased when 
needed. This capacity meets the requirement, but the need is not always equal to the 
requirement; therefore, the added capacity is left dormant or exported for alternate use. This 
alternate use could involve buying back system trades when there are competing interests. 
This concept is shown in Figure 12.  
This figure depicts how adaptive capacity relates to parasitic capacity. Adaptive capacity 
is the key system attribute that brings about system resilience (Jackson 2009). Parasitic 
capacity that extends beyond a functional requirement. Parasitic capacity can exist in 
robustly designed systems as a catch all approach to functional requirement 
accommodation, or it can exist in adaptive resilient system when extensible functional 
states are desired. In a perfect world, system designer would seek to minimize parasitic 
capacity. 
Adaptive Capacity vs. Parasitic Capacity. Figure 12. 
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The ability to control or adapt the output readily is the key distinction that makes this 
adaptive capacity and not just unused parasitic capacity. For example, an M1 Abrams tank is 
designed to withstand heavy anti-armor threats. If placed in an operating environment in 
which only small arms are being used, this added protective capacity goes unused and 
actually become parasitic—the weight of this added protection inhibits mobility and requires 
the engine to consume additional fuel. By using extra fuel, the unused capacity projects 
consequences on other functional requirements. In contrast, an armor system with adaptive 
capacity could meet the requirement outright and possess added capacity readily available to 
protect against heavier threats. Alternatively, the adaptive capacity at its strongest could meet 
the requirement but also readily possess the capability to minimize the parasitic capacity that 
is not always needed. Thus, an adaptive resilient M1 Abrams would have the adaptive 
capacity to protect against the heavy threats when needed but be able to shed or exclude the 
unnecessary protection to give it the mobility or fuel efficiency previously inhibited. Another 
adaptive resilient M1 Abrams may at minimum meet the heavy threat protection 
requirements but have adaptive capacity readily available to scale that protection higher or in 
other ways along known protection factors to potentially account for unknown threats. This is 
the dichotomous nature of adaptive capacity; either approach makes systems better suited for 
the uncertainty associated with complex operating environments. 
2. Modes of Adaptability
In order for a system to adapt, it must possess the ways and means to restructure or 
reconfigure functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity. Two modes of adaptability—
internal reconfiguration and external reconfiguration—serve to achieve the desired 
adaptation.  
a. Adaptive Mode 1: Internal Reconfiguration
Adaptations that occur through internal reconfiguration use means (e.g., processes, 
mechanisms, and artifacts) within the system to achieve desired functionality. Internal 
reconfiguration can occur through four means: operational variation, reallocation, 
degeneracy, and exaptation. The following examples of these adaptive modes use a robot as 
the adaptive system faced with challenges it must overcome in its operating environment. 
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(1) Operational Variation 
Operational variation is the simplest of the modes. For example, imagine a robot was 
directed to open a door to move from one room to another. To open the door, it must reach 
out with its right hand and turn the knob in counter-clockwise fashion. However, if this robot 
were to encounter a doorknob that only turned in a clockwise direction, the robot would have 
to adapt the direction it twisted the knob to clockwise to transit between rooms. The 
operational variation mode involves employing the same means toward achieving a function 
but employing the means in a slightly modified way, in this case, changing the direction the 
robot turned the doorknob (clockwise to counterclockwise). This adaption is an example of 
operational variation; the means to conduct the function remained the same but were applied 
in a modified fashion. 
(2) Reallocation 
Reallocation is similar to operational variation in the sense that it uses the same 
means to perform the same function but takes the means from another location or area where 
it may not be currently needed. For example, imagine the same robot must open the door to 
move from one room to another; however, its right hand is broken, and it is therefore unable 
to twist the knob to accomplish this function. By adapting its approach to use its left hand to 
twist the knob, the robot would still be able to accomplish its task. This is an example of 
reallocation; the same type of means were employed but from an alternate location. 
(3) Degeneracy 
Degeneracy is a mode of adaption in which an artifact can serve as the means to 
conduct a prescribed function but is more appropriately qualified to accomplish other 
functions (Whiteacre and Bender 2010). For example, imagine the robot transiting between 
rooms is carrying a heavy object that has made its hands incapable of opening the door. 
Instead of setting the heavy object down, the robot adapts its approach by lifting its leg to 
manipulate the knob on the door with its foot, thereby opening the door to accomplish its 
function. Although the feet and legs are more appropriately suited for walking between 
rooms, these multifunctional artifacts can be effectively applied to functions like opening 
doors. This is a degenerate adaptation. 
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(4) Exaptation 
Exaptation, also known as functional novelty, is a type of adaptation in which 
existing means are employed in novel ways when encountering new environments and 
challenges (Whiteacre and Bender 2010). For example, as the robot moves from room to 
room by opening doors, it may encounter a room with no doors to open but a ladder that 
leads to a higher level of the building where there are stairs to the room the robot must reach. 
By adapting the ways in which its hands, feet, and legs are used, the robot is able to transit 
between rooms in a novel fashion. Although very simple, this example shows the essence of 
exaptation in using existing means in novel ways. 
b. Adaptive Mode 2: External Reconfiguration
External reconfiguration involves using external means to achieve desired system 
functionality. Adaptive Mode 1 includes adaptive means that are present within the system at 
the time of the functional disturbance or incident. Adaptive Mode 2 involves external means 
(e.g., mechanisms, processes, and artifacts) that were not present in the system when 
functionality was lost; however, when applied after the fact, the system regains its 
functionality. External reconfiguration occurs through three means: progressive scaling; 
redundant scaling; and replacement, repair, or healing. 
(1) Redundant Scaling 
Redundant scaling is a form of external adaptation in which the means to overcome a 
disturbance are appropriate but insufficient or lacking the amount of resources needed to 
overcome the disturbance. Using the robot and door example, redundant scaling could apply 
when a door is jammed and a single robot is too weak to open the door. The robot may have 
all the right means, but lack the magnitude or quantity of resources to overcome the force 
jamming the door. Redundant scaling could solve this problem by bringing in another robot 
to put its strength and means against the door to overcome the jam. All the required means 
are present: hands, legs, arms. However, one robot’s strength was insufficient. An additional 
robot duplicated the means, thus adding the necessary strength to achieve functional success.  
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(2) Progressive Scaling 
Progressive scaling is similar to redundant scaling in the sense that the original 
system lacks the magnitude of means to accomplish a task. However, progressive scaling 
differs somewhat: Instead of duplicating the means to accomplish the function, a single 
means of greater magnitude is applied. In the case of the jammed door, an adaptation that 
applies progressive scaling would replace the initial “normal-sized” robot attempting to open 
the stuck door with an NFL linebacker robot. The potency of the linebacker far exceeds that 
of the normal robot in opening the jammed door. Progressive scaling might also include 
providing the original robot with an enhancement to achieve the function. A crowbar, an 
explosive charge—or perhaps the door is only locked, and a key in the hand of the robot is all 
that is needed to open the shut door.  
(3) Replacement, Repair, and Healing 
In some situations, the disturbance disrupting the functionality damages the system, 
preventing functionality or making it susceptible to future functional failure. In these cases, a 
system that possesses an adaptive trait to heal, repair, or replenish itself would be of great 
value. Imagine if the robot were replaced by a man, who in trying to open the door, pushed so 
hard that he broke his arm. It would likely be impossible for the man to continue trying to 
open the door with a broken arm. However, the human body has evolved to possess a trait in 
which the structural/skeletal bones that support the body mend themselves when fractured. 
This process requires significant time to recuperate, with limited functionality of the damaged 
bone, but if set correctly, usually returns the appendage or region of the body to normal 
function and operation. Replacement, reparation, and healing can also occur under Adaptive 
Mode 1 (internal reconfiguration) if the means to do such was internal to the system when the 
disruption occurred. 
3. Degrees of Adaptability
Degrees of adaptability is a measure of the number of adaptations a system has at its 
disposal. The degrees span the modes and submodes of adaptability. If a system has four 
internal reconfigurations and five external reconfigurations, then the overall system has nine 
degrees of adaptability. If a system has only four internal reconfigurations, each of which 
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uniquely uses the submode of reallocation, then the system has four degrees of adaptability. 
A greater number of degrees of adaptability is a key contributor to the concept of adaptive 
resilience. This will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 
B. RESILIENCE 
Webster defined resilience as the ability to regain strength, health, or success after 
something bad happens (Merriam Webster Dictionary 2015). In a systems engineering 
context, resilience is a system attribute that describes the system’s ability to withstand or 
recover from perturbations and disruptions that exceed its functional tolerance. Resilience is a 
system state of being without which a system would fail with the slightest external influence. 
Note that two conditions are needed for a system to be defined as resilient: the ability to 
withstand disruptions and the ability to recover from disruptions. The founder of resilience 
theory, C. S. Holling, called these two conditions of resilience ecological resilience and 
engineered resilience, because these terms fit better with the context of ecology, his field of 
study (Holling, Allen, and Gunderson 2009).  
An outstanding contextual analogy assists in visualizing Holling’s idea of 
resilience: a ball and a bowl (Ruhl 2011). The ball and the bowl together represent a 
system’s operational state. When the ball is contained within the bowl, the system is 
operating at a suitable state to achieve its top-level functionality. The shape of the bowl 
represents Holling’s conditions of resilience. Tall, narrow bowls shaped like a vase or 
cup bearing steep sides are consistent with a system that possesses engineered resilience. 
Figure 13 depicts this concept. 
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This figure depicts the respective strengths and weaknesses of the two types of resilience: 
recovery and resistance. Recovery resilience possesses strengths in high perturbation 
magnitude situations. Resistance resilience has strength against a diverse range of 
perturbations. Adapted from Ruhl’s description of resilience bowls (2011). 
 Ball-Bowl Basins. Figure 13. 
A ball-bowl system with ecological resilience possesses shallow but widely separated 
walls, like a saucer with a wide area or surface to hold the ball. When either of the ball-bowl 
systems is in a state of operational equilibrium, the balls contained within are at rest in their 
bowl centers. If the bowl is lightly shaken, the ball rolls around, but does not roll out. The 
ball in the tall, narrow bowl remains near the bottom center, never straying far from this 
location. Even if it does roll up the sides of the bowl, it will quickly roll back down and 
recover its equilibrium operational position. The ball in the shallow, widely separated walls 
would likely roll all around the bowl basin but would resist rolling over the edge and out of 
the bowl. The ball in this bowl may take an arbitrary path back to the center of the bowl and 
therefore take longer to reach equilibrium. Now consider how different disturbances to the 
bowl shapes would produce different recovery or resistance responses. The tall-sided bowl 
may easily tip over and spill the ball out, but not the shallow, wide bowl. A strong latitudinal 
disturbance to the bowl may bounce the ball out of the shallow saucer but not out of the tall 
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vase. Conversely, a strong longitudinal disturbance to the bowls may bounce the ball out of 
the tall, narrow bowl; however, the broad area of the flatter basin bowl has a greater area to 
catch the bouncing ball and return it to its center. The bottom of the bowl represents the 
“attractor” to the equilibrium state, whereas the form of the basin defines the “disturbance 
capacity” within which the system state can move before crossing the failure threshold.  
The wider the basin, the greater the number of system states that can be experienced 
without crossing the failure threshold. This shape gives the system wide latitude to 
accommodate diverse system states and disturbances but limited ability to accommodate 
disturbances of large magnitude within those diverse states. Tall, narrow bowls give a system 
limited latitude to accommodate diverse system states and disturbances but can typically 
handle disturbances of significant local magnitude. Engineered resilience strategies rely on 
strong attractors and limited system-state latitude, whereas ecological resilience strategies 
possess weaker attractors but tolerate a broader more diverse range of system states (Ruhl 
2011). Systems can exhibit both of these forms of resilience on a continuum, and therefore, 
the strategies should account for and include varying degrees of both. For the MSIAR, these 
conditions or strategies will be referred to as types or the typology of resilience. Additionally, 
to prevent confusion with previous applications of resilience theory, these types will be 
referred to as resistance resilience and recovery resilience.  
1. Typology of Resilience 
As previously discussed, two types of resilience exist. The two types of resilience 
were previously referred to as ecological resilience and engineered resilience when used in an 
ecological context. In a technical context, these types are more accurately termed resistance 
resilience and recovery resilience.  
(1) Type 1 Resilience: Resistance  
Type 1 resilience, called resistance resilience (T1R), is characterized by the diversity 
and magnitude of disturbance or perturbation a system can withstand or absorb without 
having its fundamental behavioral structure or top-level functional state redefined. An 
example of a system with strong T1R is an armor panel made of steel that can withstand 
many hits throughout its area from a given threat projectile. As long as the threat projectile 
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does not hit the same location more than once, the protective capability of the armor plate is 
maintained. An example of a system lacking T1R is an armor panel made of glass, which 
may be effective against a few threat projectile hits but rapidly degrades in top-level function 
of protection with each subsequent hit. In contrast to Type 2 resilience, Type 1 resilience 
relies on adjustments to system processes or states (differing hit locations) as the means of 
maintaining the top-level functionality of the system (Ruhl 2011). This is graphically 
depicted in Figure 14.  
 
 
Glass is an excellent ballistic material until it is fractured. Its armor protection capability 
significantly diminishes with each shot after the first strike. Further, glass armor is 
usually used to enable a protected viewport out of the volume that is protected. Once hit, 
the glass loses it light transmission capability, thus eliminating its transparency. 
Resistance resilient materials are being researched which mitigate the glass armors lack 
of resistance resilience. The image on the right shows a polycarbonate materials which 
has sustained over 12 ballistic impacts and still provides visual transparency. 
 Transparent Glass Armor. Figure 14. 
(2) Type 2 Resilience: Recovery  
Type 2 resilience, called recovery resilience (T2R), is a system’s ability to 
reconfigure or adapt its functionality to regain equilibrium or top-level functionality. T2R 
typically produces a targeted response that can withstand much greater magnitude of the 
disturbance or perturbation that created the situation requiring system recovery 
(adaptation). Recovery is often associated with and measured by the amount of time 
required for a recovering system to regain top-level functionality. Holling referred to this 
type of resilience as engineered resilience because it is closely related to system 
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reliability, efficiency, and other engineering attributes associated with maintaining 
operationally effective states (Ruhl 2011).  
2. Levels of Resilience
Robert Wears and Bradley Morrison (2013) proposed an interesting perspective 
on resilience regarding the levels of resilient systems complexity in terms of three distinct 
levels of complexity. These three levels of resilient systems have increasing levels of 
complexity and capacity that enable the systems to adapt their processes to accommodate 
specific challenges associated with accomplishing a function.  
(1) Level 1 Resilience 
Level 1 resilience (L1R) systems are associated with systems that contain a simple 
negative feedback loop. Figure 15 is a causal loop diagram showing how L1R systems 
respond to disturbances and perturbations by adapting future functional inputs based on 
recent operational performance outputs. The system must possess a desired zone or a state of 
operation output values that when violated induce a corrective response to adapt or change 
the system inputs to values to regain the desired output. The cruise control on a car is a 
simple example of a L1R system. A vehicle’s cruise control set at 55 mph will increase the 
accelerator inputs when the car begins traveling up a hill to account for the reduced velocity 
and increased energy required to move the car up the hill. Conversely, the same car on cruise 
control will reduce the accelerator input value if the car exceeds 55 mph traveling down a 
hill. The top-level functional state of the car’s cruise control system is to achieve and 
maintain a speed of 55 mph. If the vehicle exceeds this value, an L1R process is initiated to 
reduce the car’s velocity to the desired top-level functional state. If the vehicle begins losing 
velocity, the L1R process initiates increased input values to the accelerator to increase the 
car’s velocity back to the desire top-level functional state. Work associated with resilience in 
ecosystems typically involves L1R processes. Although the feedback loops and systems as a 
whole are typically more complex than the system shown in Figure 15, the fundamental 
resilience process driving the system adaptations are L1R systems seeking homeostasis. 
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Source: Wears and Morrison (2013). 
Level 1 Resilience Causal Loop Diagram. Figure 15. 
(2) Level 2 Resilience 
Level 2 resilience (L2R) is a second-order “novel” response to a system disturbance 
that addresses shortcomings or inefficiencies resulting from the L1R response. Figure 16 is a 
causal loop diagram showing how L2R systems respond to disturbances and perturbations. 
L2R responses are often characterized by variations, or novel applications, of existing 
processes and procedures. In instances of L2R systems, external inputs from the environment 
not only alter the system’s performance, but also alter the processes and sequences that 
influence and adapt the system’s performance (Wears and Morrison 2013). L2R systems and 
outputs often involve tradeoff or sacrifice decisions. Using the car cruise control example, a 
L2R cruise control system might invoke a response from the transmission or braking system 
to regain the desired speed. When the vehicle goes down a hill, an L1R system may 
completely remove all accelerative input from the fuel system. This response, however, may 
not keep the system at the desired top-level functional state (velocity of 55 mph). Therefore, 
the L2R system may downshift the transmission to a lower gear, which would apply the 
engine’s compression as a means to slow the vehicle to the desired velocity. The L2R system 
could also engage the braking system.  
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Source: Wears and Morrison (2013). 
Level 2 Resilience Causal Loop Diagram. Figure 16. 
Another way to look at this cruise control example is to associate a performance 
condition with the response. If a vehicle falls out of the 55 mph velocity zone for whatever 
reason, the top-level function may require the vehicle to regain the desired state within a 
certain time constraint. Assume this time constraint is two seconds. A vehicle traveling at 55 
mph begins to descend an inclined section of road. The L1R inputs initiates deceleration of 
the vehicle, but at a rate that will not achieve the two-second constraint or standard. This may 
cause the L2R response to downshift the transmission to increase the rate of deceleration 
(through engine compression) to achieve 55 mph in under two seconds. The tradeoff or 
sacrifice associated with this response is that the vehicle’s engine efficiency is likely to 
decrease temporarily. This sacrifice achieves the higher priority top-level functional state of 
maintaining 55 mph. The car burns a higher rate of gas, increasing the system’s operating 
cost but avoiding a speeding ticket or accident, which would obviously cost much more. 
(3) Level 3 Resilience 
Level 3 resilience (L3R) occurs when a system learns from its experiences during 
L1R and L2R events and responses. Figure 17 is a causal loop diagram showing how L3R 
systems respond to disturbances and perturbations. If a system has the means to learn and has 
experienced sufficient L1R and L2R responses with successful, appropriate, and relevant 
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feedback, the system may then begin to learn to apply its L1R and L2R responses optimally 
(Wears and Morrison 2013).  
Source: Wears and Morrison (2013). 
Level 3 Resilience Causal Loop Diagram. Figure 17. 
Means of machine and system learning include artificial neural networks, pattern 
recognition methods, and extensible training regimens, which continuously condition 
systems to learn behaviors to counter emerging perturbations. These means allow a system to 
self-optimize to its operating environment and store the behaviors as available system input 
states. These input states are then compared with the associated system output to achieve and 
maintain the desired or optimal system performance. When the system encounters similar 
external or environment circumstances, it will then base its new L1R or L2R response on its 
previous performance in that similar situation. Thus, the L3R response shapes and refines the 
L1R or L2R responses to achieve an optimal state of system output or performance. 
Additionally, because the system learns and stores these historical responses, the system 
tends to build performance margins or strategies that can be employed in rapid or 
extemporaneous fashion.  
Continuing the vehicle cruise control system example, an L3R response could 
involve maintaining speed on a very rough road. A rough road could induce rapid 
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decelerations and accelerations that could cause the L1R and L2R of the cruise control 
system to engage continually and unnecessarily. This could cause the vehicle to engage or 
disengage the accelerator and transmission unnecessarily as it attempts to maintain 55 mph. 
A L3R response would recognize this rough terrain based on previous experience and 
perhaps disengage the L2R response on the transmission or reduce the sample rates of the 
feedback loop to prevent the system from fighting the terrain in attempting to maintain the 
desired velocity. This L3R response influences and optimizes the L1R and L2R responses 
that maintain the desired top-level function of the system.  
C. ENGINEERED RESILIENT SYSTEMS VS. RESILIENCE 
ENGINEERING 
Although the terms engineered resilient systems and resilience engineering sound 
similar, they are very different. The following paragraphs describe and differentiate each of 
these concepts. 
1. Engineered Resilient Systems 
During a speech given on April 3, 2013, then U.S. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
Hagel commented, “We need to continually move forward with designing an acquisition 
system that responds more efficiently, effectively, and quickly to the needs of troops and 
commanders in the field” (Hagel 2013). SECDEF Hagel made this statement to emphasize 
that defense systems were becoming more costly and technologically complicated and 
complex, leading to more risk in their development. Military leaders across the services and 
especially those in the defense-system acquisition community began investigating ways to 
apply the SECDEF’s verbal guidance. Subsequently, many defense acquisition agencies 
began focusing on engineered resilient systems (ERS). In late 2013, members of the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DOD) enthusiastically embraced this “new” concept and approach 
to the defense-systems acquisition process. According to Holland, Director of the Army 
Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC), engineered resilient systems is a U.S. 
DOD acquisition, science and, technology thrust area in which researchers seek to generate 
processes, procedures, practices, and tools that will enable the defense research, 
development, and acquisition community to meet the vision of the former SECDEF (Holland 
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2013; Goerger 2013). Holland explained that the intent of ERS was to increase the speed of 
system development and imbue broader capability and subsequent effectiveness of fielded 
systems, all while minimizing system life cycle costs. Goerger, also from ERDC, claimed the 
DOD goals of ERS were to develop the tools and procedures within DOD acquisition process 
to 
 
1. Produce more complete and robust requirements prior to materiel solution 
analysis 
2. Make the engineering design process more efficient and effective 
3. Consider the manufacturability of a proposed design explicitly 
4. Establish baseline resilience of current capabilities. (Goerger 2013, 5)  
 
As shown in the OV-1 diagram (Figure 18. ERS process architecture requires inputs 
from the defense platform/system program management offices, inputs from users and 
doctrine communities in the form of system requirements, and analysis resource inputs. 
These inputs are then analyzed with regard to cost, functional/performance tradespace, and 
mission factors. The outcome consists of system designs that are rapidly reconfigurable with 
respect to the needs and requirements of the operating environment (OE).  
Based on analysis of the Operational View—1 (OV-1) diagram shown in Figure 18. 
the main difference with the existing processes and practices is the greater emphasis on prior 
acquisition processes and analysis to have field-ready defense system evolutions that can 
address predicted functional requirement changes. ERS produces the same system products 
as existing systems engineering and acquisition processes; however, they are supported only 
with a more responsive and resilient acquisition enterprise to accommodate requirement 
changes (Rhodes, Ross 2014). The ERS concept does not necessarily deliver a more resilient 




Conclusions drawn from this ERS OV-1 suggest that the enterprise system acquisition 
process is what is made more resilient by the ERS concept. The result of this enhance 
resilient enterprise system acquisition process are rapidly reconfigurable systems, and not 
necessarily systems with enhanced resilience. Source: Holland (2013). 
 Engineered Resilient Systems Operational View 1. Figure 18. 
The DOD ERS output of rapidly reconfigurable systems (RRSs) can be interpreted in 
many ways. In the broader context of ERS, RRSs are the result of establishing the ways and 
means of ERS. In other words, RRSs are the outcomes of ERS processes (the results of the 
integration of a common core platform, functionally successful heuristics, and the tools and 
resources needed to create the rapid reconfigurations) (Rhodes, Ross 2014). This definition 
implies that an ERS is essentially a rapid redesign or modification that occurs in protracted 
timelines that may or may not be faster than existing approaches to fielding system design 
changes. A system requirement will change, thus rendering a current system unable to 
achieve its functional task and requiring an engineering change to the system to enable it to 
regain its top-level function or task. The system must undergo an engineering change 
proposal and execution process. This process time and resource consuming. This requisite 
engineering/system process is how fielded DOD systems are upgraded and changed when 
requirement shift or evolve. ERS will still be subject to that same process but the tools 
available to solve the problem will be more suited for timely turn around.  
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2. Resilience Engineering 
The aims of system resilience and resilience engineering are the same; however, 
resilience engineering is different from system resilience. Resilience engineering emerged 
from resilience theory, a theoretical framework applied in the late twentieth century to 
discover how ecological systems resist or recover from environmental disasters (Holling, 
Allen, and Gunderson 2009). Contemporary resilience engineering is primarily applied to 
enterprise systems that function in complex environments—for example, emergency rooms, 
air traffic control, and power-grid management. Resilience engineering typically involves 
explicit design measures and processes built into these enterprise systems to give them 
robustness, yet flexibility to recover from functional disruptions that would otherwise cause 
the system to fail (Resilience Engineering Association 2016). System failures are an outcome 
of normal performance variability; therefore, a “resilient system” is able to “adjust its 
functionality prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain 
required operations even after a major mishap or in the presence of continuous stress” 
(Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson 2006, 56). Adaptive resilience borrows many of the 
principles and approaches of contemporary resilience engineering and applies them to 
achieve similar ends in physical technological systems. 
3. Differentiating Engineered Resilient Systems and Resilience 
Engineering 
It is important to distinguish between engineered resilient systems and resilience 
engineering because these terms are increasingly confused in the systems engineering field of 
study. Engineered resilient systems is a DOD project designed to establish and reinforce the 
necessary infrastructure, enterprises, and knowledge to inform defense research, 
development, and technology acquisition to address the complex operating environments 
defense systems will encounter. Resilience engineering, in contrast, is a field of study and 
practice that fuses systems engineering with reliability, availability, and maintainability 
(RAM) engineering, risk management, and operational research (among many others) to 
produce physical resilient systems. In essence, resilience engineering is the operating space, 
or bin, for any and all activity associated with making systems, processes, and enterprises 
more robust and resilient, whereas engineered resilient systems is an enabling effort or 
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activity that will bring the resilience engineering competency to the U.S. Department of 
Defense acquisition process. One is the practice of building resilience in systems (resilience 
engineering); the other involves establishing the means to build resilience in system 
development processes (Engineered Resilient Systems). Figure 19 depicts this difference. 
Engineered resilient systems rely on resilient engineering processes, tools, and 
infrastructure that rapidly enable system modifications and new system development 
when existing system requirements change. This is essentially the same as the recover 
reconfiguration shown in the resilient system-engineering image on the right. Systems 
developed and engineered with system resilience (right image) as a requirement are able 
to resist or recover from system stresses or failures through innate system configurability. 
This does not mean that ERS systems cannot be engineered to be resilient, but rather, the 
DOD ERS project does not specifically target resilient physical systems as a product, and 
resilience engineering does.  
Engineered Resilient Systems vs. Resilience Engineered Systems. Figure 19. 
D. ADAPTIVE RESILIENCE 
Adaptive resilience is a system attribute which enables a system to adapt its 
functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity in order to maintain or regain functional 
effectiveness in satisfying its top-level functional requirements. The conceptual need for 
adaptive resilience stems from the growing complexity present in modern system operating 
environments. Traditional technological systems are generally developed and fielded with a 
set problem or fixed set of requirements that the system’s functionality solves or fulfills. 
These systems generally operate at one optimized design point for a given set of external 
operational conditions to achieve a given set of principal/parent system tasks (Braha, Minai, 
and Bar-Yam 2006). This approach, although acceptable for most systems, presents 
significant functional limitations for systems required to operate or function in complex 
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environments where those external operational conditions are unpredictable, experience 
perturbation, or rapidly shift. The purpose of adaptive resilience is to enable a system to adapt 
its functional traits, structure, process, and/or identity in operationally relevant timescales in 
order to maintain or remain functionally effective in satisfying its principle/top-level 
functional requirements in an unknowable and rapidly shifting environment. In order to 
achieve an adaptive resilient system, system designers and engineers must identify, account 
for, and incorporate the necessary range of performance–trait adaptability or adaptive 
capacity early in the design and development process. Therefore, an effective integration 
methodology is required to achieve system-level adaptive capacity during the system design 
and development process.  
1. Traditional System Design Methods 
In the early 1990s, systems designers proposed a design methodology to map 
stakeholder needs to functional requirements effectively and then to map those functional 
requirements to physical components. The methodology was called axiomatic design. This 
methodology centered on two axioms or principles that if followed, made systems designs 
simple and acceptable (Suh, Crookall 1990). Only Axiom 1 will be discussed in this 
dissertation because it is most relevant. Axiom 1 calls for maintenance of functional 
requirement independence when tracing functions to physical components. In this process, 
the modification of physical component parameters remains isolated to the function that must 
be addressed. For example, consider a kitchen faucet. Imagine a user wants to control the 
temperature and flow rate from the faucet. A faucet with a hot knob and cold knob would 
require the user to tinker with both knobs with both hands to find the desired flow rate and 
temperature. When the sink’s hot water flow function is coupled to the cold water flow 
function, these functions are not independent and according to axiomatic design, less 
desirable. In contrast, a sink with a single handle regulating both flow and temperature 
enables the user to singlehandedly attain the desired flow and temperature. This is depicted in 
Figure 20.  
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This figure shows uncoupled axiomatic design using faucets. Dual-handled faucets are 
coupled and therefore less desirable for controlling temperature and flowrate, compared 
to the single-handled uncoupled faucet design. “FRs” refers to functional requirements. 
“DPs” refers to design parameters. Source: Axiomatic Design Solutions (2016). 
 Coupled and Uncoupled Faucets. Figure 20. 
Dennis Buede (2009) further extended this concept of uncoupled design in his book 
The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods. Buede claimed that the axiomatic 
design approach offered by Suh lacked “sufficient richness of concepts” in the process he 
proposed to handle the complexity in engineered systems (Buede 2009, 53–55). Buede also 
stated, “Suh’s process does not provide a sufﬁcient process to develop and enable validation 
of the requirements” (Buede 2009, 53–55). Buede proposed the use of systems engineering 
methods and tools to fill the gaps in Suh’s process. He supplemented the hierarchical 
axiomatic design method with a concept called allocated architectures (Buede 2009, 284–
290). The allocated architecture merged the functional architecture analysis and the physical 
architecture analysis into holistic system architecture with functions mapped one-to-one with 
the executing components that meet the system’s stakeholder requirements. As previously 
discussed in Chapter I, these design methods often fail when the functional requirements shift 
due to uncertainty and complexity in their operating environment. The requirement that is 
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allocated to an optimal physical component works very well, until the requirement shifts or 
changes to a state that is unachievable by this optimized component. 
2. Contemporary System Design Methods 
Others have identified this problem and have proposed ways and means to address it. 
Many of these approaches focus on how the functional requirements are developed rather 
than focusing on resilient components which address the functional requirement. Many 
approaches focus on the system functional tradespace. Systems engineering is largely 
focused on managing the functions of a system in a way that achieves all of their outcomes 
with minimal collateral effects. Functions within a system often compete and affect one 
another. Tradespace analysis shapes functional requirements in a way that trades away 
competing functionality from one requirement to gain functionality from another. The aim is 
to strike balance between various functions, which enables some minimum level of capability 
in each function. The goal is to find a system design point which is functional at many design 
points but optimal in none. These systems from here forth will be called robust systems. The 
problem with robust systems is that it is difficult to understand the functional outputs and 
broader effects that a single function has on adjacent functions within a system (McKenney. 
Kemink, Singer, 2011; Doerry 2012). Taking this approach was limited as there were 
minimal ways for system designers to become informed on the effects of each function 
(MacCalman, Beery, Paulo 2016). To broaden this awareness would require excessive 
amounts of experimentation to build a common operating picture of a systems functional 
effects across its field of related functions. MacCalman, Beery and Paulo proposed low 
fidelity modeling approach which explores and illuminates a system’s tradespace using 
statistical experimental design (MacCalman, Beery, Paulo 2016). This approach builds that 
common operating of system functions and various system design points and informs the 
designer on the feasibility and performance at that design point, or any other potential design 
point they desire to understand. This is helpful for systems which operate in uncertain 
environments because the designer can pinpoint a broadly applicable design where functional 
utility is realized in broad set of operating conditions.  
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Beery built on this work and generated a method that provides clear process steps and 
ideal tools for applying this concept (Beery 2016). Beery’s MBSE methodology, called 
“model based systems engineering methodology for employing architecture in system 
analysis” (MBSE-MEASA), appears in Figure 21.  
 
This figure depicts the MBSE-MEASA methodology, which refines axiomatic and 
allocated architecture approaches and provides recommended MBSE tools to clearly 
comprehend the system of interest using operational and physical models. Source: Beery 
(2016). 
 MBSE Methodology for Employing  Figure 21. 
Architecture in System Analysis. 
Other approaches include set based design. Set based design approaches are where 
system designers identify a set of functional design points that are feasible early on in the 
design process. The designer will then narrow the set of design points as discriminating 
information about the final system design become available. The final design decision is 
made when absolutely necessary and usually involves desired performance metrics or cost 
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(McKenney. Kemink, Singer 2011). By doing this, the system designer is able to make more 
informed decision with information that emerges as the design realization occurs. This makes 
the design decision more obvious and more efficient. During this time a new technology, new 
experiments, or just better fidelity in the final system design can emerge making the final 
decision or selection of the system or component design that much better. A graphic 
depiction of set based design is shown in Figure 22.  
 
 
This figure depicts how set based design methodologies start with a wide set of feasible 
and suitable designs, and then converges on the final design when a final decision is 
absolutely necessary. This delayed decision time allows for greater design fidelity to be 
realized before constraining design decision are made; ultimately making the final system 
design the most informed and likely most suitable. Source: McKenney. Kemink, and 
Singer (2011).  
 Set Based Design: Design Space Figure 22. 
The problem with these contemporary design approaches is that they still result in a 
fixed design. All of this information from tradespace analysis and delaying design decisions 
is helpful in making good system designs for static and uncertain environments. But the 
complex environment by nature makes the very most informed designs disadvantaged 
because the requirement will still change. A system must be able to rapidly change with the 
environment to be resilient to it. This is not to write off these approaches as unsuitable, just 
incomplete for complex operating environments. This is where adaptive resilience can take a 
system design to the next level. 
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3. Adaptive Resilient Design Method: MSIAR 
The MSIAR builds on the traditional and contemporary design methods with a 
supplemental design and engineering analysis intended to predict how and where functional 
requirements might evolve. In Chapter I, Figure 4. , Figure 5. , and Figure 6.  showed high-
level depictions of how adaptive resilience design is more suitable and for complex operating 
environments that traditional and contemporary design methods. Adaptive resilient design 
augments these previous design approaches. Adaptive resilience transcends the conceptual 
design phase where these previous approaches primarily are applied and applies this 
information predictively during the detailed design phase. This is not to say that the MSIAR 
cannot be conducted during the conceptual design phase as well. However, it must be at 
minimum applied during the detailed design phase. Instead of simply mapping the physical 
components to the functional requirement, the MSIAR methodology is designed to account 
for potential functional requirement shifts, perturbations, and evolutions. The MSIAR seeks 
to reveal where system functions could potentially evolve over a range of requirements 
instead of just one and then maps adaptive components capable of accommodating the 
functional range. This is depicted in Figure 23.  
 
 
This figure depicts how the MSIAR creates a range around the functional requirement 
that the physical component must accommodate with component adaptive capacity. This 
range is predicted and accounted for during the first step of the MSIAR, defining 
adaptive design considerations. 
 Allocated Architecture With Adaptive Resilience. Figure 23. 
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Axiomatic design and allocated architecture push for uncoupled components in the 
system design. This may not always be achievable. Sometimes systems have functions that 
are unavoidably coupled to multiple components and components that are coupled to 
multiple functions. When this situation arises, MSIAR is designed to exploit this situation 
and bring value from that normally undesirable coupling. This concept is shown in Figure 24.  
 
 
This figure depicts two functions coupled by a physical component. The MSIAR is 
designed to leverage functional resources from one function to provide added adaptive 
capacity to a component that has shifted or evolved. If the requirement shift or evolution 
exceeds the capacity of the adaptive physical component, the component can pull 
resources from another component that may not need them at that time. This can occur 
through the modes and means discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 Coupled Function Adaptive Resilience. Figure 24. 
For example, a vehicle armor system adds width to its host platform. This width 
implicates a vehicle’s mobility by limiting the vehicle’s ability to traverse narrow corridors in 
an urban or heavily forested environment. Fixed armor width is a perfect example of parasitic 
capacity affecting adjacent system function. Under certain circumstances, added armor width 
can provide added ballistic protection. The vehicle’s survivability requirements are coupled 
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with its mobility requirements; thus, its armor subsystem is coupled to its mobility 
subsystem. Under the right circumstances, these coupled systems could be adaptively traded 
between the subsystems to provide added capability when needed. The MSIAR would 
account for this through adaptive design considerations and component or subsystem means 
to trade away protection for mobility adaptively, and vice versa. This makes the best out of 
this less-than-ideal situation. This example is discussed in depth in the adaptive resilient 
armor case study presented in Chapter IV and Chapter V. 
The MSIAR shares one common aspect with set based design. Where set based 
design identifies a set or range functional design factors and parameters to be narrowed as the 
system design becomes refined, MSIAR maintains this set or range. Adaptive resilience 
utilizes this set and seeks to find physical components which can accommodate that range of 
factors through internal and external reconfiguration and adaptability. This concept is 
graphically depicted in Figure 25.  
 
 
This figure depicts how the adaptive range of consideration is closely related to the broad 
design sets associated with set based design. Instead of narrowing the set like set based 
design, the MSIAR assigns adaptive components which can accommodate this range 
functionality, making the system resilient to functional requirement evolutions which fall 
within this adaptive range. 
 Set Based Design and MSIAR Figure 25. 
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The range of functional requirement accommodation realized by the MSIAR is 
created when the physical system components have the necessary adaptive capacity to make 
that accommodation. This physical component-level adaptive capacity is shown in Figure 26.  
 
 
This diagram shows the concept of component-level adaptive capacity. This capacity 
realizes component-level resilience (depicted as resilience basins), which provides 
resilience in depth and in breadth. The taller, deeper basins can handle greater magnitude 
of functional perturbation but indicate the component must have the adaptive capacity to 
reach such a state. The thinner, wider basins depict component adaptive states that can 
accommodate a broader or more diverse functional evolution but may lack the capacity 
for higher magnitude perturbations in those diverse states. Nesting the basins shows how 
a range of component functional states can be achieved, which makes a system adaptively 
resilient.  
 Component-Level Adaptive Capacity.  Figure 26. 
The purple resilience basin represents the functional state within the functional range 
of accommodation. The gray dash-bordered basins represent the other adaptive functional 
states enabled by the adaptive physical components. A visual representation linking the 
adaptive resilience bowls to the functional and physical component architecture is shown in 
Figure 27.  The degrees or modes of adaptability trace to the range of functional 





This diagram shows adaptive resilience basins as they relate to the functional range of 
accommodation enabled by physical components with adaptive capacity. The red ball in 
the adaptive resilience basin and its dashed path correlates to the functional requirement 
shifts and evolutions that drive the need for the MSIAR. 
 Adaptive Resilience Basins Mapped  Figure 27. 
to Allocated Architecture. 
E. SUMMARY OF PRIOR WORK AS IT RELATES TO ADAPTIVE 
RESILIENCE 
In summary, an adaptive resilient system uses adaptive capacity to be resilient to 
functional requirement perturbations, shifts, and evolutions that would otherwise disable a 
system from achieving its top-level functionality. Adaptive capacity is achieved by 
integrating adaptive modes, external reconfiguration, and internal reconfiguration, into a 
system’s physical component architecture. These modes are integrated into the system 
components by following the MSIAR when designing and engineering the system. Full 
system adaptive resilience, which has both internal and external reconfigurations, is depicted 
in Figure 28.  
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This diagram shows the concept of adaptive basins but adds external reconfiguration to 
the concept. Now the original adaptive basin is nested within a larger scale adaptive basin 
set that can be imported to the system in a rapid fashion to allow it to scale its 
performance to the disruption at hand. This nesting results in increased adaptive capacity. 
The more nesting of internal and external reconfigurations in the system, the more 
degrees of adaptability are present, and consequently, adaptive resilience. 
 Nested Internal and External System Adaptive Resilience Basins.  Figure 28. 
The greater number of nested adaptive basins in a system, the higher its adaptive 
capacity. This adaptive capacity and capability creates the desired system resilience. This 
resilience has two achievable typologies: recovery and resistance. Resistance is a system’s 
innate ability to withstand perturbations to its functionality, through either adaptation or 
functional robustness. Recovery is the system’s ability to adapt and reconfigure itself to 
regain top-level functionality over time. Both resistance and recovery are achieved through 
the seven adaptive modes (operational variation, reallocation, degeneracy, exaptation, 
redundant/progressive scaling, and replace/repair/heal), each with progressively increasing 
timescales for employment. An alternate way to perceive the difference between resistance 
and recovery is shown in Figure 29.  
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This figure shows T1R, T2R, and adaptation are the driving forces that overcome the 
perturbation, keeping the system on the functional side of “Mount Resilience.” The 
system is represented by the black ball, and perturbation and adaptive forces act on it. 
 Mountain of Adaptive Resilience.  Figure 29. 
The time in which a system is able to adapt is also a critical aspect of adaptive 
resilience. When system perturbations and failures are encountered, the sooner the system 
can reconfigure itself to resist or recover, the more resilient it is. The nesting of adaptive 
means provides a system with multiple ways to reconfigure itself to achieve the resistance or 
recovery needed to resume functionality in the event of a functional requirement shift or 
evolution. These adaptive options often have disparate timelines for achievement. These 
timelines can be chronologically pursued to maintain available means and ways to regain 
functionality. This concept is depicted in Figure 30.  
When a systems adaptive performance factors are properly nested and characterized, 
the system will be in a position where it can adapt optimally and agilely to the likely 
spectrum of functional requirement shifts and evolutions it may encounter. Additionally, the 
system will accomplish this by mitigating unnecessary or unwanted parasitic capacity. This 
enhanced state of resilience, achieved through purposeful integration of component adaptive 
capacity, is the system attribute of adaptive resilience. System integration of adaptive 
resilience is the active planning, accounting, and integration of adaptive means implemented 
with the explicit objective of achieving enhanced system resilience for a given physical 
system. The following chapter will outline the recommended methodology to realize adaptive 
resilience in systems which operating in complex operating environments. 
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This figure shows how systems lacking adaptive resilience have delayed recovery 
timelines to bring about lost top-level functionality. Adaptive resilient systems with 
multiple nested degree of adaptability can provide resistance and recovery solutions in 
shorter operationally relevant timelines. Operational relevance is based on how soon the 
system regains its lost functionality. Systems that take longer to regain this functionality 
are not as operationally relevant as systems that produce lost functionality sooner. 




III. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION OF THE METHODOLOGY FOR 
SYSTEM INTEGRATION OF ADAPTIVE RESILIENCE 
A. DEFINITION OF ADAPTIVE RESILIENCE 
Adaptive resilience is a system attribute that enables the system to adapt its system 
performance factors or parameters to maintain the ability to fulfill its top-level function and 
requirements in operationally relevant timescales. For example, an armor system’s top-level 
function could be to prevent or protect against threat penetration. Nonadaptive armor systems 
are designed to protect or prevent penetration from a certain class or scale of ballistic threats. 
If a more capable threat is introduced, the nonadaptive armor system may not be able to 
protect or prevent penetration from that threat. If the armor cannot protect or prevent threat 
penetration, then the armor system has lost its top-level functional utility. Not only does the 
armor system lose its functional utility (first-order effect), but significant higher-order effects 
result from the process to correct this functional deficiency. These higher-order effects 
include several elements: the new requirement that engineering redesigns must account for, 
the cost and effort associated with that redesign, the lost operational time because of this 
failure, and the political/social ramifications associated with the failure of the system (e.g., 
death, system failure, cost). An adaptive resilient armor would be able to adapt or modify the 
means through which it defeated threats to maintain or regain its top-level function or 
requirement within an operationally relevant timeline. The system’s ability to change relies 
on adaptive capacity accommodations made in its initial design.  
1. Purpose of Adaptive Resilience 
The purpose of adaptive resilience is to enable system’s to maintain or remain 
functionally effective in satisfying its top-level functional requirements in unpredictable and 
rapidly shifting operating environments. The need for adaptive resilience is driven by 
traditional and contemporary system functional inadequacies which emerge during operation 
in complex environments. Traditionally, most technological systems are developed and 
fielded with a set problem or requirement that the system’s functionality solves or fulfills. 
This is the top-level function. This traditional approach is acceptable for most systems, but 
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presents significant functional limitations for systems required to operate or function in 
complex environments in which functional requirements are unpredictable or rapidly shift. In 
order to achieve an adaptive resilient system, system designers and engineers must account 
for the capacity, range, or variability of functional traits early in the design and development 
process. These qualities must be integrated into the design at an early stage in the system 
design and engineering process. One might ask why a designer would not just design for the 
worst case in that range. The answer to this question goes back to parasitic capacity. Adaptive 
resilience mitigates undesired parasitic capacity associated with a robust fixed design. In 
other words, the integration of adaptive resilience enables or incorporates functional adaptive 
capacity within a system design, giving it the ability to agilely and efficiently change 
functional performance parameters in order to maintain or regain functionality with regard to 
a given top-level task or requirement in a broad range of complex environments or situations. 
However, adaptive resilience is not a silver bullet: Some limitations may hamper the ability 
of a system to resist and recover from disruptions, perturbations, and requirement shifts.  
2. Problems Addressed by Adaptive Resilience 
The key problem addressed by adaptive resilience is the limited ability of traditional 
systems to maintain their functional ability to maintain top-level requirements in situations 
with significant requirement shifts and evolutions. Armor, for example, has a principle or 
top-level function to prevent penetration. Armor on a military vehicle may have a 
requirement to prevent a small arms projectile from penetrating the exterior of the vehicle 
and entering the crew compartment. A traditional armor would be tested, optimized, and 
validated to prevent threat penetration against a statistically relevant threat scale a vehicle 
would likely encounter in a conflict. However, the risk remains that a light armored vehicle 
could face an asymmetric tactic change that renders traditional engineering and design 
methodologies outmoded. The asymmetric enemy has adopted complex and asymmetric 
tactics that are unpredictable and often emergent, employing heavily overmatched 
(conventional or improvised) weapons against lightly protected vehicles, as previously 
discussed in the prologue and introduction (Perkins, Odierno 2014). To handle these 
circumstances, status quo vehicles would require a significant redesign of their armor 
systems, requiring months of design, testing, production, and integration in order to regain 
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the top-level functionality of its integrated armor. This status quo engineering approach and 
design methodology would regain the system’s top-level functionality, but again, at a 
singular design point, leaving the system potentially vulnerable to another rapid shift in 
weaponry or tactics. These types of situations call for adaptive performance capability that 
can resist or rapidly recover from top-level function failure. An adaptive resilient armor could 
be rapidly scaled along its performance factors to maintain protective capability in the event 
of many penetrating weapons or tactics shift (to a point). The concept of integrating adaptive 
resilience is intended to overcome these challenges by enabling the system to remain 
functionally capable with respect to its top-level function, despite requirement shifts. An 
adaptive resilient armor could adapt its functional attributes and tailor them in functionally 
relevant timelines to prevent penetration from a broad range of penetrating threats. 




This diagram shows the methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience 
(MSIAR). Note the binning of each process step with the generic systems engineering 
process steps. This methodology can be used in a stand-alone fashion or as a supplement 
to the systems engineering process. 
 Methodology for the System Integration  Figure 31. 
of Adaptive Resilience Flow Diagram.  
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For many human-made systems, the ability to adapt functional performance to 
achieve adaptive resilience is highly desirable. A proposed method to achieve adaptive 
resilience is shown in Figure 31. The ability to achieve adaptive resilience is enabled by a 
system’s innate adaptive capacity. To explain this conceptual description of this 
methodology, a common and relatable pickup truck system will be used. Pickup trucks 
generally have high automotive power and torque, but the power comes with a tradeoff in 
fuel efficiency. These are competing requirements that in traditional systems engineering 
methods would be traded or balanced away. Some days, the truck could be used to haul a 
heavy trailer, and on others, it could merely transport a single occupant to work and back. On 
the light-load days, the pickup truck provides a significant amount of parasitic capacity that 
detracts from desired efficiency. The daily operational requirements unpredictably shift, but 
shift in a way that limits the range of the shift. In an energy resource-constrained world, fuel 
inefficient vehicles tend to be financially costly. The ability to “adapt” a pickup truck’s 
performance to the requisite power or efficiency need at hand would be of significant value. 
A highly efficient pickup truck that had the ability to change its performance configuration to 
achieve the needed torque and power for towing at the touch of a button would be ideal. 
However, how does a designer incorporate that ability to adapt into a given system? This is 
the question the following proposed methodology is intended to answer. The following 
methodology uses seven high-level steps that can be decomposed to any requisite level of 
fidelity for the integration effort of interest: 
 
1. Define adaptive design considerations 
2. Identify controllable/adaptive performance factors 
3. Characterize adaptive performance factor configurations 
4. Verify and validate adaptive performance factor configurations 
5. Map validated configurations to adaptive system components/modules 
6. Integrate adaptive components and configurations into system 
7. Verify and validate integrated component configurations and performance 
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1. Define Adaptive Design Considerations 
The first and most critical step to integrating adaptive resilience is defining the 
desired adaptive design considerations and identifying the manner in which they are adaptive. 
The standard pickup truck is powerful and full of utility for situations in which power and 
torque are needed. However, this attribute is a detractor for alternate uses of the pickup truck 
such as simple transportation or commuting. Driving a pickup truck 50 miles every day is on 
average more costly from a fuel perspective than driving a compact car. Conversely, a 
compact, fuel-efficient car is much less costly for commuting and simple transportation from 
that same fuel perspective. However, the compact car is not suitable for pulling a large trailer 
or hauling cargo. Another alternative would be to use the car for commuting and the truck for 
hauling. However, this is even more costly, because now the user must purchase and 
maintain two separate, costly vehicles. A potentially better option would be to have a truck 
that provided the power when needed, but when the power was not needed, could be 
reconfigured in a manner that optimized fuel efficiency and normal use costs. The existing 
functional requirement for the pickup truck is for it to transport passengers and a quarter-ton 
of cargo. However, with emerging political and environmental pressures, the pickup truck 
designer could employ the MSIAR and define adaptive design considerations to account for 
potential fuel efficiency requirements. This adaptive design consideration would be to design 
the vehicle to transport cargo, but with an adaptive range of performance that offered 
required power, optimal fuel efficiency, and every performance configuration in between. 
This design consideration places a range around the functional requirement that the physical 
components of the pickup truck must accommodate. Once the adaptive considerations are 
specified and applied to the existing requirement at an appropriate level of fidelity, the 
process advances to the next step. 
2. Identify Controllable/Adaptive Performance Factors 
With the adaptive design considerations applied to the requirement, the controllable 
or adaptive performance factors must be identified. This step enables systems engineers and 
designers to understand what parameters can be manipulated and adapted to achieve the 
desired range of adaptive performance. Functional parameters or factors are independent 
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attributes of a function that dictate the performance or output of that function. In an algebraic 
function, a factor is the independent variable (often x), which influences the dependent 
variable [f(x) or y]. In other words, in this step of the methodology, the systems designer 
seeks to find the “controllable” independent performance variable(s) on which the targeted 
adaptive function depends. Controllable means that the factor can be manipulated easily and 
in an agile fashion. Controllability is critical, because if the factor cannot be controlled, then 
the user cannot predictably adapt it for desired performance.  
In analyzing controllable and adaptive performance factors, the two modes of 
adaptability, internal and external reconfiguration, should be used as a starting point for ideas. 
In the pickup truck example, controllable performance factors are numerous. One way of 
quickly identifying controllable factors is to look at common components or parts and 
compare or contrast their differences. A pickup truck typically has an eight-cylinder engine, 
and a compact car typically has a four-cylinder engine. Pickup trucks generally have four or 
five transmission gears, whereas most fuel-efficient compact cars have five to six 
transmission gears. Compact cars generally have tires that have a low topographical profile 
for optimal friction and rolling efficiency on improved roads, whereas pickup trucks have a 
knobby high topographical tire profile for maximum traction on unimproved and off-road 
surfaces. These aspects of a vehicle can be used as adaptive factors because they are all easy 
to manipulate in an agile fashion. For example, shifting transmission gears is an easy 
adaptation of a vehicle’s functional state. However, changing the vehicle’s gear sizes and 
ratios is much more challenging and time intensive, making that an unsuitable adaptive 
factor. These are just a few obvious and controllable component or system factors related to 
typical pickup trucks and compact cars that directly affect the desired adaptive function 
range. Once the controllable performance factors are identified and specified to a desired 
level of fidelity, an adaptive systems designer may proceed to the next step in the 
methodology.  
3. Characterize Adaptive Performance Factor Configurations 
Performance factor solution configurations are the factor states that meet or advance 
the system’s performance toward the desired function performance specified in the 
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requirements. In other words, referring back to the previously discussed algebraic function, 
the performance factor solution configuration for that function is the specific independent 
variable value(s) that achieve the desired dependent variable values or range of values. It is 












    
What are the values of x (independent variable) that provide values of i(x) that are equal to or 
greater than 6 and less than or equal to 8? Table 1 shows the answer and a mathematical 
proof of this concept. 
Table 1.   Algebraic Proof: Independent and Dependent Variable Defining the 
Functional Output within a Desired Range of Values. 
 
 
The output values of the algebraic function are listed in the right column. These 
function values and input x values applied to the algebraic function serve as the function 
configurations for the given algebraic function set. The i(x) = 5 or 9 values are shown in red 
to denote that these values are out of the desired output range; and therefore the x = 0 and 4 
factor values are unsuitable input configurations.  
Now apply this same process to the pickup truck example. The innate system 
performance factors (inputs) previously identified for power and efficiency could include the 
number of engine cylinders, the number of transmission gears, or the topographical profile of 
the tire treads. By analyzing the different numbers of cylinders and by collecting data on the 
engine power output and fuel efficiency for each cylinder, gear, or tread quantity or state, a 
x  Values Proof: x  + 5 Function i (x )
0 0 + 5 5
1 1 + 5 6
2 2 + 5 7
3 3 + 5 8
4 4 + 5 9
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linear or nonlinear function could be generated that “functionally characterizes” the cylinder 
count, gear count, or tread-type to the level of power and efficiency for the vehicle. Varying 
these factors or combinations of factors provides configurations that enable variable-
dependent solutions or performance outputs (power and efficiency). Knowing how the 
variability in the independent factor configurations implicates the dependent performance 
output enables a systems designer to understand and predict how changes to the factors (gears 
cylinders, and treads) affect performance output (power and efficiency). Assuming that 
varying the number of engine cylinders has an impact on engine power and efficiency, 
engineers could design an engine whose number of engaged cylinders could be controlled to 
optimize power and efficiency for the immediate operational need.  
This approach for adaptive factor characterization can be taken one (or multiple) 
steps further by employing multiple factors of adaptability to produce a combinatorial effect 
on specific functions. For example, consider the following algebraic function shown in 
Equation 2: 
2
( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The parent function, P(i,j,k), is made up of subfunctions i(x), j(y), and k(z). P(i,j,k) 
represents an adaptive function output, and i(x), j(y), and k(z) represent independent factor 
configuration functions. Figure 32 shows the function plots for i(x), j(y), and k(z), as well as 
a combined plot for all three subfunctions.  
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Subfunctions i(x), j(y), k(z), and P(i,j,k) from Equation 2. 
 Performance Characterization Plots for Adaptive Factor Figure 32. 
Configurations 
Now think of these subfunction plots as individual components of a system in which 
each subfunction independent variable is controllable, and its dependent output has direct 
correlation and impact on a higher-level system function. In other words, the output of the 
algebraic subfunctions directly translates to the functional performance of a common higher 
level function. In the case of the pickup truck, P(i,j,k) would be the (hypothetical) power 
output of the pickup truck with respect to i(x), which hypothetically represents the power 
output based on the number of engine cylinders (1 ≤ x ≤ 8). Similarly, j(y) hypothetically 
represents the power output based on the number of transmission gears (1 ≤ y ≤ 6), and k(z) 
represents the power output based on the tire tread profile (1 ≤ z ≤ 4). By having three 
configurable factors, the user has three degrees of adaptability to be able to adjust, modify, or 
adapt the system toward achieving the desired functional outcome and 192 adaptive design 
configurations along those degrees of adaptability to achieve that outcome.  
Characterization of the adaptive performance factor configurations is another critical 
step in the MSIAR. This step in the methodology gathers the data and defines the scope of 
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adaptability that can be achieved for the factors of interest. The output of this step is a 
predictive formula that approximates the functional output of all the functional values. The 
individual factor outputs are not necessarily additive or linearly cumulative. It must not be 
assumed that the adaptive factor outputs have a cumulative effect on the overall system 
output. For example, changing the engine cylinders from eight to four may not integrate well 
with certain tire tread configurations or transmission gears. Because of this, the factor 
configurations and their functional outputs must be verified and validated. This is the next 
step in the methodology. 
4. Verify and Validate Adaptive Performance Factor Configurations 
Verifying and validating the resultant factor configuration solutions is critical to 
being able to predict accurately or even approximately the outcome of a system adaptation. 
Verification ensures the adaptive performance factor configurations actually achieve the 
desired system performance. Validation ensures that verified adaptive performance factors 
conform to the adaptive design considerations and system functional requirements specified 
in step 1. Each factor has its own effect on the adaptive functionality. Sometimes these 
effects are independent of the other factors, sometimes they are not. Sometimes the factors 
have combinatorial effects that are additive or linearly cumulative. Sometimes conflicting 
effects occur in which individually two factors have a positive outcome on a functional 
output, but when combined, have a negative outcome. Often, synergistic effects occur in 
which the combined output of the two factor functions is greater than the sum of the two 
outputs. Because of this resultant inconsistency, verification and validation of the resultant 
factor configuration solution must be conducted. This process generally consists of executing 
system tests of low fidelity system components and models at the desired characterized factor 
configurations. For the hypothetical pickup truck example, verifying and validating would 
involve testing a low fidelity prototype engine, transmission and tires at the respective 
various cylinder, gear, and tire tread states to acquire relative performance confirmation.  
Verification and validation need not occur at each configuration state; in the pickup 
truck example, that goal would require 192 experiments to be conducted (8 cylinders x 6 
gears x 4 tire treads types = 192 configuration points). A reduced experiment set could be 
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conducted to gather hard cumulative function output values with which to compare, contrast, 
and validate the formulaic values predicted in the previous step of the methodology. Using 
methods to ensure proper design of experiments (DOE), an appropriate “fractional” factorial 
validation experiment set could be assembled to generalize the holistic functional response at 
the various factor configurations. If significant discrepancies exist between the predicted 
functional output and the experimental output, a causal investigation could be conducted to 
characterize more clearly the factor correlation with the functional output. Once function 
outputs are verified (and potentially adjusted), the output values must be validated against the 
original adaptive design considerations specified in the first step of the methodology. If gaps 
exist between the requirements and the resultant configuration outputs, they must be filled. 
This can be done through further experimentation by adding additional factors, expanding the 
factor state range, or if the requirement cannot be met, by informing the stakeholders of the 
situation and proposing a change to the requirement. If the validated configuration solutions 
meet all the considerations, then the appropriate level of adaptability has been identified, and 
the conceptual system can proceed to the next step in the methodology  
5. Map Validated Configurations to Adaptive System Components 
After the configuration solution outputs have been verified and validated against the 
functional requirements, the next step is mapping the configuration solutions to physical 
subsystems and components capable of producing the configuration states and functional 
outputs. This step simply consists of identifying physical components that have the 
configurability to enable the overall system to operate at the identified configuration factor 
states. If subsystems or components do not exist with this capability, a design and 
engineering process must occur to create them or to integrate that capability into existing 
systems. In terms of the hypothetical pickup truck, an example of this process would be 
mapping the need for a V8 engine system that could turn piston cylinders on or off as needed 
to achieve the opposing requirements of power and efficiency (Stabinsky, et al. 2007). If an 
engine like this does not exist, perhaps modifying the spark plug and fuel systems on an 
existing engine would prevent certain piston cylinders from not firing, thus attaining the 
engine cylinder utilization variability number needed to achieve the dichotomous function 
range for engine power and efficiency. During this process, a systems designer may discover 
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that a physical component or subsystem cannot achieve the variable factor states or that 
achieving them results in unforeseen consequences that remove the incentive for having the 
adaptive capability in the first place. For example, turning off half of the cylinders on the 
engine may cause the engine to expend more fuel to drive in a normal commuter fashion, 
negating the desired outcome of increasing efficiency. The potential for a situation like this 
exists but can be avoided through the proper use of systems engineering principles. Once the 
mapping of requirements to components is complete, the component performance at the 
various factor levels must be verified and validated to confirm the predicted outcomes found 
in the characterization models. The characterization models numerically show what is 
possible and not possible regarding the adaptive performance occurring through varying 
factor configurations. After the systems designer identifies (or creates) the physical 
components, their actual physical performance must be verified and validated. This occurs in 
the next step.  
6. Integrate Adaptive System Components and Configurations
Steps 6 and 7 of the MSIAR occur in a mutually dependent fashion. Integration 
cannot be complete without verification and validation, and verification and validation cannot 
occur unless a level of integration has been achieved. The level of integration for this step is 
much more in-depth, compared to the previous step, and requires analysis of overall system 
impacts on the vehicle. All traditional systems engineering and integration principles apply in 
this step of the methodology. Referring back to the pickup truck example, the integration 
effort might include the insertion of an adaptive engine block, a transmission, and variable 
tire treads into the overall pickup truck system. The integration analysis would perhaps 
encompass how the engine block in efficiency mode (< 8 cylinders) powers the auxiliary 
systems that rely on the engine for functionality (e.g., air conditioning, engine cooling). If 
interferences or severe implications were encountered, modifications may be required. This 
step is essentially the synthesis of the functional requirements with the physical adaptive 
components in the larger system of interest, thus ensuring that higher system performance is 
maintained or enhanced as desired. Figure 33 depicts an example of the integration space or 
tradespace that constrains ground vehicles and systems.  
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This figure depicts the common subsystem tradespace associated with ground systems 
and vehicles. The primary trades are driven by ground system performance, payload, and 
protection, which can be further decomposed into system attributes such as space, weight, 
and power/cooling. Through balancing and trading these system characteristics and 
attributes, opportunities, and risks emerge in the ground system survivability realm for 
system safety, situational awareness, threat defeat, signature management, 
detection/warning, lethality/self-defense, and overall system integration. This framework 
serves as a way to contextualize visually the relevant constraints that ground systems 
must manage. Adaptive resilience can help balance or even eliminate tradespace 
constraints for systems in which the MSIAR is applied. 
 The Ground System Iron Triangle.  Figure 33. 
7. Verify and Validate Integrated Component Performance 
As in the previous step, final verification, validation, and integration occur in a 
mutually dependent fashion. The integrated adaptive component performance must be 
verified and validated against the functional requirements of the overall system. This 
validation and verification is for the holistic physical system. No models or simulations are 
used. The purpose of this step is to ensure that the physical system components are capable of 
physically performing at the functionally required ranges of output. Verification ensures the 
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integrated components actually achieve the desired system performance. In addition, 
verification helps characterize the performance in case there are system-level synergistic or 
nihilist effects from the combinations of adaptive performance factors. Validation ensures 
that verified integration of components conform to the adaptive design considerations and 
system functional requirements specified in step 1. Referring again to the pickup truck’s 
engine cylinder variability, an engine may produce 300 bhp with all eight cylinders engaged 
and only 150 bhp with only four cylinders engaged. Generally, an engine that has less power 
output uses less fuel, but that may not always be the case. The purpose of reducing the 
number of cylinders engaged and having less horsepower is to increase the engine’s fuel 
efficiency. However, what if this reduction causes reliability, availability, and maintenance 
issues to arise? Adapting engine size could create detrimental effects across the greater 
system that then must be addressed. This type of situation would be identified during this step 
of the methodology. This step helps ensure the adaptive functions integrated into adaptive 
subsystems and components physically perform and offer the desired adaptive resilient 
benefits for the system as a whole.  
It is likely that numerous components and subsystems will be identified for factorial 
adaptability. However, as mentioned previously, the possibility exists that when combined, 
these subsystems or components could have negative or counteractive effects on the desired 
functional output. On the other hand, in combination, they could have a synergistic effect in 
which their effect on the desired functional output is positively greater. Therefore, the results 
of combining the adaptive components and subsystems must be compared to the original 
specified functional requirements and adaptive design considerations to ensure they are met 
or exceeded. If they are not met, then the components are likely not good candidates for 
adaptive resilience integration. If this is the case, the methodology must be restarted and 
different means of achieving the functional outcome identified and tested.  
8. Summary 
As with any systems engineering–based methodology, iterations and restarts of the 
process steps will likely occur. Feedback loops were deliberately placed in Figure 31. to 
denote the continual update and iteration of the steps as the user advances through the 
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methodology, producing new data, information, and knowledge. These insights could 
implicate or modify a choice or course of action selected previously in the methodology. The 
conceptual description of the methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience 
was provided in a cursory and general fashion. Significant effort and analysis is required for 
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IV. CONSTRUCTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADAPTIVE 
RESILIENCE SYSTEM INTEGRATION METHODOLOGY 
A. ARMOR TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 
Armor, in the classic sense, is generally associated with combat or protection from an 
attack. The general purpose of armor is to prevent the penetrating blows of weapons, teeth, or 
the environment from piercing a vulnerable area. It is very likely that nature inspired the first 
implementation of armor by a human, perhaps prompted by an early human’s witnessing of a 
jackal’s attempt to devour a turtle on the Mesopotamian plain. The survivability/protection 
function of armor has existed everywhere for billions of years, tracing back to the functions 
of the outer membranes on the first mitochondria (Cooper 2006). Armor serves many 
functions, from callus tissue padding on feet to windshields on cars to the ballistic shields 
commonly associated with vehicles or bodies. Like armor in the nonmilitaristic sense, vehicle 
armor is a mature function, and the physical performance potential of this technology is at or 
rapidly approaching its known physical performance limits. Yet, the existing and emerging 
threats facing armor technologies trends toward increased penetration and lethality. Further, 
the entities that employ these threats are random and opportunistic in their means of 
employing those threats (Burns 2008). This fact has created many challenges for the 
classically designed armor systems utilized in the contemporary operating environment. The 
current and future operating environment is and will continue to be chaotic or complex 
(Perkins, Odierno 2014). Armor is considered a parasitic system because it serves only a 
single purpose and is usually heavy and burdensome, hindering its host vehicle’s automotive 
performance and mobility. A solution to this problem would be the creation of an armor with 
a broad, high-performing ballistic performance, successfully deflecting the myriad threats on 
the battlefield, yet also achieving orders-of-magnitude less weight to avoid implicating the 
host vehicle’s functionality. The problem with this solution is that the fundamental 
performance factor that drives armor performance is also the factor that makes armor so 
heavy—mass.  
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1. Common Armor Materials 
In the vehicle armor domain, armor materials generally fall into two categories: 
opaque and transparent. Opaque armor materials are used for armoring the hulls, doors, and 
roofs of vehicles. Transparent armor materials, generally glass, are used for armoring vehicle 
windows. Opaque armors are opaque because there is no need to see through them. The most 
common materials for opaque armor are steel and aluminum. Numerous military 
specifications exist for steel armor, but two steels—MIL-DTL-46100 and MIL-A-12560—
are most commonly used for modern armor applications. These two steels are commonly 
referred to as high-hard steel and rolled homogenous armor (RHA) steel, respectively. These 
armored steels are both hard yet considerably resistant to the shock sustained during high 
velocity impact. Both of these steels are produced by rolling cast steel billets into plates of 
specific thickness. Aluminum is another common armor material, used when weight savings 
are required. Aluminum is a very effective lightweight armor material (Gooch, Burkins, and 
Squillacioti 2007). Of the different series of aluminum, the most common are the 5000 and 
7000 series, specifically MIL-DTL-46063H (7039-T64); MIL-DTL-32262 (6061-T651); and 
MIL-DTL-46027J/46083D (5083-H13; Gooch, Burkins, and Squillacioti 2007).  
Common composite materials used for armor applications consist of S2 fiberglass 
and E fiberglass. These two materials have great toughness in addition to their high tensile 
qualities. A recently developed composite material used in armor applications is ultrahigh 
molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE). This material derives from the same molecular 
material as plastic trash and grocery bags. The difference is that this material is formed into 
fibers and compressed to precise processing and treatment standards, which imposes extreme 
pressures and heat to make monolithic sheets or blocks suitable for armor use. UHMWPE is 
a lightweight, high-performing material in the context of terminal ballistics. The material’s 
main drawback is that it is prone to catching fire during ballistic events (Korobeinichev, 
Paletsky, Kuibida, Gonchikzhapov, Shundrina 2016). This attribute can be mitigated through 
chemical treatments and additives. The final opaque material commonly used in armor 
applications is ceramics. Ceramics have extreme hardness but generally low toughness. 
However, the hardness and density of ceramics makes this material ideal for armor 
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applications. Its main shortcomings are that it shows poor performance after an initial strike, 
and the material is costly.  
Windows or view ports in armored vehicles have always been vulnerable points. 
With the emergence of the IED threat, the Soldiers operating in combat environments 
requested greater visual situational awareness to detect and hence prevent IED ambushes. 
With this request came the inherent viewport vulnerability, which led to increased efforts to 
develop windows and view ports with ballistic protection capability. The most commonly 
used material in transparent armor is glass, more specifically, borosilicate glass. This type of 
glass is produced in the same fashion as the Pyrex cookware glass that many people use in 
their kitchens (Goodfellow Ceramic & Glass 2013). Borosilicate is used because of its 
resistance to thermal expansion. Borosilicate glass has a thermal coefficient of linear 
expansion of 3.3 × 10–6 / C°. Glass used in ballistic application must be very thick. This has 
implications in situations of temperature changes in cold and hot environments. The inside of 
the vehicle is heated while the outside is cold, or vice versa. The thicker the glass, the greater 
the temperature gradient that can occur from the inside to the outside of the panes. This 
difference causes thermal expansion and contraction in a material that does not have 
tolerance for either. Borosilicate, though not impervious to temperature changes, is more 
resistant to the subsequent fracture that often occurs with other glass materials in temperature 
extremes (Goodfellow Ceramic & Glass 2013).  
Other transparent materials include polycarbonate and ceramics. Polycarbonate is an 
extremely tough material that is virtually impossible to shatter. Its only drawback is that it 
tends to scratch easily. It is often used as an interpane material between borosilicate glass 
sheets. Transparent ceramics is a new emerging material in the armor field. This class of 
ceramic material is called spinel. Spinel is still immature in its consistent manufacturability 
for transparent armor use (Weins 2015). It also extremely expensive in its transparent state. 
However, this material has shown great potential for ballistic performance, on par with steel.  
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2. Armor Velocity, Mass, and Volume Metrics
a. V50 Ballistic Limit
The ballistic limit of an armor is typically expressed as the V50 ballistic limit. The V50 
ballistic limit referred to in this dissertation is the U.S. Army’s criterion. The U.S. Army V50 
criterion is a more stressing version than the U.S. Navy criterion. The U.S. Army criterion 
defines a complete penetration if the projectile hole would allow light to pass through to the 
nonstrike face side of the armor. The U.S. Navy criterion requires the entire projectile or a 
major portion of the projectile to have passed through the armor plate of interest (Army Test 
and Evaluation Command, 1984). This metric is a valuable measure of an armor material’s 
ballistic performance. The V50 ballistic limit is measured by maintaining a fixed thickness 
and obliquity of an armor material target while a series of threat projectiles are fired at it with 
increasing velocities (Army Test and Evaluation Command 1984). The intent of varying the 
velocity is to find the exact velocity at which 50 out of 100 projectiles transition from 
complete to partial penetration through the armor plate. This distribution normally follows a 
cumulative normal distribution. After a statistically significant number of shots have been 
fired, mean velocity for V50 and the standard deviation can be determined. The V50 ballistic 
limit curve for a .30 cal APM2 against various RHA thicknesses is shown in Figure 34.  
b. Areal Density
Areal density (AD) is a common mass measure or characteristic of an armor 
technology used for quick weight comparison of similar armors. In the United States, areal 
density is usually referred to in English units as pounds per square foot (psf). Many armor 
technologies use a composite or laminate construction of different materials. These materials 
each have a separate purpose or function and generally vary significantly in density. As a 
way to summarize the overall density of the armor, a 1-foot by 1-foot areal cross-section is 
taken of the entire armor composite and weighed. The total weight of the 1-foot by 1-
foot section is the armor’s areal density (Burns 2008). Table 2 shows the areal density of 
rolled homogenous armor (RHA) steel at various thicknesses. Using this data, an armor 
technology made of 1-inch RHA would have an areal density of 40 lbs.  
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This figure depicts the V50 ballistic limit for RHA plate at thicknesses ranging from .20″ 
thick to .75″ thick vs. .30 cal APM2. For example, an RHA plate at approximately .60″ 
thick has a V50 equivalent to the standard muzzle velocity of the .30 Cal APM2. Muzzle 
velocity is the mean velocity measure of a projectile as it departs the muzzle or barrel of 
the weapon that is firing it, in the munitions standard load manufacture. Source: Gooch 
and Burkins (2004). 
 V50 Ballistic Limit vs. RHA Thickness for .30 cal  Figure 34. 
APM2 armor piercing projectile. 
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Table 2.   Areal Densities for Varying Thicknesses of RHA Plate. 
Mass and volumetric efficiency are valuable measures of how well an armor utilizes its 
mass or volume, respectively, in defeating a threat. The efficiency is based on the 
benchmark armor material RHA. The table shows the areal density for different 
thicknesses of rolled homogenous armor (RHA). For RHA, the areal density is just over 
40 lbs., as shown the fifth column, at the 1-inch thickness row. Areal density is a great 
measure and tool that assists in the comprehension and benchmarking of mass and 
volumetric efficiency. 
c. Mass Efficiency
Mass efficiency (Em) is the measure of how the armor’s mass performance compares 
to an equivalently performing armor made of solid RHA (Burns 2008). As discussed 
previously, RHA is an effective but extremely heavy armor material. When dealing with 
armor, the ever-present battle is to minimize weight while improving ballistic performance. 
RHA is a default or benchmark armor material; therefore, it is used often in comparisons of 
armors. This measure is complicated but important in understanding how well an armor 
performs. Mass efficiency is calculated by shooting the armor-of-interest with a given threat 
to measure unpenetrated, residual-thickness areal density. That areal density is then 




Density Thickness Thickness Areal Density
kg / m3 lb / ft3 Inches ft lb / ft2
7830 488.592 0.065 0.005416667 2.65
7830 488.592 0.125 0.010416667 5.09
7830 488.592 0.1875 0.015625 7.63
7830 488.592 0.25 0.020833333 10.18
7830 488.592 0.3125 0.026041667 12.72
7830 488.592 0.375 0.03125 15.27
7830 488.592 0.4375 0.036458333 17.81
7830 488.592 0.5 0.041666667 20.36
7830 488.592 0.625 0.052083333 25.45
7830 488.592 0.75 0.0625 30.54
7830 488.592 0.875 0.072916667 35.63
7830 488.592 1 0.083333333 40.72
7830 488.592 1.25 0.104166667 50.90
7830 488.592 1.5 0.125 61.07
7830 488.592 1.75 0.145833333 71.25
7830 488.592 2 0.166666667 81.43
Material: Rolled Homogenous Armor
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This difference is divided by the overall areal density of the armor-of-interest. This measure 
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d. Volumetric Efficiency 
Volumetric efficiency (Ev) is the measure of how well the armor uses the volume it 
takes up in defeating the threat (Burns 2008). This efficiency measure is calculated by 
subtracting the overall depth of penetration (DOP) of the threat into the armor from the 
threat’s depth of penetration into RHA. This difference is then divided by the overall 
thickness of the armor-of-interest’s profile. Armors that stop threats halfway into the 
thickness of the armor obviously perform well, but do not make efficient use of the overall 
armor volume (parasitic capacity). That left-over distance could be considered weight that 
could be trimmed off the armor or as a safety buffer in case of an anomaly in the threat 
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3. Basic Penetration Mechanics 
Very high velocity projectile penetration can be simply approximated through 
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Sir Isaac Newton derived this approximation, based on his observations of 
momentum transfer. This approximation does not take into account projectile shape, kinetic 
energy dissipation, target/projectile failure modes, and their associated material properties, 
which also play a significant role in resultant terminal ballistics. This approximation also 
assumes that the target is a semi-infinite block of material that can never be completely 
penetrated. To include a comprehensive equation that accounts for all of these factors is not 
appropriate for an armor primer that aims to familiarize those new to this field. This 
approximation is a helpful and simple way to generalize and compare the penetration 
capabilities of projectiles and penetration resistance from the mass of target materials. A 
bullet of length 1 and density 1 will approximately penetrate a distance equivalent to its 
length into a semi-infinite target block with density 1 at very high velocities. For 
conventional small arms, the projectile lengths are generally less than 2 inches. Therefore, a 
monolithic armor of equal density must be at least 2 inches thick to be able to stop the 
projectile. If the projectile and target material were steel, it would require at the very 
minimum 2 inches of contiguous steel to stop the projectile. To put this into the context of 
mass and area of protection, a 1-foot by 1-foot by 1-inch plate of steel weighs 40 lbs. This 
dimensional measure, as described previously, is known as areal density. The areal density 
required to stop the 2-inch steel projectile would be 80 pounds per square foot (psf). To 
continue this areal density context, assume the area for the side crew compartment of a 
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typical tactical vehicle is 6 feet long by 4 feet tall, or 24 square feet. To provide crew 
protection for this tactical vehicle, the armor for just one side would weigh almost one ton. 
This quick analysis demonstrates that armor technology is very heavy. The 2-inch threat is 
considered small compared to some of the more lethal 2 foot long (or greater) penetrating 
threats. To protect against a 2 foot long penetrating threat would require 12 tons, or 24,000 
lbs., of parasitic armor weight, hanging on just one side of a vehicle. It should be obvious that 
this extreme amount of weight is unacceptable for the protection of one side of a vehicle. The 
only way to reduce this armor weight for such threats is to increase the complexity of armor 
designs.  
4. Static Armor Defeat Mechanisms
Contiguous or monolithic armors are the simplest form of armor in the sense that they 
do not employ dimensional or dynamic effects to enhance their terminal ballistic capability. 
These armors utilize modes of armor material plastic deformation, shown in Figure 35, to 
terminate the threat projectile.  
This figure shows the various impact velocity regimes and their associated effects on a 
target. Note that as velocities break above 1000 m/s, the target material properties begin 
to lose significance, and the mechanical interaction between the projectile and material 
becomes fluid-like. Source: Zukas (1980).  
Impact Velocity Effects and the Method of Figure 35. 
Loading to Achieve such Velocities. 
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Spaced armors employ air gaps to allow fragmentation or spalling to occur. The spalling 
absorbs energy and disperses the projectile kinetic energy over a greater area on the 
second phase of the armor. The air gap acts as an expansion zone, allowing the spall to 
expand an impact over a greater area on the second phase of the armor, often called a 
“catcher.” This can be seen in the picture below the drawing. 
 Spaced or Air Gap Armor Figure 36. 
When monolithic armors fail, the vehicle occupants they protect often face a worse 
situation as the armor becomes a projectile, in addition to the threat or fragment. This was a 
common problem in early armor technology. With the conservation of energy, these failure 
modes can be put to good use. Modern armors generally employ air gaps between materials 
to capitalize on the material failure modes of spalling, plugging, and fragmentation (Zukas 
1980). Common armor material failure modes are depicted in Figure 35 and Figure 37.  
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This figure shows the various target or armor failure modes. These modes are highly 
dependent on the material of the target, the material of the projectile and the velocity 
upon impact. Source: Zukas (1980).  
 Common Armor Material Failure Modes. Figure 37. 
When these failures occur, the initial energy of the projectile is dissipated in the 
fracture of the armor materials and in the subsequent projection of the fragments. Instead of 
one acute, high-energy projectile to defeat, now several larger, lower energy projectiles are 
spread over a larger area. These particles are generally easier to deal with than the previous 
pristine projectile. This modern armor mechanism is known as spaced armor. The most 
common spaced armors generally employ a very hard material (e.g., steel, ceramic, glass) to 
fracture and erode the projectile, dissipating its energy. The fragments of the projectile and 
the armor material now travel through the air gap, where they disperse the residual energy 
over a larger area and into the next phase of armor materials. The larger the air gap, the 
greater the dispersion of threat and armor particles over a larger area, reducing the 
penetration of the threat (Hurlich 1950).  
This secondary phase is often called the catcher material. This material is generally 
softer but with higher ductility and tensile strength (e.g., aluminum, S2 Fiberglass, aramid 
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fibers, UHMWPE). Beyond this general concept, the only major differences between opaque 
armors are the selection of materials and the order, arrangement, and dimensions of their 
designs. Transparent armors use a similar mechanism for the defeat of ballistic projectiles, 
but the catcher phase of the armor is integral to the effector. Because the use of a traditional 
catcher armor would eliminate the occupant’s ability to see out of the transparent armor, the 
solution generally relies on the rapid erosion and dissipation of the projectile’s energy in the 
armor. When glass or ceramic shatters from ballistic impact, every crack acts as a sponge, or 
sink, for kinetic energy from the projectile. This is one of the features that makes glass an 
outstanding ballistic material. The other valuable terminal ballistic property of glass or 
ceramic is the volumetric expansion of the material after fracture. This is known as bulking in 
the terminal-ballistics community.  
The thousands of jagged edges from the shattered glass/ceramic prevent the material 
from compacting to its original volume. This bulking can be contained by placing high 
toughness materials (integral catcher) between the transparent panes of glass or ceramics. 
Polycarbonate is used for this purpose. The polycarbonate contains this expanding volume of 
glass while simultaneously compacting it into a tight volume that the projectile must pass 
through. As shown in Figure 38, the projectile passes through this shattered glass or ceramic 
and is subsequently eroded to an ineffective mass. Ballistic glass and ceramic both possess 
impressive capacities to defeat ballistic threats; however, they do have some ballistic 
drawbacks. For example, both materials tend to be more expensive, not only to purchase but 
also to integrate, because they are brittle materials that must be insulated from the vibration 
and shock transmitted from the vehicle. Additionally, these materials tend to have poor 
multiple-hit capabilities—the panes generally shatter upon impact. Current research efforts 
are in progress to localize the damage and increase the multiple-hit capability of these two 
materials. Ceramics and glass have been employed in opaque armors to capitalize on this 
erosive bulking mechanism. Large panes are generally not used to prevent the shattering. 
Instead, geometric tiles generally smaller than one inch are used to minimize the damage 
zone. 
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This drawing shows the bulking and volumetric expansion of glass. The green lines 
represent the interpane polycarbonate sheets that expand and contain the fractured glass, 
forcing greater erosion of the projectile. Adapted from Grujicic, Pandurangan, Zecevic, 
Koudela, and Cheeseman (2006).  
Transparent Armor Bulking Phenomenon. Figure 38. 
Obliquity is another factor that can contribute to an armor’s performance. Obliquity is 
essentially a manipulation of an armor’s dimensionality to optimize the amount of mass in 
the trajectory of the threat. Obliquity also imparts transverse forces, orthogonal to the armor 
strike face, on the projectile upon impact, redirecting the projectile trajectory toward the 
wider dimensions of the armor plate. The critical fact with obliquity is that its benefits rely 
heavily on the trajectory of the threat. Figure 39 shows how obliquity employs the angularity 
of an armor plate to optimize the mass on the trajectory of the threat. While employing the 
angularity to obtain the trajectorial mass benefit, the length of the plate must grow 
significantly to maintain the same height of coverage. However, in growing the length of the 
plate, the mass benefit is essentially lost. This can be mitigated by assuming risk related to 
where the oblique armor is placed. Obliquity is used in the location of highest threat impact, 
often at the expense of armor mass in less engaged areas. An example of this is the placement 
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of armor on combat vehicles. Often the frontal area is the most heavily armored, and the 
oblique armors on the top side of the combat vehicle are least armored.  
 
 
Obliquity can increase material thickness at the projective point of impact and trajectory. 
Note the sloped wall shows a 50% increase in thickness. This oblique angle would be 
more difficult to penetrate than a normal impact angle because of the increase in mass in 
the path of the projectile. Obliquity also imparts transverse loads on the threat which can 
cause it to pitch and yaw reducing its penetration.  
 Armor Obliquity. Figure 39. 
Armor technology is a mature field and a ripe candidate for the enhanced capability 
provided by adaptive resilience. Armor technologies to date have been largely nonadaptive. 
The status quo typically involves an optimized stack of metallic and composite materials that 
provide protection up to a prescribed scale or class of threat. Through the integration of 
adaptive resilience, enhanced performance, particularly in complex threat environments, can 
be realized. 
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B. CASE STUDY: ADAPTIVE RESILIENT ARMOR 
In the following paragraphs, the MSIAR will be applied to a set of armor 
requirements for the cancelled U.S. Army ground combat vehicle (GCV) program. The GCV 
was an U.S. Army infantry fighting vehicle concept designed to operate across the full range 
of conflict types, providing unmatched state-of-the-art survivability and protection while 
transporting a full nine-person squad plus crew. However, in the prescribed requirements, the 
GCV would have weighed anywhere from 64 to 84 tons, making it as large as the M1 
Abrams tank and twice as heavy as the currently fielded U.S. Army infantry fighting vehicle, 
the M2 Bradley IFV (Kempinski and Murphy 2012). The GCV program ended in February 
2014 because of U.S. Department of Defense budget cuts, among other reasons (Defense 
News 2014). The GCV program was a textbook case in which competing functional 
requirements drove the system toward unsuitable system design. This fact makes the GCV 
requirements a perfect starting point for this case study. The program also serves as the most 
recent basis for armor protection requirements. These requirements were delivered in a draft 
capability development document (CDD). This CDD will be the reference for armor 
requirements as the methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience is applied. 
Figure 40 shows step 1 of the MSIAR. Vehicle armors that function in complex 
operating environments must have the ability to protect against the multitude of conventional 
threats as well as the ability to protect against emerging and improvised threats whose 
penetration characteristics are yet unknown. This need is challenging. Current and traditional 
armors provide protection up to a known limit. If that limit is exceeded by an emerging 
threat, new or additional armor must be integrated into the vehicle, which usually increases 
the armor system’s mass and volume, thus implicating the vehicle’s mobility and 
performance. Additionally, this new armor requires significant time to design, manufacture, 
and integrate into a vehicle fleet. This time element poses a problem for the vehicle systems 
with obsolete or overmatched armor; they are operationally vulnerable during this time.  
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1. Define Adaptive Design Considerations 
 
 
Step 1 of the MSIAR seeks to answer the following question: “What is the desirable 
range of adaptive system performance (with respect to parasitic capacity and system 
resilience) which meets the functional requirement? 
 Step 1: Define Adaptive Design Considerations. Figure 40. 
a. Operational Need 
To conduct this analysis and definition for adaptive design considerations, the draft 
GCV capability definition (CDD) document will be used as a reference. The CDD identified 
seven current and future capability gaps that the new GCV would prioritize in this system’s 
development: protection, sustainment, support networking, transportability, mobility, growth, 
and lethality. Three of these system descriptors and characteristics had direct or significant 
implication on the design of a GCV armor system and were specified as priorities and gaps 
for the GCV program: protection, transportability, and mobility.  
Protection is described by the CDD as mobile and modular armor that provides 
mission flexibility for the commander while protecting the force and allowing for future 
technology upgrades. Transportability of the GCV system referred to the ability to transport 
by a range of lift and strategic mobility assets, specifically the C17 and C5 fixed-winged 
aircraft. Mobility was described by the CDD as a GCV that is maneuverable to ensure 
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tactical mobility in complex terrain and to overcome enemy counter mobility efforts. These 
three needs will shape and define the requirements, which will in turn shape the armor system 
developed for the GCV. 
b. Operational Requirement
The operational need gives shape and context to the capability and functional 
requirements. The CDD provides specific requirements for protection, transportability, and 
mobility in the form of key performance parameters (KPP) and key system attributes (KSA). 
Figure 41.  shows a comparison between the current Bradley IFV and the GCV. The 
applicable KPPs, KSAs and specifications are abstracted and depicted in Figure 42, Figure 
43, Figure 44, and Figure 45.
This figure shows a comparison of characteristics for the current M2 Bradley infantry 
fighting vehicle (IFV) and a notional ground combat vehicle (GCV) at extrapolated 
design configurations based on requirements. Source: Congressional Budget Office 
(2013). 
Characteristics: Current M2 Bradley IFV vs. the Projected GCV. Figure 41. 
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This figure was extracted from the draft capability definition document for the GCV. It 
describes the GCV system survivability key performance factor (KPP). A key 
performance parameter (KPP) is a descriptive metric that contains critical characteristics 
of an effective system. KPPs are used to build system performance specifications. 
Adapted from Huggins (2013). 
 Draft GCV System Survivability Key Performance Parameter 2.  Figure 42. 
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This figure was extracted from the draft capability definition document for the GCV. It 
describes the GCV system mobility KPP. Source: Huggins (2013). 
 Draft GCV Mobility Key Performance Parameter 7. Figure 43. 
This figure was extracted from the draft capability definition document for the GCV. It 
describes the GCV system transportability key system attribute (KSA). KSAs are 
descriptive metrics that contain attributes essential to an effective system. KSAs are also 
used to build system performance specifications. Source: Huggins (2013). 
 Draft GCV Transportability Key System Attribute 7. Figure 44. 
This figure was extracted from the draft capability definition document for the GCV. It 
describes the GCV system mobility KSA. Source: Huggins (2013). 
 Draft Dash Speed Key System Attribute 36.  Figure 45. 
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In summary, the applicable requirements derived from the GCV KPPs and KSAs 
appear in Figure 46. After analyzing these requirements, systems designers can understand 
the considerations they should include when integrating adaptive resilience into armor 
systems. These requirements will be refined into performance specifications that will further 
constrain the GCV system and its hosted subsystems. 
Source: Huggins (2013). 
GCV Requirements Selected for Adaptive Resilience Integration Figure 46. 
c. Survivability Adaptive Armor Constraints and Considerations
The GCV survivability requirements will be the most constraining of the adaptive 
armor design. The requirements in Figure 47 show that the GCV must provide protection to 
a broad list of threats. This threat list is classified. In an effort to keep this dissertation at the 
unclassified classification level, the .30-cal APM2 will be designated as the notional 
threshold threat, and the .50-cal APM2 will be designated as the notional objective threat (see 
Figure 48.  
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This figure was extracted from the draft performance specification for the GCV. It serves 
as the detailed requirement for the GCV system regarding how the system avoids 
penetration. This function is typically performed by armor. Source: PEO Ground Combat 
Systems (2013). 
Draft Performance Specification for Penetration Avoidance. Figure 47. 
Source: Gallardy (2015). 
 Dimensional and Mass Characteristics Figure 48. 
for .30-Cal APM2 and .50-Cal APM2. 
Additionally, this dissertation will assume the simplest azimuthal trajectory, 
elevational trajectory, and range—0°, 0°, and muzzle distance, respectively. The survivability 
ASPEC -1828 
The GCV IFV armor protection (excluding core structure and 
underbody armor) shall be modular, with the ability to, install, 
remove, and replace, threshold (T) and objective (O) armor 
modules. 
ASPEC -1834 
The GCV IFV shall protect all occupants in normal fighting 
position, primary weapon components within the turret, and 
mission critical mobility components within the chassis against 
direct-fire kinetic energy threat xx degree azimuthal, xx degree 
elevation at a range of xx meters, (T) and against direct-fire 
kinetic energy threat xx azimuthal, xx degree elevation, at a 
range of xx meters (O).  Classified (C-PSPEC251).
ASPEC -1825 3.1.2.2.4 Penetration Avoidance
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requirements state that the armor system shall be modular, with the ability to install, remove, 
and replace at threshold and objective levels (.30-cal and .50-cal). This requirement implies 
that the armor must incorporate Adaptive Mode 2, external reconfigurations. The resultant 
adaptive design consideration can be stated as follows: 
The adaptive armor design must be able to prevent the penetrations of .30-
cal APM2 threats at the threshold and .50-cal APM2 threats at objective 
levels through Adaptive Mode 1 (internal reconfiguration) and Adaptive 
Mode 2 (external reconfiguration) at 50% reduction of weight from a fixed 
RHA armor system.  
d. Mobility Adaptive Armor Considerations
The mobility requirements shown in Figure 49 will shape the weight of the adaptive 
armor design. The mobility requirement essentially states that the GCV must be able to 
accelerate to a speed of 30 mph within a threshold time of 22 seconds and an objective time 
of 16 seconds. This requirement will largely be achieved by the power the engine transmits to 
the powertrain. This power derives from the amount of force the engine can generate 
multiplied by the speed at which it can transmit it. Force is only one component of 
acceleration. The other component is mass. Acceleration derives from force divided by mass. 
Therefore, the greater the mass of a body, the more force will be required to accelerate it. As 
previously stated, this requirement is largely met with the power plant and the drivetrain of 
the GCV; however, minimizing the weight of the armor system can pay significant dividends 
in meeting this requirement. Therefore, the resultant adaptive armor design consideration can 
be stated as follows: 
The adaptive armor design must achieve the maximum amount of ballistic 
performance from the least amount of weight.  
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This figure was extracted from the draft performance specification for the GCV. It serves 
as the detailed requirement for the GCV system regarding how the system can rapidly 
accelerate. Acceleration is a function of force divided by mass. The less mass a system 
has, the less force is required to accelerate it. The leading subsystem that contributes to a 
ground platform’s mass is its armor structure. The lighter a ground platform’s armor, the 
more efficient and quicker it will be able to accelerate. Source: PEO Ground Combat 
Systems (2013). 
 Draft Performance Specification for Dash Speed.  Figure 49. 
e. Transportability Adaptive Armor Considerations 
The transportability requirements listed in Figure 50.  shape both the weight and 
dimensions of the GCV. The military standard that governs the transportability constraints is 
MILSTD 1366E. This standard dictates many modes of strategic mobility and 
transportability, such as rail, ship, truck, and air.  
 
 
This figure was extracted from the draft performance specification for the GCV. It serves 
as the detailed requirement for the GCV system regarding how the system can be 
strategically transported. The air platforms listed are constrained in their volumetric and 
mass payloads. The GCV armor system’s dimensionality and weight must meet those 
dimensional and mass constraints of the platform to meet this performance specification. 
Source: PEO Ground Combat Systems (2013). 
 Draft Performance Specification for Air Transportability.  Figure 50. 
For this analysis, the most restrictive standard will be used: the C17 aircraft 
constraints shown on the left side of Figure 51. Air transport is the fastest mode, giving 
nations with this capability a strategic advantage in terms of responding quickly to a 
contingency operation. However, dimensions and weight on aircraft come at a premium cost. 
In width, the C17 is the most restrictive at 204 inches, or 17 feet. The current M2 Bradley 
ASPEC -1619 
The GCV IFV, at FCC, with engine idling, on a level hard surface 
road, shall accelerate from a standing start to 48 kph (30 mph) 
within 22 seconds (T), and within 16 seconds (O). 
ASPEC -1618 3.1.2.1.1.1 Dash Speed 
ASPEC -2776 
The GCV IFV shall, in its Transport Configuration - if applicable, 
be transportable on C-17 & C-5 aircraft in compliance with 
MILSTD 1366E. (T=O
ASPEC -2775 3.1.7.7.1 Air 
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IFV width at full combat configuration is 12.8 feet. The notionally designed GCV was 
templated to be 13.7 feet wide.  
 
 
This figure depicts the internal width and height constraints in the cargo holds of a C17 
and a C17 ER. These measurements are in inches. The GCV strategic transportability 
specification requires the system to be air-transportable by C17 and C5. The C17 is the 
most restrictive dimensionally of the two aircraft. Source: MIL-STD-1366E (2006). 
 C17/C17 ER Equipment Design Limit Cross Section. Figure 51. 
Comparing the C17 dimensions to the notional GCV dimensions shown in Figure 51. 
, only 18 to 24 inches of space remain on either side of the notional GCV design if it were to 
be loaded on to a C17 aircraft. This is acceptable but still dramatically wide. The width of a 
vehicle also has significant implications in terms of its tactical mobility. In restrictive urban, 
forested, or mountainous environments, wide vehicles are restricted to wide corridors. It is in 
the military’s best interest to keep this vehicle as narrow as possible but not to exceed 13.7 
feet. On top of the GCV aircraft dimension constraints, weight also plays a major role.  
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This figure depicts the dimensions of a fully equipped M2 Bradley AFV and the notional 
Ground Combat Vehicle. The notional GCV was predicted to be 11 inches wider than the 
Bradley. Source: Congressional Budget Office (2013). 
 Dimensions: Current M2 Bradley IFV vs. Notional GCV. Figure 52. 
Table 3 shows the cargo deck weigh capacities for the C5 and C17. The C5 can lift 90 tons, 
and the C17 can lift approximately 65 tons on its cargo deck. 
Table 3.   C17/C17ER/C5 Cross-Section and Lift Limits 
 
Source: MIL-STD-1366E (2006). 
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When it comes to strategic mobility, less weight is best. The current C17 and C5 can easily 
lift two M2 Bradley IFVs. These platform dimension and weight constraints limit GCV 
strategic mobility to one system per aircraft, as opposed to the current ability to carry two 
M2 Bradleys. Nonetheless the system still maintains the ability to be strategically 
transported by air. Therefore, the adaptive design consideration defined for mobility also 
has application in transportability. The resultant adaptive armor design consideration for 
transportability can be stated as follows:  
The integrated adaptive resilient armor design when integrated on the host 
GCV platform may not exceed 204 inches of total GCV system width 
during strategic transport. 
 
f. Adaptive Armor Design Consideration Summary 
In summary, the GCV’s armors must minimize weight and volume yet counter the 
notional threshold .30-cal APM2 and objective .50-cal APM2 threats. In addition, if an 
armor is overmatched by an unaccounted for threat, the architecture of the armor/vehicle 
system must be able to scale or adapt in a rapid and modular fashion. A GCV armor system 
that can do these things effectively will have achieved a state of adaptive resilience, as 
summarized in Table 4.  




The adaptive armor design must be able to prevent the 
penetrations of .30 cal APM2 threats at the threshold and 
.50 cal APM2 threats at objective levels through adaptive 
mode one (internal reconfiguration) and adaptive mode two 
(external reconfiguration) at 50% reduction of weight from 
a Fixed RHA Armor System.
ADC 2:
The adaptive armor design must achieve the maximum 
amount of ballistic protection from the least amount of 
weight.   
ADC 3:
The integrated adaptive resilient armor design while 
integrated on the host GCV platform may not exceed 204 
inches of total GCV system width during strategic 
transport. 
Adaptive Armor Design Considerations:
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2. Identify Controllable/Adaptive Performance Factors 
 
Step 2 of the MSIAR seeks to answer two questions. What are the best controllable 
adaptive performance factors or parameters that can be effectively manipulated to scale, 
modify or otherwise adapt the function. What are the suitable modes of adaptability to 
employ in realizing those controllable adaptive performance factors? 
 Step 2: Identify Controllable/Adaptive Performance Factors Figure 53. 
Figure 53.  depicts step 2 of the MSIAR. With the adaptive design considerations 
defined, the controllable or adaptive performance factors must now be identified to determine 
which armor system parameters can be manipulated to achieve the requirements and adaptive 
design considerations. Functional parameters or factors are independent attributes of a 
function that dictate the performance or output of that function. In other words, this step of 
the methodology identifies the controllable independent performance variable(s) on which 
the adaptive function depends. Controllability is critical, because if the factor cannot be 
actively manipulated, then the user cannot adapt it for the desired performance. Armor 
systems derive their fundamental functionality from the transfer of momentum from threat to 
the armor system. This is observed in the Newtonian penetration equation (Equation 5) 
presented at the beginning of the armor primer. The physics of armor and threat interaction 
are governed by the law of conservation of energy. The key factors driving threat and armor 
performance are the armor material properties, armor mass, armor dimensionality, and 
physics of the threat and armor interaction (kinetic energy and momentum). Thinking 
adaptively, threats, whether conventional or improvised, employ a range of masses 
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accelerated to a range of velocities to achieve a range of kinetic energies to penetrate an 
armor. An armor designer who can effectively manipulate these factors in a meaningful and 
timely fashion can create an adaptive armor technology to prevent a threat’s penetration.  
Traditional armor designs use a material with a fixed material mass bolted onto a 
vehicle in some dimensional configuration that statically absorbs the kinetic energy or 
momentum (velocity, dimensionality, and mass) of the incoming threat upon its impact. So 
an adaptive resilient armor would need to have the ability to somehow manipulate its mass, 
dimensionality, and velocity over a range of values in a fashion to counter the penetrating 
threat’s kinetic energy effectively. Although material properties are controllable, they would 
only be useful in Adaptive Mode 2, requiring an external reconfiguration. Therefore, mass 
and dimensionality are the most controllable system performance factors needed for an 
adaptive armor. With the factors identified, an armor designer could synthesize them with 
means to achieve the adaptive ends. The means are the adaptive modes discussed in Chapter 
II. Next, the armor designer must identify ways to manipulate the factors using the means 
described in the two adaptive modes (see Figure 54.   
 
 
Adaptive performance factors can be considered the “ways” in which adaptive resilience 
can be achieved while the adaptive modes can be considered the “means” to achieve 
adaptive resilience. 
 Adaptive Mode and Adaptive Design Consideration Synthesis. Figure 54. 
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a. Adaptive Mass 
How can an armor designer manipulate the mass of an armor? There are several 
ways. Obliquity is the first method. If obliquity could be optimized at the point of threat 
impact in real time, ballistic performance of the armor could be adaptively improved through 
the increase in mass on the trajectory of the threat. Armor obliquity can be readily 
manipulated on vehicles with the right mechanisms. As shown in Figure 55. a simple shift of 
30° can result in an increase of approximately 25% ballistic mass efficiency. This example 
employs two factors mass and dimensionality adapted through operational variation. 
Reallocation is another method. Typically armors are engaged from one direction. This 
leaves the armor on the opposite side of the engagement unutilized. By reallocating this 
armor to the engaged side of the vehicle, more protection can be achieved. This could be 
useful in a situation where terrain eliminates the possibility of attack from a certain direction, 
or as a resilient mode of recovery if a noncatastrophic penetration occurred and the vehicle 
needs more protection on that side. This is much more difficult but possible with the right 
technologies. 
 
The heavy red lines on each graph show that at approximately the same impact velocity 
(2000 fps), a .30 cal APM2 stops in a 1- inch plate at 0° obliquity, while stopping in 
a .75-inch plate at 30° obliquity. Adapted from Gallardy (2015). 
 V50 Ballistic Limit Differences in Aluminum Armor for .30 cal Figure 55. 
APM2. 
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b. Adaptive Dimensionality 
Besides obliquity, adaptive dimensionality can be achieved using adaptive spaces in 
the armor. Two half-inch plates of steel with a space between them will have greater ballistic 
performance than will a single 1-inch plate of steel. Two half-inch plates at two inches apart 
will have greater ballistic performance than two half-inch plates with only one inch of 
separation (Hurlich 1950). Manipulating the space between plates would be relatively simple 
with the right mechanisms. 
c. Adaptive Dynamic State 
Adaptive dynamic state can be simply achieved using any controllable kinetic energy 
stimulation mechanism attached to the armor. However, this is most likely unnecessary 
overkill given the two threats of interest for this case study. These threats are easily defeated 
with passive or static armors. A passive way to manipulate the dynamic response of an armor 
during a threat engagement would be through momentum transfer. As previously stated, most 
armors are static plates of material bolted to the side of a vehicle. If the armor were able to 
dynamically travel and interface with the threat longer, it could steal more kinetic energy and 
disrupt its trajectory. An armor that would partially give way with the threat or ride along 
with it during its plastic deformation could have valuable ballistic implications. Through 
external reconfiguration, the mass and thus momentum response of the armor could be 
optimally tuned to any threat of interest. 
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3. Characterize Adaptive Performance Factor Configurations 
 
Step 3 of the MSIAR seeks to answer the following question: Which range of selected 
controllable factor configurations achieve the Adaptive Design Considerations?  
 Step 3: Characterize Adaptive Performance Factors. Figure 56. 
Figure 56. depicts step 3 of the MSIAR. Performance factor solution configurations 
are the factor states that meet or move the system performance toward the desired function 
performance specified in the requirements. In other words, referring back to the algebraic 
function discussed in Chapter III, the performance factor solution configuration for that 
function is the specific independent variable value(s) that achieve the desired dependent 
variable values or range of values. This same thought process must now be applied to the 
armor system. The innate system performance factors (inputs) that were previously identified 
for the armor could serve as a measure of dimensionality, dynamic velocity of an armor plate, 
or the density of a candidate armor material. By analyzing the armor’s ballistic performance 
(output) based on statistically relevant samples of data at these factor inputs, a linear or 
nonlinear function could be generated that functionally characterizes the effects of the 
dimensionality, plate dynamics, or density toward the ballistic performance of the total 
system. Varying these factors or combinations of factors creates adaptive system 
configurations or functional states with a range of outputs. Knowing how the variability in 
the independent factor configurations implicate the dependent performance output enables 
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system design engineers to understand and confidently predict how changes to the factors 
(dimensionality, dynamics, or density) affect performance output (ballistic resistance). By 
integrating these variable ranges of performance or adaptive capacity into the system, 
engineers could create an armor system in which the ballistic performance could be 
confidently adapted in real time to protect against adaptive threat application.  
Conceptually describing this step seems simple enough; however, it can be 
challenging to find the needed data to be able to characterize the controllable factors. If the 
data are readily available, simple engineering analysis and manipulation of the data can serve 
the need. However, if the data do not exist, they must be created. This can be accomplished 
through numerous methods, including modeling, simulation, and physical experimentation. 
The following paragraphs outline the use of available data and show how experimentation 
can be used to achieve these ends. 
a. Mass Characterization through Data Analysis 
As discussed during the armor primer, mass or density of armor is typically described 
in a measure called areal density. To characterize the needed mass or areal density needed to 
meet the threat-defeat threshold and objective requirements, ballistic threat data are required. 
The most common armor and standard comparative armor material is known as MIL-DTL-
12560 rolled homogenous armor (RHA). A large amount of ballistic data are available for 
this armor material. This data can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. In addition, because this armor 
material has a military specification associated with it, this reference will be used to collect 
the needed ballistic reference data. The needed data can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. These 
tables were pulled from MIL-DTL-12560. This specification states that the V50 ballistic limit 
for RHA at muzzle velocity (2700 fps) for the threshold .30-cal APM2 is .60″. The 
specification specifies that the V50 ballistic limit for RHA at muzzle velocity (2700 fps) for 
the objective .50-cal APM2 is 1.015″. RHA at 1 inch thickness has an areal density of 
approximately 40 psf. Therefore, the threshold and objective V50 ballistic limits areal 
densities are 25 psf and 41 psf, respectively. Recall that the V50 is the ballistic limit for the 
projectile velocity at which 50 of 100 shots will completely penetrate the plate. A 50% 
probability of defeat does not equal protection. Therefore, the actual required areal density 
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for protection is much heavier. To avoid any classification documentation issues, doubling 
the V50 thickness will serve as a conservative approximation of required RHA thickness for 
complete ballistic protection from these threats. Thus, an armor must have perform in an 
equivalent manner as a 48 psf RHA armor to protect against the notional GCV threshold 
threat .30-cal APM2. To meet the .50-cal APM2 objective protection level, an armor must 
have equivalent protective performance to an RHA armor at an areal density of 80 psf. To 
meet the adaptive design considerations, the armor must protect against the threshold and 
objective threats at 50% of those values. This would require an adaptive armor capable of 
protecting against the threshold threat at 24 psf and the objective threat 40 psf.  
With this information, characterization of the required armor mass or areal density is 
complete. Conveniently, the threshold and objective value create a range of armor masses. 
This range will serve as the mass range of adaptation or adaptive capacity for an adaptive 
resilient armor. The doubled V50 will be considered the threshold armor areal density because 
it is heavier and less desirable from a system perspective. The single V50 will serve as the 
objective adaptive armor areal density because it is lighter and thus more challenging to 
achieve protection consistently at the lighter weight.  
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Table 5.   Minimum Required V50 Ballistic Limits for .30-cal APM2 at 0° 
 
The value bordered in red is the plate thickness determined to achieve a 50% probability 
of completely stopping the threat. This means that out of 100 threshold threat projectiles 
fired at the muzzle velocity of 2700 fps a plate of .600″ thick, 50 projectiles will pass 
through, and 50 will be stopped. This value does not assure ballistic protection at this 
thickness, but rather states the very threshold of the required plate thickness for ballistic 
protection at this threat velocity. Adapted from MIL-DTL-12560J (MR) (2009).  
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Table 6.   Minimum Required V50 Ballistic Limits for .50-cal APM2 at 0° 
 
The value bordered in red is the plate thickness determined to achieve a 50% probability 
of completely stopping the threat. This means that out of 100 objective threat projectiles 
fired at the muzzle velocity of 2700 fps a plate of 1.015″ thick, 50 projectiles will pass 
through, and 50 will be stopped. This value does not assure ballistic protection at this 
thickness, but rather states the very threshold of the required plate thickness for ballistic 
protection at this threat velocity. Adapted from MIL-DTL-12560J (MR) (2009). 
b. Characterization of Dynamic State through Analysis 
Characterization of dynamic state is difficult without capable tools and computing 
resources. However, a simple characterization analysis can be conducted using the law of 
energy conservation. Essentially, the law of energy conservation states that there can be no 
energy loss during an interaction of differing bodies of mass. This interaction assumes the 
collision is occurring in a perfectly closed system. For this example, assume this collision is 
occurring in a perfectly closed system. The two bodies of mass in a ballistic event are the 
armor and the threat projectile. Because a ballistic event occurs in milliseconds, the effects of 
the potential energy change are minor and can be ignored. An armor is meant to terminate a 
ballistic event, or in other words, terminate the KE of the threat. Therefore, the resultant 
conservation of energy equation appears in Equation 6, as follows: 
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The threshold and objective threats have a mass of 10.8 grams and 45.9 grams, 
respectively. This mass can be converted to grains, which is a common mass measure used in 
ballistics. Thus, the threshold and objective threats measures are 166 and 400 grains, 
respectively. This mass, combined with the muzzle velocity (2700 fps) in the KE equation 
(Equation 6), results in 2697 ft-lbs and 6469 ft-lbs of kinetic energy. This is the incoming 
energy associated with the two threats of interest. This means that the armor system must 
absorb, redirect, or otherwise mitigate this energy to stop the penetrating threat. Armor 
typically does this through fixed plates that plastically deform upon impact to absorb the 
energy. The collision event is what terminates the kinetic energy in the system.  
In the previous adaptive factor characterization paragraphs, it was shown that an 
RHA plate is capable of terminating the kinetic energy in a fixed dynamic state at the V50 
areal densities of 24 and 40 psf, respectively, for the threshold and objective threat. If that 
plate has a dynamic state other than zero (fixed), it will have an effect on balancing the 
conservation of energy shown in Equation 6. If the plate is moving toward the projectile, that 
will have a cancelling effect on kinetic energy of the particle. However, if the plate is moving 
too fast in the opposite direction (hypervelocity), the plate material will begin behaving like a 
fluid upon impact, and its material properties will have a degraded terminal effect. This is 
according to a lecture presentation given by Marc Adams of the California Institute of 
Technology on the phenomena associated with hyper velocity impacts. If the plate is moving 
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in the same direction, it could add to or subtract from the penetration performance of the 
projectile. Without significant mechanics of material analysis and finite element physics 
analysis, characterizing the dynamic state as an adaptive factor is difficult. However, it can be 
confidently stated that dynamic state does affect ballistic performance, and further, that if an 
armor system employs dynamic state as a performance factor, then that specific design 
should be characterized. Generalizations on this adaptive factor cannot be readily made 
without knowing the specific way it will be employed. This means that if this factor is to be 
used in the creation of an adaptive resilient armor system, the material makeup and mass of 
the system must be known. This will not happen until physical components are mapped to the 
adaptive factors configurations in step 5 of the MSIAR. Therefore, this adaptive factor cannot 
be characterized until after step 5.  
c. Dimensionality Characterization through Experimentation 
In the event that the characterization of a controllable performance factor cannot be 
achieved through existing data analysis, experimentation may be required to generate the data 
needed for the characterization. This may be especially true because very few systems 
employ adaptive means for performance factors. This means that establishing a range of 
characterization values could be difficult using existing data. This was the case for analyzing 
armor dimensionality. Data were available for monolithic plates at 0° and 30° obliquity but 
not for any other obliquities. This lack of data also held true for spaced armors. Very specific 
spaced armor data were available but none that fit the weight constraints required for this 
analysis. Therefore, experimentation was conducted with respect to an adaptive standoff and 
obliquity with respect to mass.  
In this experiment, a plate of quarter-inch MIL-DTL-41600E steel (high hard) was 
placed in front of a semi-infinite stack of MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plate (6061-T651 Type 
200). This material was chosen as a baseline for the experiment because quarter-inch high 
hard steel combined with softer aluminum represents a high-performing, common composite 
spaced ballistic armor. This is similar to a high hard applique armor on an aluminum hull 
commonly seen on combat vehicles. In this structure, the quarter-inch of high hard steel 
served as the adaptive plate, and the aluminum served as a fixed ballistic witness or catcher 
of spall and debris from the threat and high hard plate. In other words, the strike face 
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obliquity and the stand-off/air gap manipulation for the adaptive armor was achieved through 
the high hard plate. Figure 57. shows the ballistic experiment results. 
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These graphs depict the residual plate penetration of the threshold and objective threats into MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plate after striking 
various obliquities and air gaps of a .25-inch plate MIL-DTL-41600E steel. Data on such an armor target at adaptive obliquity and air gaps 
design points do not exist. Therefore, characterization experiments were required to acquire such data.  
 Ballistic Experiments with MIL-DTL-41600E Steel and MIL-DTL-32262 Aluminum Plate vs. .50-cal APM2 Figure 57. 
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Experiments were conducted primarily with .50-cal APM2 because of resource 
constraints. Three shots were conducted with .30 cal APM2. The .50-cal APM2 was selected 
for its more stressing performance against the armor. The three .30-cal APM2 shots can be 
compared in ratio fashion to the .50-cal APM2 for a quick approximation of performance 
consistency. For the adaptive air gap factor, experiments were conducted at 3″, 6″, 9″, and 
18″. Eighteen inches was selected as the maximum standoff because this distance still 
provided room for C17 transportability. The areal density range of an armor for this 
adaptation ranges from 63 psf at 3″ to 33 psf at 18″. This result is nearly a 50% reduction in 
the required areal density for defeat over the adaptive factor configuration range. For the 
three .30-cal APM2, the adaptive gap was set at 12″. This resulted in a mean areal density for 
the three shots at approximately 28 psf. Through extrapolation, the required areal density for 
the .50-cal APM2 at this same air gap was approximated at 42 psf. Recall the adaptive mass 
areal density range for complete defeat was calculated at 48 psf and 80 psf for the threshold 
and objective threats, respectively (see Tables 5 and 6). The 28 psf and 42 psf areal density 
ratios for adaptive air gap were consistent with the 48 psf and 80 psf. Had these ratios been 
significantly different, additional investigation would have been required to understand the 
ratio disparity. 
For the adaptive obliquity factor, experiments were conducted at 0°, 30°, and 60°, all 
at the maximum standoff of 18″. The areal density for total threat defeat ranged from 34 psf 
to 18 psf, respectively, for the 0° to 60° range of obliquities. These adaptive factor 
configurations provided an additional 50% reduction in required areal density for complete 
threat defeat over the range of adaptive factor configurations. This finding shows how nesting 
of adaptations can provide a cumulative benefit in system performance and therefore 
resilience. 
d. Combinatorial Effects of Adaptive Factors 
By having three configurable factors (mass, obliquity, air-gap), the user has three 
degrees of freedom to be able to modify, reconfigure, or more appropriately, “adapt” the 
armor system toward achieving a desired functional outcome—stopping the threat. Thus, far, 
the configuration space has been identified but not the specific configurations that reach the 
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desired output. Additionally, the hypothetical functions only represent one end of the 
functional configuration space, the penetration resistance. The converse of this adaptability 
problem is that these adaptations could have implication (positive or negative) elsewhere on 
the armor system or overall vehicle system. In order to characterize the factors fully, 
additional analysis may be required to assess the second-order implications of the factors on 
the overall functionality of a system. For example, mass always helps in penetration 
resistance, but if the armor weight makes the overall vehicle system too heavy, the functional 
benefit sought may not be worth the negative implication on other system aspects. 
Combined factor inputs may have a positive or negative synergistic effect on the 
higher functional output. Sometimes these combined factor configurations have an additive 
effect, in which the output is purely a summation of the inputs. Sometimes the factor inputs 
have a less-than-additive effect on the combined output, in which the individual factor 
outputs or responses are not cleanly additive. Often, the combined factor inputs can have a 
synergistic effect on the combined output, resulting in an overall output greater than the sum 
of the individual factor outputs. The outcome is that the factor configuration must be looked 
at in a combined fashion to see its ultimate cumulative effect on the desired functional output. 
Referring back to Figure 57. , the obliquity experiments were conducted at the maximum 
standoff of 18″, the maximum air gap adaptation. By adding obliquity to the air gap, 
additional ballistic performance was achieved. In other words, a cumulative ballistic benefit 
was realized by combining the factors. This means that the protection of the armor could 
extend past the objective threat protection and provide extended protection against higher 
performing ballistic threats. This benefit could also be used to optimize the mass of the armor 
system against the specified threats in the requirement. This concept refers back to the two 
different ways to utilize adaptive capacity discussed in Chapter II.  
e. Summary of Adaptive Factor Characterization 
Characterization of the factor configuration solutions is a critical step to the MSIAR 
methodology. In this step in the methodology, the system user gathers the data and defines 
the scope or range of adaptability that can be achieved for the factor configurations of interest 
and shows how those adaptations can assist the user obtain higher performance from the 
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system. The output of this step is a comprehension of each factor’s effect, and perhaps its 
combinatorial effect, on the final performance of the system.  
Developing an adaptive armor system requires analysis of the ballistic limits for 
rolled homogenous steel armor plate. It was identified previously that at the very least, an 
RHA areal density of 24 psf and 40 psf were required for the threshold and objective threats, 
respectively. Recall that these metrics were doubled to 48 psf and 80 psf in order to ensure 
that the threshold and objective threat would be defeated. These values can be viewed as the 
benchmarks the adaptive system areal density must meet (as light or lighter in areal density). 
Any adaptive armor defeating this threat set at lighter areal densities would be demonstrating 
efficiency and benefit over a traditional static armor in achieving the identified performance 
specification, realizing the target KSAs and KPPs, and meeting the specified operational 
requirements listed in the draft GCV CDD.  
The remaining adaptive factors of dimensionality and dynamic state show important 
effects on achieving the desired specification, attributes, parameters, and requirements as 
well. Characterization data were not collected for dynamic state but will be touched on in the 
following steps. Characterization data were collected on dimensionality. Dimensionality of 
an armor affects the ballistic protection performance of the armor and therefore can have an 
effect on the mass of the armor and the GCV. As previously demonstrated, the more volume 
an armor has, the better its ballistic performance. However, if an armor is dimensionally 
doubling the width of the GCV, it will violate other requirements, particularly the mobility 
and transportability requirements. Therefore, an armor with an adaptive dimensionality could 
be highly valuable for all the specified requirements.  
Through experimentation, it was shown that a quarter-inch piece of MIL-DTL-
41600E steel plate coupled with MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plate separated by an adaptive 
air gap achieved significant ballistic mass efficiency. Table 7.  shows the areal densities 
achieved at the smallest and largest air gaps. Additionally, areal density ranges associated 
with an 18-inch air gap and a range of obliquity of 0° to 60° are also shown. Mass 
efficiencies greater than 2 can be realized through simple dimensionality adaptations. The 
benefit of these adaptations is that the volume penalties that a user would pay at the highest 
dimensional values can be eliminated as quickly as they were created. An armor with an 18-
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inch air gap extending from both sides of the GCV would not be ideal for loading and 
transporting on a C17. It would also severely restrict the mobility corridors the vehicle is 
required to traverse, particularly in urban environments. However, with an adaptive air gap, 
the user can have the protective benefits of an 18-inch air gap when the situation dictates, and 
when the user needs transportability or mobility, the air gap can be reduced back to 3 inches, 
giving back the mobility needed for other aspects of mission success.  
With two of the three adaptive factors characterized, this step of the MSIAR is 
complete. The third adaptive factor will emerge after step 4 of the MSIAR. The next step is 
the verification and validation of the characterized adaptive factor configurations.  












Mass: RHA V50 RHA 2(V50) Em Em
Threshold 24 48 1 1
Objective 40 80 1 1
Dimensionality:
Air Gap: HH-AL 18" 3" Em Em
Threshold 28 [1] 38 [1] 0.85 1.7
Objective 33 63 1.21 1.26
Obliquity: HH-AL 60° (@18" AG) 0° (@18" AG) Em Em
Threshold <17.5  [2] 28  [2] >1.37 1.7
Objective 17.5 33 2.28 2.42
Dynamic State:
Threshold ? ? ? ?
Objective ? ? ? ?
1 Extrapolated approximations from experimental 
data points collected at 12" air gap. Extrapolation 





Efficiency    
vs.                
(RHA 2(V50)) 
Mass 
Efficiency             
vs.                              
(RHA V50) 
2 Minimum adaptive range value based on the 
maximum adaptive range extrapolated value from 
Air Gap adaptive factor data. Both are 0° obliquity.  
Threshold maximum value will not exceed the 
Objective maximum value, therefore Objective value 
is used.
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4. Verify and Validate Adaptive Performance Factor Configurations 
 
Step 4 of the MSIAR seeks to answer two questions. Do these characterized 
configurations achieve this adaptive range of performance? Are these the correct adaptive 
performance factor configurations to achieve the desired adaptive resilient armor system? 
 Step 4: Verify/Validate Adaptive Performance Factor Figure 58. 
Configurations 
Figure 58. depicts step 4 of the MSIAR. Verifying and validating the resultant factor 
configuration solutions is critical to being able to predict accurately or even approximately 
the outcome of a system’s adaptation. Each factor has its own effect on the adaptive 
functionality. Sometimes these effects are independent of the other factors, sometimes they 
are not. As previously discussed, the factors can have additive or linearly-cumulative 
combinatorial effects. Sometimes effects conflict where, individually, two factors have a 
positive outcome on a functional output, but when combined, have a negative output. Often, 
synergistic effects occur in which the combined output of the two factor functions is greater 
the sum of the two outputs. Because of this resultant inconsistency, verification and 
validation of the resultant factor configuration solution must be conducted. This process 
generally consists of a series of tests to collect data and build a statistically significant level of 
confidence in the identified adaptive factor performance at the range of adaptive factor 
configurations.  
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In the previous step, experiments were conducted for factor characterization. These 
characterization efforts can be associated with experiments and tests that would occur at 
system technology readiness level (TRL) 1–3. Verification and validation testing in this step 
of the methodology would be akin to TRL 3–5. For the adaptive armor system example that 
has been discussed so far, it would involve expanding armor testing at the various 
dimensional, dynamic, and mass states to acquire relative performance measurements. This 
level of testing and experimentation could not be conducted for this dissertation because of 
time and resource constraints. Therefore, a limited series of experimental test results will be 
used to continue to develop the proof for the MSIAR.  
Verification and validation need not occur at each configuration state. For the two-
dimensionality adaptive factors that were characterized, the adaptive ranges of interest were 
0° to 69° and 0″ to 18″ for obliquity and air gap, respectively. Dividing these factor ranges to 
whole-number design points (7 and 5) would require 35 experiments to obtain a data point at 
each design point. The tester would then multiply this by multiple tests to build statistical 
confidence in the data; it becomes readily apparent that testing can become very intensive. 
This is where design of experiments (DOEs) can be of great value. Through proper analysis, 
a full factorial test set can be reduced to a half factorial or even lower and still acquire the 
statistically relevant and confident data to verify and validate the performance of the system 
and performance factors. Figure 59. shows an example of how DOEs can be used to reduce 
experiment sets while maintaining an experiment design that gathers hard cumulative 
functional output values to compare, contrast, and verify or deny the formulaic 
characterization data from the previous step. Using proper design of experiments methods, an 
appropriate fractional factorial verification experiment set can be assembled to generalize the 
holistic functional response at the various factor configurations. If significant discrepancies 
exist between the predicted functional output and the experimental output, a causal 







This figure shows how employing design of experiments (DOEs) can reduce the test and 
experiment load so that iterative tests can be conducted to build statistical confidence to 
verify and validate functional performance. Adaptive factor performance trends could be 
easily derived from the reduced factorial DOE on the right, which could be just as 
informative as the full or half factorial. This reduced set is less resource-intensive, which 
can allow more tests to be conducted for greater statistical confidence at similar cost, 
compared to the cost of the higher factorial DOEs.  
 Full, Half, and Reduced/Fractional Factorial DOE. Figure 59. 
Once function outputs are verified (and potentially adjusted), the output values must be 
validated and reconciled against the original adaptive design considerations that were 
specified in the first step of the methodology, as shown in Figure 60.  
Validation ensures the adaptive functional requirements are actually met or achieved. 
If gaps exist between the requirements and the resultant configuration outputs, they must be 
filled. This can be done through further experimentation by adding additional factors, 
expanding the factor state range, or if the requirement cannot be met, informing the 
stakeholders of the situation and proposing a change to the requirement. 
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This graph depicts the residual plate penetration of the threshold and objective threats into MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plate after striking 
various obliquities and air gaps of a .25″ plate MIL-DTL-41600E steel. Data on such an armor target at adaptive obliquity and air gaps design 
points do not exist. Therefore, limited experimental test were conducted to characterize such an armor system. This data collected in step 3 of 
the MSIAR will serve as the output of step 4 and be used for informing decisions on step 5. 
 Integrated Adaptive Factor Response. Figure 60. 
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Based on the limited experimentation conducted in the previous MSIAR step, the 
experimental adaptive factor performance data shown in Figure 60. will serve as verified and 
validated adaptive factor-performance response curves. These response curves will be 
included in the next step of the MSIAR to aid in identifying adaptive components and 
subsystems, which will serve as the physical means to achieve the desired adaptive system 
performance. Figure 61. depicts a summary crosswalk of the adaptive factor configuration 
ranges which will address the respective adaptive design considerations shown on the right 
side of the image.  
 
 
This figure depicts how the adaptive performance factors trace to the adaptive design 
considerations from Table 5. By adapting the dimensionality, 50% weight reduction (40 
psf reduced to 17.5 psf) in armor areal density can be achieved, making these adaptive 
factor configurations suitable for Adaptive Design Considerations 1 and 2. Adaptive 
Design Consideration 2 is denoted in red because it is unknown how much weight can be 
removed from the design. This will be fully understood and optimized as the MSIAR is 
continued and more is learned about the dynamic state adaptive factor. The 
dimensionality adaptive factor also can support a total GCV vehicle width of 198″. 
Adaptive Design Consideration 3 constrains the armor plus vehicle width to 204″. The 
dimensionality adaptive factor can adapt from 3″ to 18″, allowing the vehicle to have the 
enhanced protection of the 18-inch armor standoff while being able to collapse to 3″ for 
strategic transport. 
 Validated Adaptive Factor Response. Figure 61. 
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5. Map Validated Configurations to Adaptive System Components 
 
Step 5 of the MSIAR seeks to answer the following question: What physical component 
implementations achieves the verified and validated range of adaptive performance 
configurations? 
 Step 5: Map Validated Configurations to Adaptive System Figure 62. 
Components. 
Figure 62. depicts step 5 of the MSIAR. Once the configuration solution outputs have 
been verified and validated against the functional requirements, the next step involves 
mapping the configuration solutions to physical subsystems and components capable of 
producing the configuration states and functional outputs. This step consists of identifying 
physical components that have the configurability to enable the overall system to operate at 
the identified adaptive factor configuration states. If subsystems or components do not exist 
with this capability, a design and engineering process must occur to create them or to 
integrate that capability into existing systems. In the characterization of adaptive performance 
configurations step of the MSIAR, factor characterization experiments were conducted to 
understand the benefits of having an adaptive obliquity and air gap in an armor design. The 
armor system used for the experiment was a simple quarter-inch of MIL-DTL-41600E steel 
plate coupled with a stack of MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plates.  
The adaptive obliquity and air gap was achieved through the manipulation of the steel 
plate to the air gap distance or obliquity of interest, as shown in Figure 63. This armor 
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structure is simple yet ideal for ballistic threats such as the .30-cal APM2 and .50-cal APM2. 
The high hardness of the steel front plate can fracture the threat, and the ductile aluminum 
absorbs the residual dispersed particles and energy. This will serve as a starting point for the 
adaptive design. However, this design still lacks a dynamic performance component. This is 
where novel armor called mechanically adaptive armor linkage (MAAL) could play a role.  
 
 
This figure depicts the various experiments conducted to characterize the initial adaptive 
factor performance. The first image shows the standard material make up for each 
experiment. Each experiment has an effector plate made of high hard MIL-DTL-41600 
steel, an air gap, and a stack of 8 MIL-DTL-32262 aluminum plates. The aluminum 
plates serve both as the catcher and as a residual penetration witness measure to 
understand the adaptive factor effects on the terminal ballistic performance of the armor 
system. The middle image shows how air gap dimensionality was adapted to achieve 
increase in terminal ballistic performance. The air gap was adapted between 3″ and 18″ to 
achieve various ballistic effects. The third image depicts how the obliquity was adaptive 
to achieve various threat-armor impact angles ranging from 0° to 60°. During the 
experiments, the threat would first strike the effector plate, react in the air gap, and then 
embed at various plate depths in the catcher/witness plates. The deeper into the witness 
the threat penetrated, the lower the effect of the adaptive armor design configuration. The 
shallower the residual penetration, the greater the effect of the adaptive armor design 
configuration. 
 Adaptive Factor Characterization Experiments.  Figure 63. 
a. Mechanically Adaptive Armor Linkage (MAAL) 
The MAAL armor system provides enhanced passive armor ballistic protection 
through passive dynamic deflection and ability to accumulate mass at the point of threat 
impact on the armor strike-face. The MAAL armor system causes a yaw effect on ballistic 
threats because of reactive tension in the MAAL armor strands acting on the threat and after 
impact with the threat. Because of the dynamic capacity in the fundamental link structure, the 
MAAL armor can also be implemented through numerous embodiments. Because of these 
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features, the MAAL armor system will be the first component mapped to the adaptive armor 
system.  
The MAAL system contains three basic components, as shown in Figure 64.  The 
MAAL strand disruptor consists of either the band or link strand (bike chain or similar 
structured material), which is hanging in tension. This strand through its structure must 
passively deflect upon threat impact and absorb the threat energy through spallation, 
fragmentation, and plastic deformation. Structurally, the MAAL air gap provides the 
disrupted MAAL strand and threat particles volume to disperse and expand. This can be 
composed of air or any low-density material, such as Styrofoam, for example. The MAAL 
spall and fragment catcher serves structurally as a dispersed particle catcher, absorbing all 
residual energy through inertial transfer from the disrupted and dispersed MAAL and threat 
particles.  
This structure is similar to the steel spaced armor that was characterized through 
ballistic experimentation. The major difference is that instead of a rigid high hardness steel 
plate, a dynamic strand of very high hardness steel with one degree of rotational freedom is 
used. This raises the question, would this flexible structure offer as much kinetic energy 
dissipation as a rigid plate? This is a hard question to answer. A good answer that can be 
supported with experimental results is that the plate on average absorbs more kinetic energy 
(see Appendix B). However, the strand and its dynamically enhanced structure wreaks havoc 
on the kinematic stability of the projectile, causing it to tumble, yaw, and deform in a fashion 
that makes its resultant impact and penetration on the catcher less than ideal. This is shown in 





This figure depicts the system structure and operation of the MAAL armor system. 
MAAL armor consists of three components: the MAAL strand disruptor, the MAAL drift 
or air gap, and the MAAL spall and fragment catcher. Each of these components of the 
MAAL armor system serves a critical function in the terminal ballistic performance of a 
MAAL armor. When the threat strikes the MAAL strand disruptor, projectile energy is 
absorbed in the fracture of the MAAL strand into fragments. This disruption also causes 
the threat projectile to yaw, pitch, and tumble, which in turn decreases its energy and 
penetration. The air gap allows this disruption to take effect. The greater the air gap, the 
greater the disruption. The air gap also disperses the residual MAAL fragments and threat 
particles, dispersing their energetic impact over a greater area on the fragment catcher. 
The high-speed photograph at the bottom of the figure clearly shows the disruption, 
dispersion, and impact of the MAAL and threat interaction. 
 Mechanical Adaptive Armor Linkage System Structure. Figure 64. 
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This figure depicts a threat–MAAL interaction. The pitch and yaw of the projectile 
caused by the strand disruptor is clearly shown. This impact angle significantly decreases 
the threat’s ability to penetrate into the catcher phase of the armor. The particle cloud and 
fragment impact on the catcher clearly show particles that were placed into motion by 
drawing energy from the threat projectile upon its impact with the disruptor. 
 MAAL Strand and Threat Interaction. Figure 65. 
Non-ideal impacts reduce the depth of penetration, and subsequently, the required 
areal density required for protection. This occurs through a pendulum effect occurring at the 
point of impact. The threat and the strand elastically collide and travel together for brief 
moment until the tensile strength of the MAAL strand pulls and accelerates the strand and the 




This figure is a cartoon depiction of how threat–MAAL interactions occur. The pitch and 
yaw of the projectile caused by the strand disruptor is clearly shown. Upon impact, the 
threat displaces and plastically deforms the MAAL strand. During this interaction, the 
strand travels a distance with the threat, but in doing so, the interaction zone travels in a 
radial fashion because the MAAL strand is typically pinned at one end. This radial travel 
path of the threat–MAAL interaction point applies a tensile force on the threat, creating a 
yaw or pitch on the body of the threat. This serves as a disruption to the threat, greatly 
reducing its subsequent ballistic penetration into following materials. Adapted from 
Cannon (2015). 
 Threat Pitch and Yaw Interaction with MAAL Strand. Figure 66. 
At this point, the impact converts to an inelastic impact, and the material deformation 
begins absorbing energy and disrupting the threat’s kinetic energy, similarly to the rigidly 
fixed armor plate. This threat–MAAL interaction possesses both benefits of plastic 
deformation of the rigid plate, and trajectorial disruption caused by its shifting dynamic state.  
b. Mapping Components to the Dynamic State Adaptive Factor 
In the previous steps of the MSIAR, the dynamic state adaptive factor was not 
characterized in detail because this adaptive factor is highly dependent on the material 
makeup of the armor. A generalized but meaningful characterization could not be made with 
the resources available for this research. The only meaningful characterization that could be 
made was based on a simple conservation of energy analysis in which any dynamic state (not 
fixed) would have an effect on the terminal ballistic performance of the armor. Now that a 
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specific armor structure has been selected, analysis of its dynamic state can effectively occur. 
In the previous paragraph, it was shown that the MAAL system employs dynamic behavior 
and state in its ballistic defeat mechanism; the fixed plate armor did not. This means that 
there is room for adaptation within the dynamic state.  
This adaptation can occur through the moment inertia of the MAAL strand. Because 
this adaptation is targeting the inertial properties of the MAAL strand, it is technically 
employing two adaptive factors: the dynamic state and the mass of the MAAL armor. 
Because no specific dynamic state adaptive factors exist outside of this, the inertial properties 
adaptation will subsequently be considered only a dynamic state adaptive factor. MAAL link 
strands are essentially roller chains or leaf chains. These chains (MAAL strands) are 
manufactured and commercially available in various sizes, thicknesses, and widths and 
therefore offer a variable moment of inertia with each size, thickness, and width. Figure 67. 
shows the numerous and various size and masses of commercially available MAAL strands. 
If the commercially available strands do not meet requirements, specifically designed and 
optimized strands can be manufactured with relative ease. 
The ease of manufacture means that the MAAL dynamic state ballistic defeat 
mechanism can be adapted based on the size of chain used in the armor. This adaptation is 
truly manipulating the dynamic state of the armor for ballistic performance benefit. Although 
the availability of the chain enables this dynamic state adaptive factor, more components 
must be mapped to achieve true efficiency. Each MAAL strand size depicted has a different 
link interface that must be matched to allow the strand to hang in tension. Therefore, a design 
process for the link range of interest must occur. Figure 68. shows the interface adaptor 




This figure shows the simplex, duplex, and triplex strands that can have link plate pitch 
(P) and height (H) varying from .5″ to over 3″. The graph on the right side of the figure 
shows that chains (MAAL) are readily available from sizes 25 to 240, which cover the 
pitch/height range of .5″ to 3″, respectively. Each size and -plex of chain will have its 
own inertial characteristics. This gives MAAL an adaptive range of inertial states that can 
be scaled in an external reconfiguration adaptation mode to achieve an adaptive resilient 
state in the armor design. Source: Timken Drives LLC (2013). 
 MAAL Strand Sizes. Figure 67. 
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This figure shows design drawings with dimensions for the MAAL interface adaptor, 
which allows external reconfiguration of redundant and progressive scaling of the MAAL 
strands. These adaptors mesh with the knuckles of the MAAL strands allowing variable 
strand sizes to apply to an armor system rapidly to accommodate changing operational 
requirements. 
 MAAL Strand Interface Adaptor. Figure 68. 
c. Mapping Components to the Mass Adaptive Factor 
Mass is the most influential of the adaptive factors. Mass adaptation can occur 
through both external and internal reconfiguration modes of adaptability. External 
reconfigurations of mass include the progressive scaling and redundant scaling of the strand 
mass. The internal reconfiguration of the mass strand occurs through reallocation. These 
modes of adaptation will be mapped to components in the following paragraphs. 
Progressive and redundant mass scaling component mapping is simple because they 
both are developed from components designed for the dynamic state adaptations. Progressive 
mass scaling is achieved in the same fashion as is the inertial dynamic state adaptation. 
Changing the size of the MAAL strand changes the mass and ballistic performance of the 
strand. The strands inertial properties and dynamic state also change. The MAAL strand 
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adaptor serves as the same component used for enabling the progressive scaling adaptation. 
Redundant scaling is a bit different. Redundant scaling is achieved by adding the same-sized 
strand to the existing strand. For example, if an armor system employs a single size-40 
MAAL strand but needs additional ballistic performance for new threats, adding another size-
40 strand would be considered a redundant scaling of the mass for the armor system. This 
adaptation is achieved through the same MAAL strand adaptor shown in Figure 68. 
However, each additional strand requires its own adaptor. This means that the fastener that 
attaches the adaptor to the greater vehicle armor system structure must account for this added 
length and load.  
Mass reallocation component mapping requires pulling the same factor resources 
from elsewhere in the system to apply them toward the disrupted functional requirement. For 
an adaptive armor, this would require pulling armor mass that is not ballistically engaged 
elsewhere in or on the vehicle armor system and applying it where the armor is failing to 
meet the requirement. Implementing this goal with armor has been previously unachievable 
because armors have been structurally fixed and therefore not moveable. Even if an armor 
could have been moved, no effective method existed to move such a heavy mass in an 
operationally relevant fashion. This movement could be achieved in an externally 
reconfigurable fashion; however, this would not make sense because this would create a 
vulnerability in the armor protection that would require another external reconfiguration to 
fix. The key component in a MAAL armor system is the strand. The strand, whether a belt or 
linkage, is designed to move at very high speeds. If a MAAL strand was held at one end 
vertically in the air and then lowered to the ground, the linkages would pile up on top of each 
other, accumulating mass in that pile, as shown in Figure 69.  
This aspect of the links structure can be harnessed as a way to manipulate the mass of 
the armor. Components to achieve this adaptation include sprockets and idler wheels, a drive 
sprocket, and MAAL collection bin. Figure 70. shows conceptually how these components 
would work to achieve the enhanced ballistic protection state needed for the system to 




MAAL strand can pile up in a confined space to provide added mass to an area. This can 
be used to economically apply MAAL over a volume and then reallocate the mass of the 
MAAL as needed from nonthreatened areas to areas of concern or armor failure in situ. 
Source: Cannon (2015). 
 MAAL Strand Mass Accumulation. Figure 69. 
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This figure depicts an alternate embodiment of MAAL. MAAL strands are derived from 
chain. Chains are designed to rotate and travel along cogs and gears. This purpose is 
modified to enable MAAL strands to be internally reconfigured through reallocation from 
areas that do not require protection to reinforce areas where protection is needed in situ 
Source: Cannon (2015). 




 Mass Accumulation Sprocket and Collection Bin Components.  Figure 71. 
d. Mapping Components to the Dimensionality Adaptive Factor 
Manipulating the dimensionality of the armor system is the easiest and most obvious 
of the three adaptive factors. The benefits of this adaptation were shown through the armor 
air gap and the obliquity phenomena. Components that enable this must be able to create the 
armor air gaps and obliquities that provide the needed adaptive capacity and fall within the 
requirements associated with the adaptive design consideration.  
The components that achieve the air gap and obliquities must also be able to measure 
the weight they add to the armor system. They must have the agility appropriate to 
manipulate the armor and the structural rigidity necessary to support the armor, yet be 
lightweight enough to realize the benefits of the obliquity and airgap. This can be achieved 
using a lightweight actuator and structural linear bearings and shafts, which can both move 
and support the load of the MAAL armor. Figure 72. and Figure 73. show representations of 
these components. Some components will need to be designed and fabricated because they 
do not exist. This is a given for any technology integration: Some components exist, and 
others must be created to suit the required purpose. The dimensionality components provide a 
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sampling of both, created and available components. The actuator/bearing shaft coupler had 
to be created specifically for this purpose. This component brought together the driving force 
of the actuator and the structural rigidity of the linear bearing and shaft. These components 
enable the armor system to extend and collapse, thus creating the enhanced ballistic 
protection needed to achieve the adaptive resilience state.  
 
 
The three images show the initial design for achieving the obliquity and air gap adaptive 
factor configurations. The far left image shows the adaptive resilient armor system in its 
least-protected state, which also allows the mobility and strategic transportability 
requirements for the armor’s host platform to be met. The middle and far right images 
show the enhanced protective states that achieve the protection requirements for the host 
platform. 
 Armor Dimensionality States.  Figure 72. 
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This figure depicts the components mapped to achieve the air-gap and obliquity adaptive 
factor configurations. The linear bearing, structural bearing shaft, and the 
actuator/bearing shaft coupler provide mobile structural support for the adaptive armor 
weight. The actuator provides motive force to the shaft to enable the internal 
reconfigurations to occur.  
 Armor Dimensionality Components.  Figure 73. 
e. Component Mapping Summary 
Once the mapping of requirements to physical components is complete, the 
component performance at the various factor levels must be integrated, verified, and 
validated to confirm the predicted outcomes found in the characterization-model validation 
and verification. The components mapped in this phase of the methodology will enable the 
achievement of the adaptive design points that make this armor adaptive resilient. Although 
many components lead to the adaptive resilient armor, only key components were discussed 
to keep the focus on the salient aspects of this step of the methodology. The dynamic state 
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adaptive factor was mapped to the MAAL armor, which can be readily changed and scaled 
through the use of an interface adaptor bracket. The mass adaptive factor was achieved 
through accumulation of MAAL where the armor protection is needed. This was achieved 
through the use of drive sprockets, idler wheels, and the accumulation bin. The 
dimensionality factor was mapped to structure components such as a linear bearing. These 
components all enabled adaptive resilience to be realized in the armor system. 
6. Integrate Adaptive System Components and Configurations 
 
 
Step 6 of the MSIAR seeks to answer the following question: How do these physical 
components mesh into a cohesive functional system that provide cumulative or 
synergistic outputs?  
 Step 6: Integrate Adaptive System  Figure 74. 
Components and Configurations. 
Figure 74. depicts step 6 of the MSIAR. Integrating adaptive system components and 
configurations involves incorporating the adaptive components into the higher-level system, 
which produces the cumulative or synergistic benefits of the components. Integrating an 
armor system onto an actual vehicle was outside the scope of this dissertation. Instead, an 
adaptive resilient armor demonstrator was created to show a partial view of how the 
components would integrate to achieve the adaptive factor states that produce adaptive 
resilience.  
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a. Design, Assembly, and Integration 
Design of the demonstrator rig began in the previous step. The selection and mapping 
of components had to occur in a deliberate and targeted manner. The components had to be 
selected using a precise engineering approach to produce the functional outcome for which 
they were designed. The design for the demonstrator rig was conducted in a digital fashion. 
Computer-aided modeling (CAM) was used to create and represent each component in 
virtual space. Aside from functionality, design of the demonstrator included multiple facets. 
For example, design elements included fabrication, assembly, reliability, and many other 
design attributes. Change logs were used to comply with configuration management 
principles deemed essential to success as the designer modified parts and components of the 
rig to accommodate assembly and integration.  
The process of designing the rig began with the representation of the structure or 
vehicle on which the armor would be placed. Next, the adaptive components were brought 
together and affixed to the structure to allow their adaptive modes to be leveraged. Affixing 
of the components was the phase in which the most new parts were created. These parts had 
to be fashioned and manufactured to enable the mapped adaptive components to perform 
their functions.  
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This figure depicts a computer-aided model (CAM) of the adaptive resilient armor 
demonstrator. Construction of this model in a computer model helps to verify the design 
and integration feasibility and suitability before the physical fabrication begins. 
 Digital Computer-Aided Model of the Demonstrator. Figure 75. 
The digital model shown in Figure 75. enabled the system parts and components to 
be virtually shaped, modified, and verified before being bent, cut, or assembled. Once the 
digital design was complete, a bill of materials could be created. The parts and components 
could then be procured or fabricated to begin assembly. The final product of the design was 
the technical drawing package (TDP). An example page of the TDP appears in Figure 76. 
The complete TDP for the demonstrator can be found in Appendix A. 
 133 
 
This figure shows an image extract from the technical design package (TDP), which serves as a listing of all major component and 
subassemblies for the adaptive resilient armor demonstrator. The TDP consists of several drawings and assembly instructions for the 
demonstrator. The complete TDP is listed in Appendix A. 
 Technical Design of Adaptive Resilience Demonstrator.Figure 76. 
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When all or most of the components, parts, and hardware were on hand, assembly 
began. Physical assembly should follow the same flow and process followed in the digital 
design. In fact, part of the digital design process included designing for assembly. During 
assembly design, the assembly method should be digitally verified. This is not necessary but 
serves as an additional way to verify that the components of the system can be properly 
assembled, allowing the designer to identify interferences and fit issues. Once this phase was 
complete, the physical verification began. Physically assembling the pieces can be more 
challenging than digitally assembling the pieces. In the physical assembly process, the 
tolerances and errors from fabrication can compound and create challenges that must be 
overcome. In fact, in some instances, parts must be modified or completely redesigned. For 
example, a weld on one part of the assembly had to be all but removed to allow the pieces to 
fit properly. This weld was critical to the structural support of the demonstrator rig. The 
modification and weakness in the structural frame had to be addressed through a redesign. 
Despite this issue, the physical realization of the demonstrator was a success. This 
demonstrator was fully functional and achieved all the needed adaptive design configurations 
it was designed to achieve. 
 
 
This figure depicts how the adaptive resilient armor demonstrator CAM and TDP were 
physically assembled into a full prototype demonstrator. 
 Design to Realization: Adaptive Resilient Armor Demonstrator. Figure 77. 
b. Demonstrator Adaptive Design Configurations 
The adaptive resilient armor demonstrator successfully combined the mapped 
components into a fully capable armor system. These mapped components enabled the armor 
system to adapt to critical design configurations, established by the adaptive factors that 
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enabled the system to achieve adaptive resilience. The three adaptive factors were armor 
physical state, mass, and dimensionality.  
The adaptive resilient armor demonstrator is shown in Figure 78. This demonstrator 
represents a portion of a vehicle protected by the adaptive resilient armor. The cube space 
frame on which the components rest represents the crew and occupant space of the vehicle. 
Each of the major subsystems on the demonstrator are shown. The dynamic state, obliquity, 
and air gap subsystems are shown only on one side of the demonstrator because of research 
resource constraints. The lower right image of the demonstrator rig in Figure 78. should show 
the external MAAL curtain and actuator system extending from the right side of the 
demonstrator, not just from the left. However, the mass accumulation subsystem is shown 
fully on both sides of the demonstrator, with collection bins and drive sprockets on the top of 
the rig. These subsystems will be described at length in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
This figure shows the mapped components and where they reside on the adaptive resilient 
armor demonstrator. The dynamic state, dimensionality and mass subsystems are all 
represented in the final CAM, TDP and physical prototype of the adaptive resilient armor 
demonstrator. 
 Adaptive Resilient Armor Demonstrator and Subsystems. Figure 78. 
The dynamic state of the armor was the simplest component to integrate. As 
mentioned, this component consisted of changing the size and mass of the MAAL strand of 
the armor system, thereby changing the physical inertial properties of this part of the armor 
 136 
system. Achieving this adaptive factor consisted of making the MAAL interface adaptor. 
This component was simple to design, replicate, and scale to the dimensions needed for the 
MAAL with which it needed to interface. The MAAL strand interface adaptor is shown in 
Figure 79.  
 
 
CAD vs. physical prototype MAAL Strand Interface Adaptor. 
 MAAL Strand Interface Adaptor.  Figure 79. 
Realizing the mass adaptive factor was a bit more complex. Because this 
adaptation was an internal reconfiguration, it could be adapted in situ. This process 
involved moving components and pieces that changed the physical configuration of the 
system. To achieve the desired adaptive configurations, a subsystem of sprockets, idler 
wheels, and a collection bin were required to enable the mass of the MAAL strands to 
collect.  
The overall mass accumulation subsystem is depicted in Figure 80. These 




The overall Mass Accumulation Subsystem discussed and shown conceptually in Figures 
69, 70 and 71 are all physically depicted in this figure. These components enable the 
MAAL strand to accumulate as shown in Figure 81. 
 Adaptive Resilient Armor Mass Accumulation Subsystem. Figure 80. 
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 Adaptive Resilient Armor Mass Accumulation Bin. Figure 81. 
The mass accumulation subsystem drew MAAL strands from one side of the 
protected volume to another through reallocation. This accumulation of mass enhanced the 
ballistic protection where it was needed by reallocating ballistic protection from where it was 
not needed. Although in the demonstration, the MAAL strand did not stack as pristinely as is 
shown in the model part of the picture, the MAAL strand did accumulate and stack 
nonetheless, growing the mass in the trajectory of the threats. 
The most complex of the adaptive design configurations to realize were air gap and 
obliquity. These configurations required a series of actuation, structural, and electronic 
components that actively moved the ends of the adaptive resilient armor curtain to achieve 
the enhanced protective states provided by obliquity and standoff. 
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The subsystem is depicted in Figure 82. The figure shows how the actuator, linear 
bearing, and other components supported and manipulated the 300 lb. load of the MAAL 
armor, giving it enhanced ballistic protection through obliquity and air gap. Figures 83 and 
84 show how the physical demonstrator adapted to achieve those adaptive configurations. In 
the middle image of Figure 83, a rule was used to show the range of actuation for the MAAL 
curtain. The curtain could collapse to a 3″ standoff from the vehicle or extend out to a length 
of 18″. The demonstrator was designed to only achieve a 30° angle. However, simple 
modifications could produce a 60° obliquity if needed. 
 
 
This figure shows the draft drawings of the obliquity and air gap adaptive dimensionality. 
The image on the right shows the physical prototype realization of these component on 
the Adaptive Resilient Armor Demonstrator.  




 Adaptive Resilient Obliquity.  Figure 83. 
 
 
Figures 83 and 84 show how the physical implementations of the adaptive dimensionality 
components, which create a variable armor air gap and obliquity used to enhance and 
adapt the terminal ballistic performance of the MAAL armor. 
 Adaptive Resilient Obliquity and Air Gap. Figure 84. 
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(4) Summary of Integrating Adaptive System Components 
The adaptive resilient armor demonstrator shows the feasibility of the design and 
adaptive design configurations. The demonstrator was digitally designed and modeled 
utilizing computer-aided modeling. These models were then used to generate a technical 
drawing package, which was provided to the machinist and mechanics who fabricated and 
assembled the parts and adaptive components used to build this adaptive resilient system. The 
adaptive resilient armor demonstrator possesses integrated means that can achieve the 
adaptive factor configurations for dynamic state, mass accumulation, and dimensionality, 
making the whole armor system adaptively resilient.  
7. Verify and Validate Integrated Component Performance 
 
Step 7 of the MSIAR seeks to answer several questions. Do all of these components 
combined realize an adaptive resilient system? Is this the correct adaptive resilient system 
that will be address the originating top-level functional requirement? Furthermore are 
there any synergistic or parasitic effects from the integration of this adaptive resilient 
system with itself or as part of a greater system of systems? 
 Step 7: Integrate Adaptive System  Figure 85. 
Components and Configurations. 
Figure 85. depicts step 7 of the MSIAR. Once the adaptive components are integrated 
and realized, their performance must be once again verified and validated against the 
adaptive design considerations that initiated the methodology. The purpose of this step is to 
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ensure that the physical system components are capable of physically performing at the 
predicted and functionally required ranges of output. This step helps confirm that the 
adaptive functions integrated into the subsystems and components physically perform. 
Verification ensures the integrated components actually achieve the desired system 
performance and serves to characterize the performance in case synergistic or parasitic 
effects result from the combinations of adaptive performance factors. Validation ensures that 
verified integration of components conform to the adaptive design considerations and system 
functional requirements specified in step 1. Numerous components and subsystems were 
identified for factorial adaptability; therefore, multiple verifications and validations must 
occur to assess the suitability of the final system design. As mentioned previously, the 
potential exists that when combined, these subsystems or components could have negative or 
counteractive effects on the desired functional output. In combination, they could also have a 
synergistic effect in which their effect on the desired functional output is positively greater 
than the sum of their individual performance outputs. The results of combining the adaptive 
components and subsystems must be compared to the specified functional requirements to 
ensure they are met or exceeded. If they are not met, then the component(s) are likely not 
good candidates to achieve adaptive resilience. If this is the case, steps of the methodology 
must be repeated to identify and create new components. The results of this verification will 
be shown and discussed in the subsequent proof of concept in Chapter V.  
Validation of the integrated components was mostly successful. The adaptive 
resilience armor demonstrator easily met Adaptive Design Consideration 3. Figure 86. shows 
the dimensionality adaptive configurations. The adaptive resilient armor demonstrator easily 
achieved the 3″ to 18″ air gap allowed for a notional GCV vehicle at 165″ (see Figure 41. ). 
However, an obliquity of only 30° can be achieved. Further, the obliquity can only be 
achieved within the 18″ air gap, but not at the 18″ air gap. This fact would require a new 
means to achieve the 60° obliquity and to achieve this obliquity at the fully extended 18″ air 
gap. An alternate way to achieve the desired obliquity ranges would be to rotate the MAAL 
strands using some mechanism on each strand rather than shifting the full curtain of MAAL 
strands. This idea is depicted in Figure 86. This would require significant design and 
engineering because rotating the strands would create vulnerable air gaps between the 
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MAAL strands. This issue could be addressed through iterating steps 5 and 6 until a suitable 
solution was found.  
 
 
This figure shows how the adaptive resilient armor demonstrator’s dimensionality 
adaptive factor configuration was met for the air gap (3″ to 18″), but fell short in fully 
meeting the target adaptive design configuration for obliquity. A better approach may be 
realized by rotating the individual strands shown on the right side of the figure. 
 Adaptive Design Consideration 3. Figure 86. 
This oversight in the integrated design was mitigated by using the dynamic state and 
mass adaptive factors configurations that were realized in the final physical design. The 
adaptive resilient armor demonstrator with the enhanced dynamic state of the MAAL strands 
achieved ballistic protection against the objective .50-cal APM2 threat at an areal density 
lower than 20 psf. This ballistic experiment result is shown in the following chapter. This 
finding validates the fulfillment of Adaptive Design Consideration 1. Adaptive Design 
Consideration 2 required the system to optimize its design toward the lightest configuration 
that still met the objective protection requirements. This validation was based on the 
dichotomous nature of adaptive capacity. Adaptive capacity can be used to exceed the 
requirement, providing a controlled level of parasitic capacity to counter unknown threats, or 
it can be used to optimize the system design and meet the requirement at it maximum 
 144 
factorial design point. Using a 40–2 MAAL strand, at an 18″ air gap and 0° obliquity, the 
MAAL demonstrator provided objective ballistic protection at 16 psf areal density. This was 
the optimal design configuration with the least areal density at the objective protection level 
achievable by the adaptive resilient armor demonstrator. Thus, this design fulfilled Adaptive 
Design Consideration 2. All three adaptive design considerations were validated, which was 
the final step of the MSIAR. Some design refinements could be made to refine the system, 
but the design was validated and judged successful against the three adaptive design 
considerations specified in step 1.  
C. SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDY 
The previous chapter introduced an armor technology primer to foster a fundamental 
familiarization of the concepts associated with terminal ballistics and penetration mechanics. 
The primer set the stage for the adaptive resilient armor case study to follow. The case study 
outlined each step of the methodology as it was used to develop an adaptive resilient armor 
system. The result was the successful realization of an adaptive resilient armor demonstrator, 
which achieved the adaptive design considerations it was designed to achieve through its 
adaptive factor configurations. These adaptive design considerations were based on 
contradictory and challenging user requirements, such as protection, mobility, and 
transportability. The armor system could expand its ballistic protection levels to exceed its 
requirement if necessary. When that protection was not needed, the adaptive factor 
configurations that gave the armor its enhanced ballistic protection could be decomposed to a 
less implicative state to allow it to meet its mobility or transportability requirements. This is 
the fundamental benefit of the adaptive resilience attribute. It gives its host system 
contingency capacity to implement the functions for which it was designed and can be used 
to bring optimal balance to competing requirements, thus preventing crippling tradeoffs. In 
the next chapters, the functional performance results of resulting product from this case study 





V. PROOF OF CONCEPT 
A. ADAPTIVE RESILIENT ARMOR BALLISTIC EVALUATION 
The ballistic characterization of the mechanically adaptive armor linkage (MAAL) 
armor regarding the adaptive factor configurations was conducted in accordance with 
standard ballistic test procedures. The ballistic experiments were conducted at the U.S. Army 
Tank Automotive Research Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) Ground 
System Survivability (GSS) Survivability Armor Ballistic Laboratory (SABL). This 
laboratory is one of the Army’s test authorities for the ballistic characterization of armor 
materials. This facility is an ISO 17025 certified laboratory and is the Department of 
Defense’s authority and primary test center for the automotive tank purchase description 
(ATPD) 2352 for transparent armors.  
 
The ballistic range setup used for all experiments comprised a high precision gun that 
fired precisely measured, hand-loaded threat munitions. The threat munitions were fired 
from the gun, and the threat projectiles passed through a chronograph to measure the 
projectile’s velocity. The projectile then passed through a paper break screen that broke a 
circuit and initiated the camera to begin filming. The projectile then struck the armor, and 
the interaction was filmed. An analogue ruler was used to measure residual velocity of 
the projectile. This data was used to calculate the threat’s kinetic energy loss. The 
disrupted threat then struck a semi-infinite stack of .5″ 6061-T651 aluminum plates. 
 Ballistic Test Range Setup. Figure 87. 
The ballistic range setup is shown in Figure 87. The range was fitted with a high-
precision gun. This gun was mounted on a 1000-lb. base and had a modular breach that could 
 146 
accommodate all small, medium, and select large caliber barrels and munitions. The range 
used a chronograph to capture the ballistic velocity of the fired projectiles. After the 
chronograph, a break screen was set up, which triggered the top and side high-speed cameras 
to film the terminal ballistic event. The high-speed cameras were capable of capturing 
thousands of frames per second. These special cameras were mounted on both the top and 
side of the target chamber. For this test setup, recording the velocity after the MAAL impact 
was desired in order to calculate the residual projectile kinetic energy. A standard rule was 
used to measure the disrupted projectile particle velocities after the MAAL impact.  
As previously discussed, the targets for this ballistic characterization were the only 
nonstandard items. The first target was the MAAL strand. This was the primary adaptive 
component of the adaptive resilient armor system. This component was manipulated, scaled, 
and otherwise adapted between each shot. The second target consisted of a semi-infinite 
series .5″ plates of 6061-T651 aluminum. Semi-infinite means that the end or edge effects of 
the target were designed to have no effect on the ballistic performance. This target setup 
allowed the MAAL to disrupt the threat projectile, the cameras to witness and record the 
disruption, the rule to capture the residual velocity, and the softer aluminum to measure the 
residual penetration of the disrupted projectiles. RHA steel could have been used for the 
second target but was specifically not chosen because residual penetration would have been 
far less and more difficult to measure. Further, RHA would not have readily shown the 
ballistic benefits that the adaptive factor configurations contributed to the ballistic protection 
of the armor. The softer aluminum facilitated a greater range of residual penetration, making 
it easier to show the benefits of the adaptations.  
During the experiments, the MAAL was placed at the specific point of design 
interest, and the threat projectile of interest was fired at the series of targets. The projectile 
struck the MAAL strand, and the residual armor and projectile particles embedded in the 
aluminum witness plates. A less-protective adaptive design configuration resulted in a 
residual impact several plates deep, and a more-protective design configuration resulted in a 
shallow surface impact. The plate in which the most deeply penetrating projectile particle 
terminated was the plate counted in the total areal density of the target. This is shown in 
Figure 83.  
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This figure shows an aluminum witness pack from one of the ballistic characterization 
experiments. The number in the lower right corner depicts the .5-inch aluminum plate 
order. As shown, the plates have penetration holes. Plates 4, 5 and 6 each show projectile 
terminations in them. If the projectile terminated in plate 4, the areal density of the 
MAAL strand plus four aluminum witness plates would be counted in that experiment’s 
terminal areal density. It can be seen across the stack of plates that shot 17 penetrated and 
terminated in the plate 3 (least), whereas shot 21 penetrated and terminated in plate 6 
(most). 
 6061 T651 Aluminum Witness Pack.  Figure 88. 
An impact was regarded as a complete penetration (CP) or failure if the projectile or a 
resulting target fragment from impact created a hole in the witness plate through which light 
could be observed after removing the projectile. If an impact did not result in a CP, it was 
considered a partial penetration (PP), or win. In order to keep residual penetration results 
consistent, the terminal areal density used this standard. 
The U.S. .30-cal. APM2 and 0.50-cal. APM2 were used in this study. These 
projectiles are shown in Figure 89. The APM2 projectiles have hardened steel cores with 
hardness of Rockwell C61– 63. These projectiles were used for two reasons. First, a large 
body of armor characterization results have used these threat projectiles. Second, this was the 
notional threat used in the MSIAR case study. The first series of experiments were conducted 
with the .30- cal APM2. After a large battery of experiments, it became evident that the 
MAAL armor system was potent in terminating these threat projectiles. This was a good 
result, but unfortunately unhelpful for the purpose of these ballistic experiments. The 
structure of the catcher phase of the adaptive resilient MAAL armor system was intended to 
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show how each adaptive factor configuration contributed to the ballistic protection of the 
armor. The majority of the .30-cal. experiments resulted in splash impacts on the first (front) 
aluminum plate of the catcher phase. The intention was for these penetrations to occur five or 
six plates deep and then reduce as the armor system was adapted. The MAAL armor system 
worked so well that the adaptation configuration effects were indiscernible. After the result, 
the threat projectile was scaled to .50-cal APM2, which was much better suited for the 
purpose of these research experiments. 
 
 
Source: Gallardy (2015). 
 Dimensional and Mass Characteristics for  Figure 89. 
.30-Cal APM2 and .50-Cal APM2. 
B. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The ballistic characterization conducted in support of this dissertation served as an 
abbreviated form of the two verification and validation steps of the MSIAR. These 
experiments not only served as the verification and validation steps of the methodology, but 
also affirmed the efficacy of the methodology in realizing the adaptive resilience attribute in 
technological systems. The adaptive resilient armor demonstrator and the ballistic 
characterization served as the proof of concept for this methodology—if followed, significant 
functional benefit can be achieved. For an armor system, that benefit is realized in an armor 
system that can terminate threats at lighter areal densities. The ballistic results of these 
experiments are compared to standard armor steel plate because that is the benchmark against 
which all ballistic armor is compared. Throughout these plots, a magenta diamond depicts a 
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similar structured and mass fixed armor design made of MIL-DTL-41600E high hardness 
steel. 
Figure 90. shows ballistic characterization data for the MIL-DTL-41600E high 
hardness steel. These plots serve two purposes. First, the plots serve as a comparative 
baseline for the fixed armor plate, which is the foundational armor material most often used 
in vehicle armors. These fixed plates are fixed and bolted to the exterior of a vehicle and are 
not capable of being adapted except through a time-consuming external reconfiguration 
procedure. These plates are denoted by the magenta-colored diamond. There is no trend line 
associated with these plates—they cannot be readily adapted because they lack adaptive 
resilience. Figure 90. also shows blue and red plots that do have trend lines associated with 
them. These plots show the same steel plate, but indicate how it would perform at the 
adaptive design configurations. These images are meant to show that the MSIAR is unrelated 
to specific technologies and can be applied to any existing means to obtain more capability. 
A steel plate armor could be subjected to the MSIAR, and similar adaptive modes and results 
could be realized. Many of the same adaptive modes used for the MAAL armor could be 
applied to steel plate, as shown in Figure 90. A steel plate armor system in the same 
configuration as the one shown can realize adaptive resilient performance.  
The plot on the left of Figure 90. shows that a dimensionally adapted MIL-DTL-
41600E steel plate can realize up to a 50% reduction in required areal density in terminating a 
.50-cal APM2. The plot on the right shows that by manipulating the dimensional obliquity, 
up to another 50% reduction of areal density can be realized. Looking at the magenta 
diamonds on these plots, a nonadaptive resilient armor with a 3″ air gap would require 65 psf 
armor. At certain adaptive factor configurations, an adaptive resilient armor can achieve that 
same level of ballistic protection at 15 to 30 psf. To achieve those same areal densities, a 
nonadaptive resilient armor of the same structure would require an 18″ standoff from the side 
of the vehicle. This would then implicate the transportability and mobility of the platform, 
adding 3 feet to its overall length and width. This is a simplistic example, but it captures the 
essence of the adaptive resilience attribute’s enhanced capability while simultaneously 
mitigating the requirement’s tradespace.  
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These plots depict the baseline experiments of high hardness steel at adaptive factor configurations. These are meant to serve as a baseline to 
compare the MAAL armor characterization plots. They are also meant to show that MAAL armor is not necessarily needed to achieve the 
adaptive factor configurations and that steel plate can be used to achieve many of the same adaptations that the MAAL enables. 
 MIL-DTL-41600E Steel Plate Ballistic Characterization Plots.Figure 90. 
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Figure 91. depicts the ballistic characterization results for 40–1, 40–2, and 40–3 
MAAL armor at desired adaptive factor configurations for dimensionality. In addition, these 
plots portray the difference in performance between these three MAAL strand widths. The 
40–3 MAAL strand is essentially three 40–1 strands affixed side by side. This gives each 
strand a different mass and therefore inertial dynamic state; however, the areal density for the 
two strand widths remains the same. It is readily evident that an adaptive resilient armor 
using any of the three widths of size 40 MAAL provides more capability than a nonadaptive 
resilient fixed steel plate armor.  
Figure 91. shows both the air gap and obliquity dimensionality adaptive factors. The 
air gap dimensionality response line shows significant increase in performance for all three 
sizes of MAAL. Obliquity shows a smaller increase in performance but an increase 
nonetheless. The 40–2 and 40–1 MAAL obliquity response lines show very little increase. 
This is likely because of the narrower widths of the strands. However, it is clear that the 40–2 
and 40–1 MAAL strand far outperform the 40–3 MAAL strand in required terminal areal 
density. It is also clear that the adaptive resilient armor designs provide more ballistic 
protection at reduced areal density than the similar static RHA design. The adaptive resilient 
armor scales its protection level when needed to meet or exceed its ballistic protection 
requirements through these dimensional adaptations, and then collapses its dimensionality 
when this high performance state is not needed. This adaptive resilient dimensionality 
provides the armor system enhanced top-level performance without any parasitic capacity to 
the detriment of the host platform’s transportability or mobility. 
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These plots depict the core proof of concept ballistic experiments for the MAAL armor at key Adaptive Factor Configurations. The plots 
primarily show the performance at key dimensionality adaptive factor configurations. It should also be noted that both plots show variable 
strand widths of size 40 MAAL. The 40–3 (triple strand) performed poorly compared to the high hard steel plates 40–2 and 40–1. This 
indicates that the inertial state of the lighter and narrower strands offer better ballistic disruption.  
 40-1, 40–2, 40–3 MAAL Ballistic Characterization Plots. Figure 91. 
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Further, this adaptive dimensionality can provide this enhanced protective capability 
in a matter of moments. These adaptations are internal reconfigurations. The adaptive 
resilient armor demonstrator was capable of achieving every adaptive factor configuration 
shown in Figure 91. in less than 30 seconds. This is unprecedented—in situ obliquity and air 
gap adaptations, even in external reconfiguration adaptive modes, were considered too time 
consuming and generally burdensome to be of value. These dimensionality adaptations can 
be used predictively to achieve a T1R system state. If a threat was known or expected to 
come from a certain direction, the air gap and obliquity could be optimally adapted to protect 
from that direction of attack. These dimensionality adaptations could also reactively achieve 
a T2R system state. If a threat was penetrating a platform, the air gap and obliquity could be 
used to recover the protected functional state (to a point) by adapting itself to an adaptive 
factor configuration that would enable the armor system to regain its protection. 
Figure 92. depicts mass and dynamic state adaptive factors and how they can be 
adapted through external reconfiguration and progressive scaling. As mentioned previously, 
external reconfiguration is an adaptive mode in which external means (e.g., mechanisms, 
processes, and artifacts) produce functional system resilience. Progressive scaling occurs 
when the adaptive capacity is expanded via external means. In this instance, a thicker and 
heavier MAAL effector strand (size 80) replaced a lighter and thinner MAAL effector strand 
(size 40). The ballistic characterization plots show that the size-80 MAAL strand defeated the 
.50-cal APM2 at a lighter overall areal density for both the air gap and obliquity adaptive 
configurations. At its baseline experimental adaptive configuration (3″ air gap and 0°) the 
size-80 MAAL terminated the threat at almost 50% less areal density than did the size 40. 
This finding indicates that the size 40 possesses less ballistic protection capability. This is 
true; however, it is not less capable in its adaptive resilient protective capability for this 
threat. Note the differing response plot slopes. The size-40 chain has a steeper slope than 
does the size 80. This means that greater adaptive performance was achieved by the size 40 
for this threat.  
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These plots depict an example of the external reconfiguration known as progressive scaling. Progressive scaling replaces an existing system 
component with another component of greater capacity. In this instance a size-40 MAAL strand ballistic protection performance is compared 
with a size-80 MAAL strand ballistic protection performance. The size 80 outperformed the size 40 in required areal density but did so with the 
penalty of unused parasitic capacity. This is evident in the less steep response slope of the size-80 MAAL, compared to the slope of the size-40 
MAAL. This result is shown in both plots.  
 Progressive Scaling Adaptive Factor Characterization. Figure 92. 
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The size-80 MAAL likely greatly overmatched the threat. This strand created 
parasitic protection capacity against the .50-cal threat. This result may or may not be 
acceptable, depending on the operational environment. The MAAL adaptive resilient armor 
system will likely be placed on a vehicle platform with a fixed-base armor. The adaptive part 
of the MAAL armor system is the MAAL effector strand. This means that the MAAL 
catcher plates would be a fixed material solution or base armor on a vehicle. If the size-80 
MAAL strand was over performing against the threat, the catcher base armor would be 
underutilized and therefore considered parasitic capacity. In short, the size 80 can terminate 
the threat at a lighter areal density but with parasitic capacity unused. If the threat were scaled 
to a greater penetrating threat, the size-80 MAAL strand would likely have a steeper response 
plot slope, thus offering greater adaptive resilient protective capability with less parasitic 
capacity. This adaptation would likely be useful when an enemy force scaled the threat class 
it used against the platform. This external reconfiguration adaptation is enabled by the 
MAAL strand interface adaptor. Swapping out these MAAL strands can occur in a matter of 
minutes with commonly available tools. Referring back to the resilience basins shown in 
Figure 13. of Chapter II, the plots shown in Figure 92. represent how the adaptive basins can 
nest within each other. The size-40 MAAL strand represents the smaller basin with its 
adaptive configurations, nested within the larger basin, represented by the size-80 MAAL 
strand. This stacking of scalability is a key principle in the adaptive resilience attribute. The 
greater the number of nested basins or degrees of adaptability in a system, the more adaptive 
resilience it possesses. 
Figure 93.  depicts the redundant strand scaling characterization plots. These 
experiments progressively added MAAL strands to the adaptive resilient armor system to 
show an increase in ballistic protection capacity achieved by this external reconfiguration 
adaptation. These experiments are among the first to be conducted with .30-cal APM2. The 
results showed that the MAAL armor system significantly overmatched the .30-cal APM2; 
the residual impact on the catcher portion of the system typically terminated in the very first 
plate. This made measuring the effectiveness of this adaptation difficult. Fortunately, kinetic 
energy reduction measurements were also taken. The plot on the left shows that the total areal 
density increased, as would be expected when adding additional MAAL strands to the armor 
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system. The plot on the right shows the percentage of  kinetic energy reduction achieved by 
adding each additional MAAL strand. Although kinetic energy reduction cannot be translated 
into terminal areal density, the result definitely implies that the penetration potential was 
dramatically reduced for each strand added. The plot on the right shows approximately a 50% 
mean reduction in kinetic energy for each MAAL strand added. This implies that the external 
reconfiguration of redundant strand scaling potentially had a dramatic effect on the terminal 
areal density of this adaptive resilient armor system. 
These ballistic characterization plots show the efficacy and value that an adaptive 
resilient armor can have over a nonadaptive resilient armor. The added enhanced ballistic 
protection capacity and operational flexibility provided by an adaptive resilient armor would 
be of great benefit in a complex operating environment in which the threats and operating 
conditions are constantly in flux. The data in these plots quantitatively show the benefits of 
this system, but still only in a numerical fashion. The following paragraphs will provide 
visual context to adaptations of this adaptive resilient armor system and other adaptations not 
experimentally validated for an adaptive resilient armor on a notional combat vehicle. 
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These plots depict an example of the external reconfiguration known as redundant scaling. Redundant scaling supplements an existing system 
component with additional component of the same capacity. These experiments were conducted with .30 cal APM2. This threat projectile was 
overmatched by the ballistic mechanics of the MAAL strands. Little data could be collected from the residual penetration after the MAAL 
strand impacts because most terminated in the first aluminum witness plate. What can be seen is the percentage of kinetic energy reduction 
each strand contributed to the ballistic performance of the adaptive resilient armor system.  
 Redundant Scaling Adaptive Factor Characterization. Figure 93. 
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C. ADAPTIVE RESILIENT ARMOR SYSTEM 
Chapters III and IV provided discussions of complicated subjects in a qualitative and 
quantitative fashion. Armor technology, ballistic protection data, and systems engineering 
concepts were combined to achieve superior system performance. These discussions are 
helpful for those who are conversant in these fields, but likely meaningless to those who are 
not. The following paragraphs will describe with visual detail how an adaptive resilient armor 
system on vehicles may actually function. 
In Chapter II, T1R and T2R were described as beneficial system attributes. These 
attributes of resilience are usually limited in their ability to be realized in technological 
systems because adaptive capacity to realize these attributes was inappropriately addressed 
during system design and engineering. Adaptive capacity is provided through the two modes 
of adaptation: external and internal reconfiguration. Internal reconfigurations are system 
adaptations that utilize means (e.g., processes, mechanisms, and artifacts) within the system 
to achieve desired functionality. External reconfigurations are system adaptations that involve 
external means to achieve desired system functionality. Internal reconfiguration includes 
adaptive means that were present within the system at the time of the functional disturbance 
or incident. Adaptive Mode 2 involves external means (e.g., mechanisms, processes, and 
artifacts) that were not present in the system when it lost its functionality but when applied 
after the fact, enable the system to regain its functionality. Internal reconfiguration can occur 
four ways: operational variation, reallocation, degeneracy, and exaptation. The following 
paragraphs show how internal and external reconfigurations can be realized on an armor 
system to produce a desired state of adaptive resilience and enhanced ballistic performance 
described in the previous sections.  
1. Adaptive Resilient Internal Reconfiguration 
Operational variation was the most responsive of the adaptations used to achieve 
adaptive resilient ballistic protection. This was shown in many of the ballistic 
characterization plots in the previous section. The adaptive resilient armor employed the 
adaptive factor of dimensionality. By adapting dimensional air gap and obliquity, significant 
adaptive capacity can be leveraged to produce a range of ballistic protection with minimal 
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tradeoffs to competing requirements. Figure 94. shows how this adaptive means could be 
realized on a combat vehicle. As discussed in Chapter IV, the adaptive components mapped 
from verified adaptive design configurations are visually realized on the notional combat 
vehicle. The depictions in this figure show a MAAL armor system that can be adapted 
through enabling components to provide a dimensional shield around the vehicle. These 
components are capable of adapting the air gap and dimensionality through internal 
reconfiguration to provide added capacity to the ballistic protection of the combat vehicle 




This figure shows a conceptual implementation of the MAAL armor and how it could be 
adaptively implemented on a combat vehicle. The images show examples of how air gap 
and obliquity can be manipulated to achieve the adaptive performance factors associated 
with armor dimensionality. 
 Adaptive Resilient Armor: Operational Variation. Figure 94. 
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Internal reconfiguration can also be realized through the adaptive armor mass 
reallocation. Figure 95. shows an internal MAAL armor system within the walls of the 
combat vehicle system. This internal MAAL system internally drapes over the inner walls of 
the combat vehicle. This curtain of MAAL connects to a drive-sprocket system that pulls the 
curtain of MAAL from one side of the combat vehicle to the other depending on the location 
of the need for additional ballistic protection. Figure 95. shows how this mass reallocation 
would occur, accumulating the reallocated MAAL mass into the side of the vehicle where 
added capacity is needed. It has been shown that increasing the trajectorial mass of an armor 
increases its ballistic protection.  
 
 
This figure shows a conceptual implementation of the MAAL armor and how it could be 
adaptively implemented to adaptively reallocate armor on a combat vehicle. A MAAL 
curtain could reside within the hull walls of the combat vehicle. This curtain could be 
manipulated with sprocket drive system that would enable the MAAL armor to 
accumulate over areas of the combat vehicle where added protection is required. 
 Adaptive Resilient Armor: Reallocation. Figure 95. 
Exaptation is an adaptation through which existing means are employed in novel 
ways in response to new environments and challenges. The MAAL strand was shown to have 
significant utility in armor systems. However, what if there were other ways these artifacts 
could be used to enhance their host system’s survivability? Figure 96. depicts the 
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survivability framework known as the ground-system survivability onion. Each layer or peel 
of the onion represents a functional mode that enhances the survivability of a platform. The 
framework starts with the threat point of origin at the outside of the platform and moves in 
toward the vehicle platform. Actions or capabilities that perform the function at each layer 
contribute the cumulative whole of the system’s survivability. This framework can be 
formulaically shown in Equation 7. 
 










P P P P
where
P Probability of Survivability
P Probability of Detection
P Probability of Hit if Detected









The survivability onion is a common framework to understand ground-system 
survivability. This framework works from the threat inward toward the vehicle. Other 
frameworks work from the vehicle outward toward the threat. Armor systems typically 
contribute to the last two shells of the onion: penetration prevention and damage 
mitigation. Are there ways an armor could contribute to other shells of the survivability 
onion? Source: Kempinski and Murphy (2012). 
 Survivability Onion. Figure 96. 
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Figure 97. depicts an exaptive use of the MAAL armor strand, which contributes to 
the host system survivability by enhancing its ability to avoid being detected. Thermal 
signature is critical survivability, given the prevalence of thermal target acquisition systems 
on the battle field. MAAL strands have proven to have a unique capability to not only 
provide ballistic protection, but also to do so in a manner that can obscure thermal gradient 
on the vehicle hull behind the strand. This trait gives MAAL armor added survivability 
capability over traditional armors and makes it a suitable candidate for use in exhaust ports 
and radiator grills on vehicles. These are traditionally known to be vulnerable locations 
because by nature, they have a direct unprotected path to critical system components. 
Additionally, they project a highly detectable thermal signature. Traditional armors typically 
heat up around these ports. In contrast, MAAL strands’ air gaps allow the heat to flow and 
convect more easily to the environment without heating the MAAL strand material that 
would otherwise project detectable infrared radiation observable to threats. Further, the 
adaptive resilient dimensionality discussed previously also adaptively enhances this thermal 
signature mitigation effect. The closer the strand is to the heat source, the less mitigation of 
the signature. The further in front of the heat source, the better the thermal signature is 
obscured. The efficacy of this adaptation is shown in the upper left image of Figure 97. Here 




MAAL strands can be employed in an exaptive fashion to mitigate the thermal signature 
of a platform and its high infrared radiation areas. The image on the upper left shows a 
blow dryer in a nonshielded configuration and a MAAL shielded configuration. The 
nonshielded configuration gives off a highly visible thermal signature detected at 167.1° 
Fahrenheit. The MAAL-shielded configuration projects a much less detectable thermal 
signature, at 72.7° Fahrenheit.  
 Adaptive Resilient Thermal Signature Management: Exaptation. Figure 97. 
Degeneracy is a mode of adaption in which an artifact can serve as the means to 
conduct a prescribed function but is more appropriately qualified to accomplish other 
functions. Certain types of MAAL strands are transparent. This quality makes them 
potentially usable as a transparent armor. However, the MAAL strand may not be the most 
suitable transparent armor, because the strand is meant to be frangible, fragmenting in a 
ballistic event. If a ballistic glass window on a vehicle were damaged, and this viewport was 
mission critical to the function of the system, replacing that ballistic window with a MAAL 
strand could provide a degenerate-level transparent protection from thrown objects and some 
ballistic threats. The ballistic window is the ideal solution; however, a MAAL strand could 




MAAL strands can serve as a viewport. Although not ideal for a transparent armor, in 
certain circumstances or configurations, as shown in the operation view image on the left, 
the strands could serve or enhance the ballistic performance of a transparent armor. 
 Adaptive Resilient Transparent Armor: Degeneration. Figure 98. 
2. Adaptive Resilient External Reconfiguration 
External reconfigurations can occur through three ways: redundant scaling; 
progressive scaling; and replacement, repair, or healing. Redundant scaling is a form of 
external adaptation in which the means to overcome a disturbance are appropriate but 
insufficient or lacking the amount of resources needed to overcome the disturbance. Figure 
99.  shows how an adaptive resilient MAAL armor system could employ redundant scaling to 
increase the ballistic protection of a vehicle. This adaptation simply multiplies the number of 
strands in the trajectory of the threat projectile. The MAAL interface adaptor makes adding 
additional strands in a redundant fashion quick and simple, adding to the adaptive resilience 
of the system. The efficacy of this adaptation was shown quantitatively in Figure 93.  
 165 
 
Redundant scaling of an adaptive resilient MAAL armor consists of adding additional 
strands of the same size to the effector phase of the MAAL armor system. This adaptation 
is enabled by the MAAL interface adaptor, which allows the additional strands to be 
quickly added when needed.  
 Adaptive Resilient Armor: Redundant Scaling.  Figure 99. 
Progressive scaling is similar to redundant scaling in the sense that the original 
system lacks the magnitude of means to accomplish a task. However, it differs in the sense 
that instead of duplicating the means to accomplish the function, a single means of greater 
magnitude is applied. Figure 100. shows one of two ways to employ progressive scaling 
adaptively. If mass of the MAAL strand is of minimal concern, simply adding a heavier 
strand of MAAL will provide added protection, especially in instances in which a heavier 
than expected threat is encountered and ballistic protection must be scaled. The MAAL 
interface adaptor enables quick external reconfigurations. The efficacy of this adaptation was 




Mass progressive scaling of an adaptive resilient MAAL armor consists of adding strands 
of increased size and mass to the effector phase of the MAAL armor system. This 
adaptation is also enabled by the MAAL interface adaptor, which allows the heavier 
strands to be quickly added when needed.  
 Adaptive Resilient Armor: Mass Progressive Scaling.  Figure 100. 
Inertial progressive scaling of an adaptive resilient MAAL armor is a bit more 
refined, compared to the mass progressive scaling. Both methods employ the inertia and 
dynamic state of the MAAL strand to disrupt threat projectile. The mass approach to 
progressive scaling involves simply placing more mass in the trajectory of the threat 
projectile. Inertial progressive scaling, in contrast, employs selectively tuned MAAL strands 
to create optimal yaw and pitch disruptions on the threat projectile. It does not necessarily 
employ a MAAL strand of heavier mass. This is operationally shown in Figure 101. Figure 
91.  in Chapter IV showed the efficacy of inertial progressive scaling in enhanced ballistic 
protection. The 40–1 MAAL (lighter) strand outperformed the heavier 40–3 MAAL strand. 
The increased ballistic performance in this instance was attributed to optimal inertial 




Inertial progressive scaling employs selectively tuned MAAL strands to create optimal 
yaw, pitch, and roll disruptions on the threat projectile to reduce its penetration. It does 
not necessarily employ a MAAL strand of heavier mass. The pictures in the figure show 
how the threat projectile embedded into the first catcher plate of the MAAL system 
yawed and pitched.  
 Adaptive Resilient Armor: Inertial Progressive Scaling.  Figure 101. 
Replacement, repair, and healing adaptations are essentially the same as redundant 
scaling. A damaged MAAL strand can be replaced or repaired using a strand of the same 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY 
As discussed previously, traditionally engineered systems are disadvantaged in 
complex operating environment. Many of these systems lack the ability to maintain agile top-
level functionality in situations of rapid and significant requirement perturbations. This is 
disadvantageous because in complex operating environments, these systems are often placed 
in a reactionary and costly state of operation rather than in a proactive or adaptive position of 
strength. These systems lack the resilience in their design to resist or recover from the 
constantly changing requirements in complex operating environments. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to propose, demonstrate, and prove the validity, efficacy, and value of a 
methodology that integrates the attribute of adaptive resilience into these systems.  
Adaptive resilience enables a system to adapt its functional traits, structure, process, 
and/or identity in order to maintain or remain functionally effective in achieving its top-level 
functional requirements in complex operating environments. In order to achieve an adaptive 
resilient system, system designers and engineers must appropriately identify, account for, and 
incorporate the necessary range of adaptive capacity for early in the design and development 
process. Thus, a comprehensive integration methodology was needed that accounted for 
appropriate adaptive design considerations during the system’s design and development 
process.  
This dissertation research falls into the field of resilience engineering, which is placed 
most appropriately as a subdiscipline of systems engineering. This field of study has existed 
in environmental, operational, and enterprise system contexts for decades. Volumes of prior 
work and art exist in these contexts, but very little work exists in the context of realizing 
resilience in technological systems. In these contexts, resilience was shown to be beneficial in 
the Apollo 13 mission as well as in the New York City power failures associated with the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. These examples represent instances in which enterprise 
systems were resilient to operational perturbations because they had the necessary adaptive 
capacity allowing them adapt to the situations. These cases highlight how resilience is 
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achieved through adaptability; adaptability is enabled through the creation of adaptive 
capacity. Adaptive resilience highlights the crucial link between these concepts and 
inextricably links them into a single system attribute that can be incorporated into the design.  
This dissertation employed the fundamental steps of existing systems engineering and 
design processes as the basis for the MSIAR. These steps target, shape and apply the 
appropriate modes of adaptive capacity within a technological system; enabling it to achieve 
an enhanced state of functional resilience. This methodology can be used in standalone 
system design fashion or in a broader system design context that includes many attribute 
designs. The methodology consists of seven steps, each of which is binned under a 
fundamental step of the systems engineering process. The seven steps are as follows: 
 
1. Define adaptive design considerations 
2. Identify controllable/adaptive performance factors 
3. Characterize adaptive performance factor configurations 
4. Verify and validate adaptive performance factor configurations 
5. Map validated configurations to adaptive system components/modules 
6. Integrate adaptive components and configurations into system 
7. Verify and validate integrated component configurations and performance 
 
These steps were explained in detail in Chapter III. In Chapter IV, the steps were 
applied in a relevant case study involving the design of an adaptive resilient armor system. 
The case study used requirements from an existing CDD and decomposed them into adaptive 
design considerations. These constraints and considerations were used to identify controllable 
armor performance factors. These factors where then characterized and validated at 
achievable design configurations, mapped to components, integrated into a system, and 
verified and validated through ballistic experiments. The results of these experiments, as well 
a conceptual integration model, were presented in Chapter V.  
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B. CONCLUSION 
The methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience is shown to be a sound 
methodology for the creation of adaptive capacity within armor systems. The MSIAR 
enables technological systems to adapt physical component performance factors and realize a 
resilient state of operation in complex environments. This methodology was applied to the 
design of an adaptive resilient armor system, which served as a case study proof of concept 
for the methodology. This system was based on relevant operational requirements (GCV 
CDD) where, in a static traditional or contemporary system design, the top-level function 
would be at odds with other critical functions for the greater system of systems. The adaptive 
capacity, shaped by the three adaptive design considerations, provided the armor system 
component-level adaptability. This adaptability enabled the system to meet the top-level 
function of vehicle protection, while mitigating consequential parasitic capacity on adjacent 
functions such as vehicle mobility and transportability. This result is summarized in Table 8. 
The armor system provided a range of ballistic protection that handily met both the threshold 
and objective requirements. If the system’s ballistic protection state was suddenly insufficient 
to meet an evolving threat the host platform was facing, the integrated adaptive capacity 
provided the armor means to rapidly adapt to a sufficient protected state (up to the objective 
threat requirement). This adaptive capacity was enabled through internally and externally 
reconfigurable means that adapted to known and characterized adaptive factor configurations. 
The adaptive means created the adaptive capacity, which is the only way to achieve the 
desired goal of creating an adaptively resilient system.  
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Table 8.   MSIAR Results in Addressing the Adaptive Design Considerations 
 
 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This dissertation serves as an initial foray into integrating the attribute of adaptive 
resilience into a technological system. The proposed methodology merged concepts and 
principles from the maturing field of resilience engineering with system design and 
engineering principles. This methodology was demonstrated on a single case study involving 
the design of an adaptive resilient armor system, although it can be applied to any 
technological system that encounters complex operating environments and competing 
requirements. Future research efforts regarding the methodology should center on applying 
the methodology toward other systems that require adaptive resilience as a functional 
attribute. This future research should focus on refining the activities and processes associated 
with each step of the methodology.  
Specific process steps that require further refinement are the verification and 
validation steps. Because this system is more complicated and arguably more complex than 
are traditionally engineered systems, the verification and validation processes are also more 
complicated and complex. In the verification process, the complication and complexity arises 
even if the adaptations do not implicate other system aspects or performance requirements. 
Alternatively, if they do implicate these other system attributes, what level of implication is 
acceptable? This is a challenging; this methodology motivates its users to include factors that 
are more adaptive, thus making the system more resilient to top-level function failure. 
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However, with increased adaptive means, the potential for consequences affecting other 
systems grows. 
In addition, future research should focus on objectively quantifying adaptive 
resilience. This is a highly complex question—the value to which adaptive resilience is 
measured is only applicable to the top-level function of interest. In addition, the two types of 
resilience, resistance and recovery, are disparate in their circumstances and do not easily 
support a cumulative measure of resilience. Further, the increase in technical system 
complexity inherently increases risk in the areas of reliability, availability, and 
maintainability of the technical components that enable the system adaptations to occur. 
These components allow the requirements to be more resilient to perturbation and failure but 
may introduce resilience faults because of the potential increase in complicated mechanisms. 
A means to capture the top-level functional resilience holistically in the context of reliability, 
availability, and maintainability concerns is an obvious follow-on step for future research.  
This methodology also required the use of risk analysis to identify which level or 
scale of adaptive performance to place on a given system for its operating environment. In 
the context of an adaptive armor, an objective means to determine which protection level to 
employ for a given operation needs to be defined. The number of operational protection 
configurations presented to a commander are numerous. How does a commander determine 
where and when to apply a lighter or heavier version of the adaptive resilient armor system? 
When is mobility valued over protection? When is it wise to use a lower level of protection in 
the unknowable complex operating environment? Currently, these types of questions can 
only be subjectively answered based on the experience and judgement of the user. An 
objective way to define the appropriate adaptive configuration for a given complex operating 
environment is another area of future research that must be pursued for such a system 
capability. 
This dissertation research resulted in the design of an actual adaptive resilient armor 
system with relevant and significant capability. This armor design was demonstrated in a 
proof-of-concept fashion and therefore requires further verification and validation. Detailed 
ballistic characterization that statistically validates efficacy in ballistic protection would serve 
as a first step. In addition, proofing the armor system against threats that are more lethal and 
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demonstrating the performance benefits of progressive and redundant scaling would be of 
value. Another intriguing result of this dissertation research was the significant difference in 
performance between the MAAL strand widths. The 40–1 MAAL strand significantly 
outperformed the 40–2 and 40–3 MAAL strands. There was contention among those who 
performed the tests whether this was the result of the different moments of inertia between 
the strand sizes, the mass impulse difference on the material mechanics of the projectiles after 
impact on the MAAL strands, or merely an anomalous experimental result. Further 
experimentation with more suitable measurement equipment for this experimental end could 
solve this intriguing question. 
This methodology may inspire many applications for integrating adaptive resilience 
into technological systems. These questions and many more will arise as this approach to 
systems engineering and design is further expanded and employed. Adherence to the 
fundamental principles of systems engineering will serve as a guidepost in answering these 
complex questions. The methodology for the system integration of adaptive resilience has the 
potential to eliminate many of the system tradeoffs that have limited the functional utility of 
systems that operate in complex operating environments. The methodology also has the 
potential to enhance operational effectiveness of systems that continually encounter 
operational challenges that stress or overmatch their ability to maintain top-level 
functionality. With proper discipline and application, this methodology could enable users to 
significantly enhance the resilience of the systems they are designing.  
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EPILOGUE 
THE NEED FOR ADAPTIVE RESILIENT SYSTEMS: A HYPOTHETICAL 
VIGNETTE ALTERNATE ENDING 
 
The crack of the PTRS-41 sniper rifle destroyed the brief calm of the Manekandow 
Valley. The dismounted patrol returned overwhelming fire at all suspected enemy fighting 
positions on the opposite side of the valley. However, the fire was ineffective. The sniper 
exfiltrated from his position before the patrol could return fire. A hidden photographer further 
up the valley recorded the incident and the actions of the Spartan Brigade Patrol. The gunner 
in the targeted HMMWV screamed for a medic. The patrol medic approaching the vehicle 
noticed a smoking hole in the driver-side door armor of the vehicle. The crew cabin was 
filled with smoke and screams. The gunner dropped from his cupola, still screaming. As the 
medic opened the passenger-side door, he saw the driver’s door swing open. The HMMWV 
driver emerged hacking and coughing, uninjured from the antimateriel rifle’s projectile. He 
ran to the passenger side to assist the medic. The gunner’s leg was sprayed with spall and 
shrapnel, left when the projectile penetrated the vehicle—a minor but painful injury. The 
smoke erupting from the open doors was from a smoke grenade, which luckily had stopped 
the bullet before it struck the driver, a catastrophic result narrowly averted. The patrol leader 
approached the vehicle and looked at the gaping hole torn in the armor from the sniper’s 
bullet. He radioed to the remaining vehicles of the patrol to adapt their armor systems to an 
increased level of protection enabled by the adaptive capacity integrated during the armor 
system’s design. This change would likely implicate their mobility on the remainder of the 
patrol, but the added protection was worth it. Upon return to the patrol base, the patrol leader 
could debrief the Commander and make a recommendation to progressively scale the 
protection of their vehicles on future patrols with the available heavier armors. The enemy 
had adapted its tactics to counter the new armored vehicles. However, these vehicles were 
thoughtfully designed with adaptive resilience in mind. The fleet was ready to counter any 
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1 1 DTA216836 19207 MAAL DEMONSTRATION STAND 1 Assembly
2 2 DTA216722 DTA216836 19207 ROLLING FRAME 1 Existing
3 2 DTA216837 DTA216836 19207 TOP PLATE 1 Part
4 2 DTA216841 DTA216836 19207 RAIL BASE ASSEMBLY 2 Assembly
5 3 DTA216840 DTA216841 19207 RAIL MOUNT PLATE 1 Part
6 3 9338T5 DTA216841 39428 LINEAR BEARING 2 Hardware
7 3 MS24667-24 DTA216841 19207 FLAT HEAD CAP SCREW 8 Hardware
8 3 MS27183-8 DTA216841 19207 FLAT WASHER 8 Hardware
9 3 MS45913/1-010CG8Z DTA216841 19207 LOCKNUT 8 Hardware
10 2 DTA216932 DTA216836 19207 ACTUATOR MOUNT WELDMENT 2 Weldment
11 3 DTA216844 DTA216932 19207 ACTUATOR MOUNT ARM 1 Part
12 3 DTA216931 DTA216932 19207 ACTUATOR MOUNT REINFORCEMENT 1 Part
13 2 MS27183-10 DTA216836 19207 FLAT WASHER 40 Hardware
14 2 MS35338-44 DTA216836 19207 LOCKWASHER 40 Hardware
15 2 B1821BH025C100N DTA216836 HEX SCREW 40 Hardware
16 2 95647A141 DTA216836 39428 PLASTIC WASHER 2 Hardware
17 2 91259A119 DTA216836 39428 SHOULDER SCREW 1 Hardware
18 2 MS27183-18 DTA216836 19207 FLAT WASHER 4 Hardware
19 2 MS35338-48 DTA216836 19207 LOCK WASHER 4 Hardware
20 2 B1821BH050C150N DTA216836 HEX SCREW 2 Hardware
21 2 DTA216842 DTA216836 19207 ROD ASSEMBLY 2 Assembly
22 3 DTA216875 DTA216842 19207 ROD END ASSEMBLY 1 Assembly
23 4 DTA216843 DTA216875 19207 ROD END 1 Part
24 4 9440T37 DTA216875 39428 FLANGED BEARING 2 Hardware
25 3 95475A720 DTA216842 39428 STUD 1 Hardware
26 3 6649K27 DTA216842 39428 HARDENED SHAFT 1 Hardware
27 2 DTA216845 DTA216836 19207 BAR 1 Part
28 2 DTA216839 DTA216836 19207 CHAIN ANCHOR ASSEMBLY 16 Assembly
29 3 DTA216838 DTA216839 19207 CHAIN ANCHOR 1 Part
30 3 DTA216872 DTA216839 19207 LEAF CHAIN STRAND 1 Assembly
31 4 BL866 DTA216872 LEAF CHAIN ROLL 1 Hardware
32 3 90692A775 DTA216839 39428 ROLL PIN 1 Hardware
33 2 91259A720 DTA216836 39428 SHOULDER SCREW 2 Hardware
34 2 12387303-18 DTA216836 19207 HEX JAM NUT 2 Hardware
35 2 12387303-34 DTA216836 19207 HEX JAM NUT 2 Hardware
36 2 2236K6 DTA216836 39428 LINEAR ACTUATOR 2 Hardware
37 2 93131A510 DTA216836 39428 CLEVIS PIN 4 Hardware
38 2 98335A127 DTA216836 39428 HITCH PIN CLIP 4 Hardware
39 2 3838 DTA216836 0RVK9 T-NUT 68 Hardware
40 2 91263A844 DTA216836 39428 FLAT HEAD CAP SCREW 52 Hardware
41 2 DTA216854 DTA216836 19207 ROD STOP 2 Part
42 2 B1821BH050C125N DTA216836 HEX SCREW 2 Hardware
43 2 DTA216851 DTA216836 19207 TUBE 2 Part
44 2 DTA216852 DTA216836 19207 TUBE 1 Part
45 2 5913K64 DTA216836 39428 BASE MOUNT BALL BEARING 5 Hardware
46 2 DTA216948 DTA216836 19207 NUT PLATE 5 Part
47 2 MS27183-14 DTA216836 19207 FLAT WASHER 34 Hardware
48 2 MS35338-46 DTA216836 19207 LOCK WASHER 10 Hardware
49 2 B1821BH038C100N DTA216836 HEX SCREW 10 Hardware
50 2 1497K101 DTA216836 39428 KEYED SHAFT 1 Hardware
51 2 1497K961 DTA216836 39428 KEYED SHAFT 1 Hardware
52 2 DTA216849 DTA216836 19207 BOX ASSEMBLY 2 Assembly
53 3 DTA216847 DTA216849 19207 BOX BACK 1 Part
54 3 DTA216846 DTA216849 19207 BOX FRONT 1 Part
55 3 DTA216848 DTA216849 19207 BOX SIDE 2 Part
56 3 DTA216938 DTA216849 19207 COVER 1 Part
57 3 MS27183-10 DTA216849 19207 FLAT WASHER 2 Hardware
58 3 B1821BH025C200N DTA216849 HEX SCREW 14 Hardware
59 3 M45913/1-4CG8Z DTA216849 19207 LOCK NUT 14 Hardware
60 2 6236K323 DTA216836 39428 SPROCKET 14 Hardware
61 2 DTA216935 DTA216836 19207 KEY 14 Assembly













63 2 DTA217096 DTA216836 19207 CHAIN STRAND, #40-3 6 Assembly
64 3 00151513 DTA217096 8X276 OFFSET LINK 1 Hardware
65 3 40-3 RIV CHAIN DTA217096 2B510 CHAIN STRAND 10 Hardware
66 2 DTA217097 DTA216836 19207 CHAIN STRAND, #40-1 1 Assembly
67 3 6261K173 DTA217097 39428 CHAIN STRAND 1 Hardware
68 3 6261K263 DTA217097 39428 OFFEST LINK 1 Hardware
69 3 6261K193 DTA217097 39428 STRAIGHT LINK 1 Hardware
70 2 B1822BS080R DTA216836 FLAT WASHER 16 Hardware
71 2 91202A238 DTA216836 39428 LOCK WASHER 16 Hardware
72 2 91280A527 DTA216836 39428 HEX SCREW 16 Hardware
73 2 B1821BH038C250N DTA216836 HEX SCREW 12 Hardware
74 2 M45913/1-6CG8Z DTA216836 19207 LOCK NUT 12 Hardware
75 2 DTA216954 DTA216836 19207 INDEX PLATE 1 Part
76 2 6435K18 DTA216836 39428 SHAFT COLLAR 1 Hardware
77 2 DTA216949 DTA216836 19207 HANDLE ASSEMBLY 1 Assembly
78 3 DTA216950 DTA216949 19207 HANDLE WELDMENT 1 Weldment
79 4 DTA216952 DTA216950 19207 COUPLER, MODIFIED 1 Assembly
80 5 6412K45 DTA216952 39428 COUPLER 1 Hardware
81 4 DTA216953 DTA216950 19207 HANDLE PLATE 1 Part
82 3 6308K44 DTA216949 39428 HANDLE 1 Hardware
83 3 MS35338-46 DTA216949 19207 LOCK WASHER 1 Hardware
84 3 12387305-9 DTA216949 19207 HEX NUT 1 Hardware
85 3 DTA216951 DTA216949 19207 KEY 1 Assembly
86 4 98510A136 DTA216951 39428 KEY STOCK 1 Hardware
87 3 MS27183-7 DTA216949 19207 FLAT WASHER 1 Hardware
88 3 MS35206-246 DTA216949 19207 MACHINE SCREW 1 Hardware
89 2 90293A139 DTA216836 39428 QUICK RELEASE PIN 1 Hardware
90 2 DTA217083 DTA216836 19207 BRACKET 1 Part
91 2 2236K14 DTA216836 39428 CONTROL BOX 1 Hardware
92 2 2236K16 DTA216836 39428 HAND SWITCH FOR TWO ACTUATORS 1 Hardware
93 2 MS27183-8 DTA216836 19207 FLAT WASHER 4 Hardware
94 2 MS35206-338 DTA216836 19207 MACHINE SCREW 2 Hardware
95 2 M45913/1-010CG8Z DTA216836 19207 LOCK NUT 2 Hardware
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APPENDIX C. MAAL MATERIAL FAILURE ANALYSIS  
ME 3202 Failure Analysis Project: Analysis of Modes of Failure for Adaptive 
Armor Chains Following Destructive Testing  
By Tongli Lim, Tanya McKnight, Patrick Stewart, and Ken Foos, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, Spring 2016. 
1. Failure Problem Background and Visual Observations  
Our team’s failure analysis project involved roller chain samples that were subjected 
to ballistic tests. This was a deliberate failure experiment in support of Mr. Joseph Cannon’s 
doctoral dissertation and was conducted to support development of a new armor system 
called mechanically adaptive armor linkage (MAAL). In this application, the roller chains 
were used as a mechanical barrier to disrupt ballistic threats and prevent direct damage to its 
primary platform or vehicle.  
The roller chains are manufactured by a U.S. company called Timken. The roller 
chains’ primary function is to provide power transmission in mechanical drive mechanisms; 
the chains have an average service life of 15,000 hours. The chains are manufactured through 
heat treatment and range from 300 and 600 series stainless steel to nonstainless ANSI carbon 
steel. The roller chains consist of roller links, rollers, link plates, and pins. The rollers and 
link plates are shot peened for enhanced strength. Initially, the chain’s material composition 
was uncertain. The temperature range during testing was the ambient temperature of the 
building, and anticipated use in the field did not exceed the 340°F threshold. Hence, the 
material properties in the catalog were used as a baseline for the material samples. There was 
no direct comparison between the estimated number of cycles to failure and the observed 
number of cycles because of the differences in anticipated loads and use. The samples were 
well greased, and no noticeable surface corrosion was seen. Observation of failure was 
documented by high speed, slow-motion video through top and side views. The videos 
clearly revealed that failure occurred from single ammunition rounds piercing through the 
samples. All projectiles approached orthogonal to the flatter side of the chains at speeds 
between 2800 and 2900 feet per second (fps). Tests varied between two strands of the 
MAAL with a 3″ gap between with a 9″ standoff from the aluminum witness (backing), two 
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strands of the MAAL back to back with a 9″ standoff from the aluminum witness, or a single 
strand of the MAAL backed with a 0.065″ polycarbonate cover and a 9″ standoff distance. 
All chains were hung down freely in a vertical position, and all chains studied were hit by 
either a .30- or .50-caliber M2 armor piercing (AP) round. The moments of inertia of the 
chain varied in the samples, which led us to believe that one of the specimens could have 
experienced a greater plastic deformation than the other (less inertia and a greater 
deformation). More deformation is preferable as the projectile will expend more energy 
interacting with the chains, and the projectile’s trajectory will be disrupted. 
 
 
Figure App-1: Ballistic Test on MAAL. 
 
Because of the high impact nature of the ballistic tests (see Figure App-2), the MAAL 




Screenshot of top view for video B15077-15 and screenshot of side view for video 
B15077-15.  
Figure App-2: Screen Shots of Ballistic Test Carried Out on MAAL. 
 
 
Figure App-3: Close up View of Parts to Be Analyzed. 
 
Hence, the group narrowed the analysis to three parts of interest. Preliminary 
examination of these parts showed (a) fracture surfaces were not uniform; fractures were 
observed on the first, second, or third chain of both 40–2 and 40–3 chains; (b) plastic 
deformation on all three parts seemed to indicate ductile fracture of the MAAL; the plates 
appeared elongated prior to fracture; (c) fractures occurred at areas away from the impact 
site, indicating that energy from the round also dissipated to the rest of the MAAL; (d) the 
surface of the chains was found to be well greased with no noticeable corrosion; and (e) tests 
included hardness test, optical microscope, scanning electron microscope (SEM), and 
electron dispersive spectroscopy (EDS) to help determine the type(s) of failure and material 
composition and to allow us to make recommendations in improving MAAL.  
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2. Hypothesis  
The mode of failure for the chains occurred because of impact fracture. However, it 
was interesting to note whether the mode of fracture was brittle or ductile in nature. As 
shown in Figure App-4, a ductile mode of fracture was preferred because it meant that more 
energy was absorbed by the chains, thereby reducing the impact on the vehicle that the chains 
were protecting.  
 
 
Figure App-4: Stress Strain Curve (Brittle vs Ductile Fracture). 
a. Brittle Fracture  
Brittle fractures occurred without appreciable deformation and propagated through 
rapid crack movements. The direction of crack propagation was usually perpendicular to the 
direction of the applied stress and resulted in a relatively flat fracture surface. In addition to 
the absence of plastic deformation at the macrolevel, brittle fractures usually were 
characterized by grainy or shiny textures with “chevron” markings pointing to the crack 
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initiation site. At the microlevel, crack propagation occurred along grain boundaries, 
depicting intergranular fractures.  This phenomena is shown in Figure App-5. 
 
   
Figure App-5: Brittle Fracture Example (Macro and Micro Appearance).  
b. Ductile Fracture  
Ductile fractures typically occurred with considerable plastic deformation. Necking 
usually started with microvoids forming in the interior of the cross-section, which coalesced 
to form an initial crack that grew in a direction parallel to its major axis. As a result, “cup-
and-cone” features were commonly seen at the macrolevel, and they were usually rougher, 
compared to features seen with brittle fractures. At the microlevel, ductile fractures were 




Figure App-6: Ductile Fracture Example (Macro and Micro Appearance). 
3. Scanning Electron Microscope and Electron Dispersive Spectroscopy  
The SEM produced highly magnified images and greater fields of depth compared to 
an optical microscope because of the use of electrons and electromagnets instead of light and 
lenses to create an image. An electron gun at the top of the SEM generated electrons that 
traveled along a vertical path; an electromagnetic field focused the electron beam onto the 
sample. The bombardment of electrons onto the sample caused the sample to release 
electrons that were detected and converted into a signal to produce an image. The images 
were used to identify ductile and brittle fracture modes visually. Ductile fracture displayed 
features such as microvoids or dimples that coalesced to create tears or ruptures in the 
material. Brittle fracture displayed features such as cleavage facets with little to no 
deformation.  
Additionally, accessory equipment on the SEM such as the x-ray spectrometer 
permitted the detection and analysis of x-rays (accomplished in EDS) to determine the 
composition of the sample. In EDS, the sample interacts with the electron beam as it does in 
SEM; however, x-rays instead of electrons are detected and analyzed. As the electron beam 
strikes the sample, electrons from the beam knock out electrons in shells of atoms within the 
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sample. In order to fill these holes and minimize potential energy, electrons from higher 
energy states within the atom drop down to fill the holes, and in doing so, release x-rays that 
correspond to an energy difference between the two states.  
The energies of these x-rays were characterized, providing the identity of the 
elements within the sample. SEM in conjunction with EDS was used to determine fracture 
mode and composition of the chain drives. Three samples—40-2, 40-3a, and 40-3b—were 
placed under the SEM for imaging, and EDS was performed on all samples (40-2, 40-3a, and 
40-3b) as well as on a polished sample to determine material composition. Samples analyzed 
are shown in Figure App-7.  
 
  
From left to right: 40-2, 40-3a, and 40-3b. 
Figure App-7: Samples Analyzed by SEM/EDS. 
a. Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) Results  
The SEM images at 3000x and 5000x magnification show dimples or microvoids in 
the material, indicating the final fracture was ductile in nature. In addition, some of the 
dimples were “flattened,” suggesting that the material was smashed following plastic 
deformation and fracture. It is likely that impact from other portions of the chain or flying 
fragments struck the chain after failure, producing the “flattened” dimples. The dimples had 
the appearance of being pulled, which was probably a result of being struck by a high 
velocity object such as a projectile. Figure App-8 shows SEM images of the dimples (left and 
middle) and flattened dimples (right) of the fractured samples.  
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Figure App-8: SEM Images Ductile Fracture (3000x and 5000x). 
 
  
Figure App-9: SEM Image of Surface Outside of Fracture Site. 
 
SEM images captured away from the fracture site show damage on the material’s 
surface, indicating that the chain was exposed to some form of impact energy away from the 
primary fracture sites.  
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Images also show that the structure was martensitic in nature because of the needle 




Figure App-10: SEM Image of Martensitic Microstructure. 
4. Electron Dispersive Spectroscopy Results  
EDS of the original sample shows the drive chains were composed of iron (98 
weight% Fe) and trace elements (0.28 weight% Si, 00.14 weight% Cr, and 0.80 weight% 
Mn), as shown in Figure App-11. The lack of chromium and nickel amounts typical in 
stainless steel indicate that the material was a plain carbon steel.  
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Figure App-11: EDS Results for Original Sample. 
EDS was also performed at locations containing a high degree of residue. Figure 
App-12 shows an SEM image of one such area (boxed in red). The area boxed in red was 
analyzed using EDS, and the results yielded a high concentration of lead and trace amounts 
of copper, which was likely a result of the projectile and/or projectile fragments depositing 
material on the chain drive.  
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Figure App-12: EDS Results for Fractured Sample. 
5. Optical Microscope Results  
Two samples of the chains (one each from 40–2 and 40–3) were mounted into pucks 
and polished. Following acid etching, the samples were examined using optical microscopy 
at various magnifications. Multiple examples were seen on the surface of what appeared to be 
impact damage. No telltale signs of brittle fracture were noted (e.g., chevrons). Some general 
grain elongation was seen, and visual observations supported the conclusion of a ductile 
failure mode.  
 
 
Top-left: 25x; Top-middle: 100x; Top-right: 100x; Bottom-left: 500x; Bottom-middle & 
Bottom Right: 100x magnification. 
Figure App-13: Optical Microscope Images of 40–3 MAAL strand.  
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6. Vickers Hardness Test  
The Vickers Hardness Test was used to determine the hardness of the MAAL 
material. Because the sample from MAAL was relatively small, the Vickers Hardness Test 
was a better alternative for determining hardness, compared to the Rockwell Hardness Test, 
which is usually used for larger samples. The Vickers Hardness Test uses a diamond tip in 
the form of a square-based pyramid. This tip then forms an indentation on the surface of the 
material. Unlike the Rockwell Hardness Test that measures the depth of indentation, the 
Vickers Hardness Test observes the surface area of the indentation as compared to the load. 
Figure App-14 shows the polished samples and the Vickers Hardness Tester evaluating the 
samples. 
Results from the hardness test revealed that the hardness of the fractured sample and 
that of the unaffected sample were not very much different. In addition, it was found that 
hardness near the pinhole of the roller links was higher than that at the center of both 
samples. Finally, the fractured surface revealed a higher hardness, compared to its center, 
possibly because of strain hardening of the fractured surface. This strain hardening was most 
likely from manufacturing and not a result of the projectile striking the MAAL.  
 
  




Figure App-15: Center of Original Sample. 
7. Final Analysis  
From the results described, it was concluded that the chains failed in a ductile manner 
because of impact from the projectile. At the macrolevel, the chains were observed to have 
undergone plastic deformation, resulting in rough and elongated surfaces. At the microlevel, 
the formation of microvoids and dimples seen in the SEM, as well as the trans-granular 
propagation of the fracture, confirmed that the mode of failure was ductile in nature. In 
addition, at the fracture sites, copper-toned colors were observed. These were confirmed via 
EDS to consist of lead and copper, which were constituents of the projectile. This meant that 
fractures occurred because of the direct impact of the projectile. As seen from the video, 
fragments from the impact could have also affected other portions of the chains, resulting in 
secondary or tertiary fracture sites. This was confirmed by the “flattened” dimples in the 
SEM images. In addition, EDS determined the chains were plain carbon steel, as shown by 
the low composition of nickel and chromium. SEM also confirmed the martensitic structures 
of the steel. Hence, we recommend a material of higher ductility be used for the chains.  
a. Short-Term Recommendations  
Austenitic steels, such as 304 or 316 stainless steel, are recommended as a 
replacement material for the current chains because of their high ductility. They are usually 
more than double the ductility of martensitic steels and thus will be better able to absorb and 
distribute the impact of the projectile. Other options could involve exploring the use of heat 
treatment and alloying elements to produce a combination of beneficial microstructures and 
mechanical properties.  
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APPENDIX D. GLOSSARY 
Adapt: Changing of a process, identity, form, or function to accommodate emerging 
purposes or situations more effectively. 
Adaptive capacity: Adaptive capacity can be defined as a system’s ability adapt or absorb a 
functional disturbance without completely losing operational performance toward a 
top-level function. 
Adaptive performance factors: Adaptive performance factors are the system attributes, 
factors, or parameters that can be readily changed or adapted to scale a system’s 
functional performance or output.  
Adaptive resilience: Is a system attribute which enables a system to adapt its functional 
traits, structure, process, and/or identity in order to maintain or regain functional 
effectiveness in satisfying its top-level functional requirements.  
Areal density: A measure of mass for complete armor recipe per area, typically pounds per 
square foot or kilograms per square meter. The measure leaves out the thickness 
dimension because the complete composition of armor materials is used despite its 
thickness. 
Armor: A shield of a material that serves to prevent, disrupt, or mitigate a penetrating 
mass/projectile from entering a protected volume. 
Attractor: A set of physical properties or states toward which a system tends to converge, 
regardless of the system’s starting conditions. 
Attribute: An innate quality, characteristic, or feature of a system. 
Complexity: A system trait in which the functional state of the system is not static, cyclic, or 
random but uncertain. 
Degeneracy: A mode of adaption in which an artifact can serve as the means to conduct a 
prescribed function but is more appropriately qualified to accomplish other functions. 
Deterministic: A system trait in which a system always produces the same output from a 
given starting condition or initial state—in other words, lack of randomness. 
Resilience engineering: An engineering field of study whose technical objective is to realize 
and bring about resistance to functional disruptions or recovery when those disruption 
produce system failure. 
Engineered resilient systems: A DOD acquisition project which applies the tools, processes 
and other mean to realize resilient system acquisition processes. These processes are 
aimed at delivering trusted and effective “out of the box” systems which are suitable 
in a wide range of contexts and easily adapted to many other contexts through 
reconfiguration or replacement 
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Robustness: A system state where a broad set of functional states are accommodated at the 
expense of optimal design and functionality in those functional states. A system 
which is a jack of many trades, but master of none. 
Equifinal, -ility: Like deterministic, a system trait in which the product or result is always 
the same. 
Exaptation: A type of adaptation in which existing means are employed in novel ways when 
exposed to new environments and challenges. 
Extensibility: The ability or capacity of a system to expand its functional capability to 
achieve new or emerging requirements and functions. 
Mass efficiency: An efficiency measure of how an armor design employs its mass defeating 
a threat projectile. The efficiency is compared to the equivalent required efficiency of 
rolled homogenous armor. (See Equation 3)  
Modularity: A system attribute that describes the degree to which a system’s components 
may be separated and recombined. 
Obliquity: The incidence angle in which an armor plate interacts with a threat projectile. 
(See Figure 39. ) 
Operational variation: An internal reconfiguration through which the means to accomplish 
a task are adapted when met with failure. 
Top-level function: A top-level function is a system or subsystem’s fundamental qualitative 
function. For example, an armor system’s parent function is to prevent penetration. 
Systems functionally fail when their parent function cannot be achieved.  
Parasitic Capacity: Underutilized functional capability that detracts from adjacent 
functional capability within a system.  
Perturbation: A disruption of a system or process from its regular or normal state of 
function, caused by an outside influence. 
Progressive scaling: An external reconfiguration in which the magnitude of the contributing 
means is adaptively scaled to accomplish the task. 
Reallocation: An internal reconfiguration in which similar unemployed means are pulled 
from another area of a system to contribute to the accomplishment of a task. 
Recovery: A systems ability to adapt functional traits and attributes along adaptive 
performance factors in order to top-level functionality in the face of severe 
perturbation. For example, an armor system with inherent recovery abilities could 
reconfigure its adaptive performance factors in a fashion that enabled it to regain and 
maintain its parent functionality to protect against a threat after it has been penetrated 
by that threat 
Redundant scaling: An external reconfiguration in which the means contributing to the 
accomplishment of a task is adaptively duplicated and thus scaled to accomplish the 
task. 
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Resilience: A system attribute that describes the system’s ability to withstand, resist, or 
recover from functional perturbations and disruptions.  
Resistance: A system’s innate ability to withstand or overcome a diverse set or magnitude 
functional challenges and/or perturbations and maintain top-level functionality. For 
example, a highly resistant armor has the ability to withstand penetration from a 
broad range of penetrating threats, or several impacts from the same threat. 
Trait: A distinguishing quality or characteristic of a system. 
Trajectorial mass: The mass of the volume of material on the same trajectory and 
width/diameter of the threat projectile. 
V50 ballistic limit: The ballistic limit or limit velocity is the velocity required for a particular 
projectile to have a 50% probability to penetrate a target or armor. 
Validation: A set of tests, experiments, and actions used to check the compliance of a system 
element, process, or task requirements with its purpose and functions. 
Verification: A set of tests, experiments, and actions used to check the correctness of a 
system element, process, or task requirements with its purpose and functions. 
Volumetric efficiency: An efficiency measure of how an armor design employs its volume 
defeating a threat projectile. The efficiency is compared to the equivalent required 
efficiency of rolled homogenous armor. (See Equation 4.) 
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